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FALLING DOWN ON THE JOB:
WORKERS' COMPENSATION SHIFTS FROM
A NO-FAULT TO A WORKER-FAULT PARADIGM
"I will work harder." Boxer, in George Orwell's Animal Farm
DEAN J. HAAS*

I.

INTRODUCTION

"Oh, priest of signs, disquieted creature, caught in the temple of all alphabets. . ."I is a poetic depiction of the uninitiated's attempt to define unifying principles from the labyrinthine law emanating from fifty state workers' compensation systems. Workers' compensation benefit payment
programs consumed $45.9 billion in 2000, and they represent this country's
primary allocation of publicly mandated funds to safety and health in the
2
workplace.
* Dean J. Haas received his J.D. (with distinction) from the University of North Dakota in
1983 and an LL.M. in Health Law (honors) from the University of Houston in 2001. Haas received a B.S. in economics and accounting from the University of North Dakota in 1980. This
article was written in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Master of Law. Haas
served as Assistant Attorney General and Counsel to the North Dakota Workers' Compensation
Bureau from 1984-1995. Haas' private practice at Dietz, Little & Haas from 1995-2000 included
significant representation of injured workers. Haas is currently employed by the Office of the Attorney General- Natural Resources Division. The views expressed in this article are those of the
author, not the Attorney General.
1. ALLEN WHEELIS, THE PATH NOT TAKEN: REFLECTIONS ON POWER AND FEAR 11 (W.W.
Norton & Co., 1990) (quoting Elias Canetti). The passage is an existential pondering about life
and reads as follows: "Oh, priest of signs, disquieted creature, caught in the temple of all alphabets, your life will soon be over. What have you seen? What have you feared? What have you
accomplished?" Id. The National Commission on State Workmen's Compensation echoed these
sentiments, noting that a "bewildering array of provisions were described.... We can appreciate
that State legislators and other officials have difficulty understanding workmen's compensation."
THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS 123
(1972)
(hereinafter
N AT'L COMM 'N REPORT), available
at
http://www.workerscompresources.com (last visited June 5, 2003); see also infra note 544.
2. DANIEL MONT ET AL., WORKERS' COMPENSATION: BENEFITS, COVERAGE, AND COSTS,
2000 NEW ESTIMATES, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SOCIAL INSURANCE at 1 (June 2002), available
at www.nasi.org (click Workers' Compensation, then Reports) (last visited April 5, 2003). Mont
reports:
Workers' compensation benefit payments for workers with job-related injuries or illnesses were $45.9 billion in 2000.... [Hlowever, benefit payments declined in 2000
to 1.03[%] of covered payroll from 1.04[%] of payroll in 1999. Employer costs for
workers' compensation in 2000 were $56.0 billion, an increase of 2.8[%] from 1999.
Relative to total wages of covered workers, employer costs declined in 2000 to
1.25[%] of covered payroll from 1.32[%] of covered payroll in 1999.
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The workers' compensation bargain in which employees exchange the
right to sue employers in tort in lieu of "sure and certain relief' in the form
of medical and disability benefits has a storied history. 3 In 1972, benefits
were so low that a national commission was appointed to study state workers' compensation systems. 4 The National Commission made several recommendations, most of which advocated eliminating coverage exclusions
and increasing benefits, since many workers receiving workers' compensa5
tion were below the poverty level.
This first wave of reform in the 1970s and 1980s increased benefits to
more reasonable levels. 6 The second wave of reforms, beginning in the late
1980s, consisted of benefit reductions and procedural mechanisms designed
to reduce "skyrocketing" costs. 7 Current data indicates that benefit rollbacks reduced costs from sixty-one billion dollars in 1993 to fifty-six billion dollars in 2000, significantly raising insurer profits. 8 Most remarkable
is empirical data that indicate injury rates did not fall while costs rose. 9

Id. at 1.
3. See generally Martha T. McCluskey, The Illusion of Efficiency in Workers' Compensation "Reform," 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 657, 670-71 (1998) (explaining the history and origin of
workers' compensation). N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-01 provides:
The State of North Dakota, exercising its police and sovereign powers, declares that
the prosperity of its wage workers depends in a large measure upon the well-being of
its wage workers, and hence, for workers injured in hazardous employments, and for
their families and dependents, sure and certain relief is hereby provided regardless of
questions of fault and to the exclusion of every other remedy, proceeding, or compensation ....
N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-01 (2001). The bargain metaphor in which workers receive "sure and
certain relief' in exchange for giving up "every other remedy" is the ground upon which workers'
compensation is constructed. All citations to the North Dakota Century Code are to the version
effective in 2001, unless otherwise noted.
4.
5.

NAT'LCOMM'NREPORT, supra note 1, at 13-14.
Id. at 15-27.

6. McCluskey, supra note 3, at 662.
7. McCluskey, supra note 3, at 662; see also Meg Fletcher & Michael Schachner, Managed
Care Taking offin Work Comp, Bus. INS., June 14, 1993, at 3 (projecting that workers' compensation costs, then at $60 billion, would rise to $140 billion by the year 2000).
8. See DANIEL MONT ET AL., WORKERS' COMPENSATION: BENEFITS COVERAGE, AND
COSTS, 1997-1998 NEW ESTIMATES, STATEMENT ON WORKERS' COMPENSATION BENEFITS AND
COSTS TO ACCOMPANY THE MAY 4, 2000 RELEASE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION BENEFITS
AND COSTS, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SOCIAL INSURANCE (May 2000), Table B, at 4, (noting that

"[a]s benefits and costs declined in the 1990s, insurer profitability quickly improved. The period
from 1994 to 1997 was the most profitable period in at least twenty years for workers' compensation insurance"). The report available online has been replaced by DANIEL MONT ET AL.,
WORKERS' COMPENSATION: BENEFITS COVERAGE, AND COSTS, 1999 NEw ESTIMATES AND
1996-1998 REVISIONS (May 2001) available at http://www.nasi.org [Workers' Compensation,
then Reports] (last visited April 5, 2003). Mont states in the 2001 report that "[d]eclining workers' compensation benefits and costs in the mid-1990s combined with a vibrant economy and high
financial market returns enabled insurance companies to earn more income from invested premiums. This led to very high profits by historical standards in the workers' compensation insurance
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Studies indicate that although safety programs reduce injury rates and
costs, most injuries are caused by well-known work hazards that could have
been prevented.10 The workers' compensation bargain has not provided
industry." Id. at 11. North Dakota's fund is also in much better financial health today. 19971999 N.D. WORKERS' COMPENSATION BIENNIAL REP. According to its biennial report:
The financial stability of the Fund improved substantially during the 1997-1999 biennium. The Fund's balance went from a $1 million surplus as of June 30, 1997, to a
$44 million surplus as of June 30, 1999. The Fund's contingency reserve (set aside to
prepare for large unexpected losses) went from $62 million to $160 million during the
1997-1999 biennium.
Id. The Bureau's financial situation has continued to improve. The Bureau reports that its premium rates continue to fall, "2.6% for fiscal year 2000, and 11.3% for fiscal year 2001." 19992001 N.D. WORKERS' COMPENSATION BIENNIAL REP., at 2,
available at
http://www.workforcesafety.com/library/documents/other/99-0IBiennialReport.pdf (last visited
July 15, 2003). From 1999 to 2000, the Fund's unreserved surplus rose from $91 million to $129
million, and its reserve fund surplus has improved to $212 million (short $38 million of its quarter
of a billion dollar goal). Id. at 26. According to its January 31, 2003 press release, "In 2002,
North Dakota employers paid the lowest workers' compensation premium rates in the nation....
North Dakota employer premium rates have declined for eight straight years ....
Press Release,
North Dakota Workers' Compensation Bureau, New Study Ranks North Dakota Workers
Compensation's Premium Rates Lowest In The Country, (Jan. 31, 2003) available at
http://www.workforcesafety.com/news/press-releases/News-release-2003-01-31.htm (last visited
July 15, 2003). While the Bureau announced its first premium increase in nine years in a June 27,
2003 press release, premium assessments remain low. Press Release, North Dakota Workers'
Compensation Bureau, Small Premium Increase for Employers, (June 27, 2003) available at
http://www.workforcesafety.com/news/press-releases/News-release-2003-06-27.htm (Last visited
July 15, 2003). The primary reason for premium increases in 2003 appears to be falling investment returns rather than any increase in benefits paid to workers.
In the past, employers have often been confused by the Bureau's marketing, trumpeting continually falling rates while the total premium dues are not falling. If rising productivity and higher
wage payments cause employers to pay an increasingly large workers' compensation total premium, then the employer rightfully may rejoice, and the State may brag.
However, employers are concerned with premiums paid, not simply with rates. Even in times
when the Bureau announces rate decreases, its premium collections may not fall. The Bureau may
raise the amount of compensation (payroll) on which workers' compensation premiums are paid,
allowing the rate to fall, but increase the premium due, as occurred in 2003.Individual employers
may be affected differently also, especially if their experience rating shows high claim exposure,
in which case the employer pays a higher premium. Sometimes an individual risk classification
will be adjusted higher, even while most other rates fall, significantly affecting some employers.
There are different risk classifications according to the risk of injury, and each classification is
accorded its own premium "rate." Thus the "rate" on which payroll is taxed may not always be
the best method to determine the amount of premium paid. I use the word tax purposefully because although workers' compensation is insurance, it is also mandatory and run by the state. In a
bankruptcy case dating back to the mid 1980s, as Bureau counsel, I successfully argued to the
bankruptcy court that workers' compensation premiums are in essence a tax and entitled to the
preference in bankruptcy accorded to taxes.
9. See Emily A. Spieler, PerpetuatingRisk? Workers' Compensation and the Persistence of
OccupationalInjuries, 31 HOUS. L. REV. 119, 140-45 & n.80-101 (1994) (citing data from an unpublished study completed by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH);
NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS 37 (1980); and data from the BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BULLETIN 2399, OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES AND ILLNESSES IN
THE UNITED STATES BY INDUSTRY, 1990, at 1 (1992)).
10. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, Occupational Injury Panel, Occupational Injury Prevention, in INJURY CONTROL IN THE 1990S: A NATIONAL PLAN FOR ACTION 329
(1992) (hereinafter CDC REPORT). "[O]ccupational injuries should not be regarded as inherent in
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employers with sufficient incentive to optimize safety efforts.11 Yet, the
sense is that accidents are the fault of workers, and payments to workers redistribute scarce resources from employers to workers. 12
The workers' compensation bargain incorporates moral and political
judgments about how resources should be distributed.13 Over time, the
visible nature of the employer's half of the bargain ($56 billion in payments
in 2000) overshadows the employee's half (release of tort liability) because
it is not measured, rendering it invisible.14 As a result, a view has emerged
that workers' compensation payments constitute social welfare.t 5 The focus on reducing employer costs attains righteous status when economic efficiency arguments are utilized. Yet, these efficiency arguments obscure
the nature of the bargain and raise questions as to the proper allocation of
16
resources between employers and workers.
State legislatures have concluded that reducing workers' compensation
benefits or diminishing access to those benefits increases efficiency and allows the State to compete for jobs.17 This analysis is mistaken. First, it in-

the workplace, nor should they be acceptable. Occupational injury is an enormous and costly
problem. Most incidents resulting in worker injuries are preventable and could be averted if
known prevention strategies were more widely implemented." Id.
11. Spieler, supra note 9, at 187-88.
[T]he current methodology for the distribution of costs associated with occupational
hazards fails to encourage improved safety practices among many employers for two
reasons. First, costs are not spread in a manner which provide financial incentives to
many employers to engage in primary prevention.... Second, despite the apparent
internalization of costs, employers do not pay the full costs of injuries.
Id. at 187.
12. Id. at 211-13. "The argument that worker, rather than employer, behavior is the primary
cause of cost escalation has its roots in the idea that the occurrence of injuries, the filing of claims,
and the persistence of disability all lie within the independent control of workers." Id. at 211.
13. McCluskey, supra note 3, at 820-22. "The purported efficiency rationales for maintaining and even widening the gap between disability benefits and economic losses mask distributive choices about how much workers deserve to be compensated for work injuries and illnesses.
Reforms limiting disability benefits are about moral judgments, not economic incentives." Id. at
820.
14. Spieler, supra note 9, at 232.
15. McCluskey, supra note 3, at 820-22.
16. See id. at 716-67 (criticizing the efficiency arguments). McCluskey argues:
Economic analysis makes the crucial distinction between redistribution and efficiency
by assuming that some costs are inevitable while other costs are expendable.... The
central problem with efficiency analysis is that it begs the key question of how to distinguish between appropriate and inappropriate costs. In essence, efficient policies are
defined as those which eliminate unnecessary costs but accommodate necessary costs,
without providing adequate grounds for that distinction.
Id. at 723.
17. See McCluskey, supra note 3, at 689-90 (citing New York and Pennsylvania as examples of states concerned with remaining competitive). For example, when I was counsel for the
North Dakota Workers' Compensation Bureau, there were frequent discussions about North Dakota wishing to retain a "competitive advantage" over neighboring Minnesota, which had higher
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correctly assumes that workers are the cause of most injuries.1 8 On the
contrary, employers control the workplace, and since most injuries are attributable to well-known hazards, the focus, instead, should be on employer
safety.19 Injury, therefore, may be viewed as a cost employers impose on
workers, rather than a cost that workers impose on industry. 20 Reduction in
benefits, then, is not simply a matter for economic analysis to determine the
"efficient" level of benefits. Rather, it is a question of distributive value.
Lower benefits could mean more jobs, but it could also mean more injuries.

compensation costs. The problem of downward pressure on benefits due to competition among
states has been a longstanding concern in workers' compensation and has provoked unsuccessful
attempts to federalize workers' compensation. John F. Burton Jr., Reform at the State and Federal
Levels: Lessons from Workers' Compensation, 1995 WORKERS' COMPENSATION Y.B. 1-176, 1177. The 1972 National Commission recognized the problem of employers' relative elasticity of
labor demand by describing competition for low-benefit states as "the spector of the vanishing
employer." NAT'L COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 125. The Bureau continues to boast about
its low premium rates on its website, never drawing the obvious correlation between low rates and
low benefit levels. The Bureau has contended that its benefits are above average. This may be
true, but these broad measurement mechanisms cannot register the many exclusions and difficulty
in obtaining benefits.
18. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text. "The employer's ability to affect claims
filing behavior is directly tied to the inequality of the employment relationship. The 'culture' of
the workplace ... and not safety therefore becomes the primary, rather than a secondary, cause of
workers' compensation claims and costs." Spieler, supra note 9, at 220. Spieler notes that "the
economic and political equilibrium of the workers' compensation system prior to the 1970s may
have been built on the chronic underreporting of claims." Id. at 219. Spieler cites Professor
Terence Ison for the proposition that "the ratemaking process primarily encourages employers to
oppose and discourage claims, rather than to promote safety." Id. at 233-34 (citing Terence G.
Ison, The Significance of Experience Rating, 24 OSGOODE HALL L. J. 723, 736 (1986)). She further notes, "Premium discount provisions generally fail to solve the problem that financial incentives tend to encourage many employers to circumvent rather than reduce injuries." Id. at 252; see
infra notes 127, 422 and accompanying text.
19. See supra notes 10-18 and accompanying text. Oregon was the only state where there
were successful reductions in costs, attributing much of it to "the enforcement of the Oregon
OSHA (OR/OSHA) plan [which] was substantially strengthened." Spieler, supra note 9, at 26061.

20. McCluskey, supra note 3, at 724-30.
In his famous article, Coase argued against the predominant view that economic efficiency can be achieved through government policies aimed at internalizing externalities.... Following Coase's reasoning, whether work accidents are a cost workers
impose on employers or a cost employers, consumers, or others impose on workers is
not a question of positive science that can be resolved by objective application of neutral economic principles, but rather a question of values.... Coase's view of harm as
reciprocal shows the absurdity-or perhaps the atrocity-of the search for objective
economic criteria for cost allocation ... (citing R. H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE
MARKET, AND THE LAW, 95-96 (1988) (reprinting R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social
Cost, 3 J.L. ECON. 1 (1960)). By portraying "what is a cost of what" as a question answerable by objective economic principles, the "cost internalization" theory of workers' compensation obscures the question of who should be held responsible for work
accident costs (quoting Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387, 395-96 (1981)). The answer to that question
depends on political power and cultural norms.
Id. at 726-28 & n.264.
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Economic efficiency analysis does not purport to determine the appropriate
allocation of resources. 21
The recommendations of the 1972 National Commission have not been
fulfilled. Since the reforms of the 1990s, many states, including North Dakota, have backtracked on progress toward improving benefit levels and access to benefits. Economic efficiency concerns do not justify benefit reductions, and reforms illustrate a gradual change in the perception of the
workers' compensation bargain from one of no-fault to one of worker fault.
Rather than blame workers for high costs, the focus should be on optimizing safety. Some employers have fallen down on the job neglecting safety.
Contrary to the worker-fault paradigm, workers are not responsible for most
accidents. 22
Increasing access to and levels of workers' compensation benefits, as
advocated by the National Commission, are reasonable goals. 23 North Dakota, a penultimate agriculture state,2 4 has yet to extend coverage to agriculture workers or to workers with little political power.25 North Dakota
should do so. North Dakota has limited workers' access to vocational rehabilitation 26 and substantially limits permanent total disability benefits for
older workers, reducing benefits upon reaching retirement age. 27 Full disability benefits should be restored to these workers.

21. Id. Economic analysis uses the terms "externalities," "moral hazard," and "transactions
costs" as inefficient and therefore to be avoided. See Pierre Schlag, The Problem of Transaction
Costs, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1661, 1664-68 (1989) (discussing the inefficiency of externalities and
transaction costs); see also McCluskey, supra note 3, at 750 (discussing the inefficiency of moral
hazard). However, there are no economic grounds to distinguish inefficient costs from efficient
prices, which in economic theory results from the pursuit of self-interest by parties. Just as "externalities" cannot provide objective economic criteria to determine the efficient level of workers'
compensation benefits, "transaction costs" also fail to do so. Pierre Schlag shows that the concept
of "transaction costs" is indeterminate and subject to the same deficiencies as "externalities."
Schlag, supra, at 1665. Likewise, "moral hazard" does not provide an objective economic determination of the proper rate of compensation for workers since employers and workers have a reciprocal relationship in which the reduction in the moral hazard of workers increases the moral
hazard of employers. McCluskey, supra note 3, at 747; see also Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of
Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237, 275 (1996).
22. Supra note 10 and accompanying text.
23. See NAT'L COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 15-27 (recommending increasing benefits
and eliminating coverage exclusions).
24. Benson v. N.D. Workmen's Comp. Bureau, 283 N.W.2d 96, 103 (N.D. 1979). The
court stated, "North Dakota, being the most agricultural of all states, has never hesitated to grant
to agriculture, as its most important industry, legislative preferences." Id.
25. See Haney v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 518 N.W.2d 195, 196 (N.D. 1994) (upholding the legislative exclusion of agricultural workers from compensation coverage); see also
infra notes 199-221 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 358-368 and accompanying text.
27. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 65-05-09.3 to -09.4 (Supp. 2001).
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North Dakota should liberalize its vocational rehabilitation so that
North Dakota's workers do not have to become pizza deliverers and tele28
marketers.
North Dakota also ended permanent partial disability by terminating
partial disability claims after five years of benefit payments. 29 This limitation is harsh and should be repealed, as should reduction in benefits under
the "aggravation statute." 30 North Dakota's focus on reducing workers' access to counsel represents a short-sighted view and reallocates resources
away from workers toward employers. 31 This redistribution of resources is
also illustrated by the fact that most fraud investigations have been devoted
32
to worker fraud, rather than employer or provider fraud.
North Dakota is one of five states that operate an exclusive state fund
to insure workers' compensation risk. Nevada has recently amended its
statutes to allow private insurance. 33 North Dakota's legislature considered
legislation to allow the Bureau to administer its own budget without legislative appropriations, but the bill was defeated. 34 The apparent goal is "privatization." 35 In 2003, the legislature defeated a bill that would have al28. See Zimmerman v. Valdak Corp., 1997 ND 203, TJ4, 570 N.W.2d 204, 205 (noting that
the Bureau denied vocational rehabilitation benefits to a young man whose right arm was lost in
an accident, for he was not catastrophically injured and did not have lost earnings capacity since
he could continue to work delivering pizzas).
29. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-10(2) (Supp. 2001).
30. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-15 (Supp. 2001). The statute reduces benefits if the worker
has a "preexisting condition" prior to work injury. See infra notes 315-318.
31. See infra notes 477-493 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 510-514 and accompanying text; see also MALCOLM K. SPARROW,
LICENSE TO STEAL 2-11 (Westview Press, 1996). Sparrow contends that the extent of health care
provider fraud is not known, but he believes it to be significant. Id. at 55-75.
33. S. 37, 1999 Leg., 70th Sess. (Nev. 1999); see generally Nevada Industrial Insurance Act,
NEV. REV. STAT. 616A-616D (2000 & Supp. 2001) (containing all state law regulating private
workers compensation insurance).
34. H.R. 1281, 57th Leg. Sess. (N.D. 2001). This bill passed the House by a fifty-three to
forty-five vote. STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA, JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE 722 (57th Leg. 2001). When
the bill reached the Senate, however, it was overwhelmingly defeated by a forty-four to two vote.
STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA, JOURNAL OF THE SENATE 830 (57th Leg. 2001). In addition, if
passed, House Bill 1419 would have required the Legislative Council to "conduct an independent
study of the effects on competition on workers' compensation premium, anticipated impact on
workers, and coverage of small, medium, and large employers." H.R. 1419, 57th Leg. Sess. (N.D.
2001). The House voted eighty-three to twelve in favor of the study. STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA,
JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE 728 (57th Leg. 2001). However, the Senate voted it down twenty-five to
twenty-four. STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA, JOURNAL OF THE SENATE 932 (57th Leg. 2001).

35. Randy Bradbury, Workers' Compensation Wants to Move a Step Closer to Privatization, BISMARCK TRIB., Jan. 21, 2001, at 1A. In the Tribune's interview with the Bureau's former
director, Paul Kramer, (the Bureau now has a new director, Brent Edison, formerly in a law firm
that represented the Bureau in litigation) it was admitted that privatization would allow other insurance companies the opportunity to come into the state to compete for sale of workers' compensation insurance policies. Id. The failure of the legislature to study privatization leaves the impression that it will not be any time soon that private insurers are allowed to compete with the
State Fund to sell workers' compensation insurance in North Dakota.
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lowed private insurers to write workers' compensation coverage in North
Dakota.36 The legislature, however, granted the Bureau a name change. 37
Whether the legislature eventually authorizes private insurance, North
Dakota should utilize this opportunity to focus on workers' compensation
and disentangle the administrative oversight function of the Bureau from its
insurance function, and create two legal entities. 38 The first entity, the State
Fund, will serve the insurance function. The legislature should create a
second state agency, the North Dakota Workers' Compensation Insurance
Commission, to administer the State Act. The oversight agency regulates all
insurers, whether insurance is purchased from the State Fund or extended to
include self-insurance or private insurance. If the legislature takes this first
step-allocating the insurance function to the state fund and the oversight
function to a new commission-it seems likely that subsequent legislatures
will be more receptive to authorizing competition for employers' insurance
dollars.

There has been an explosion of interest in "privatization" in a wide variety of contexts, from social
security accounts to schools, prisons, and governmental services, but there has been insufficient
attention to retaining political accountability. See generally Jack M. Beerman, Privatizationand
PoliticalAccountability, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1507 (2001). Beerman follows Cass's categorizations of privitization efforts-divestiture, contracting out, deregulation or vouchers, and tax reductions or user fees. Id. at 1520-1545 (citing Ronald A. Cass, Privatization:Politics, Law and
Theory, 71 MARQ. L. REV. 449 (1988)). Allowing private insurers to compete with the exclusive
state fund falls under the deregulation rubric. It is difficult to fathom that North Dakota could renounce all regulatory oversight of the workers' compensation industry. No state in the Union has
done so or is likely to. See generally infra, notes 454-476 and accompanying text.
36. STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA, JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE 389 (58th Leg. 2003). House Bill
1304, introduced in the 2003 legislature, was defeated in the House eighty-seven to four. Id. The
Bill, laudable in objective, did not provide direction for adequate implementation. The Bill directed that "[tihe Bureau and the insurance commissioner shall adopt rules as necessary to implement this section." H.R. 1304 § 5, 58th Leg. Sess. (N.D. 2003). The Bill does not take into account the complexities involved, including a bifurcation of the Bureau's current duties, devolving
them to two entities: an insurer and an oversight agency. See infra notes 454-476 and accompanying text. It is the primary aim of this article to encourage a thoroughly prepared effort to accomplish this goal in the legislature.
37. H.R. 1605 § 3, 58th Leg. Sess. (N.D. 2003). House Bill 1065, introduced in the 2003
legislature, amends North Dakota Century Code section 65-02-01. 1, providing that the Workers
Compensation Bureau shall henceforth be known as the "workforce safety and insurance ...organization." Id. The focus on a triviality such as the Bureau's name seems an important symbol
of misplaced priority. Shakespeare said in Romeo and Juliet, "A rose by any other name would
smell as sweet", and the Third Reich claimed that its demand at Munich was not an ultimatum
because the document was titled "memo." SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET, act 2, sc. 1;
MARTIN GILBERT, A HISTORY OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY, VOLUME TwO, 229 (Harper
Collins 1998). "The deceptive use of words... was... to constitute a major distortion of reality .... [D]uring the Munich crisis, when Hitler handed Chamberlain a document with his latest
demands, Chamberlain told the Fuhrer indignantly, 'But this is an ultimatum'. Hitler took the
document back from him, studied it for a moment, and then said: 'Ultimatum? Not at all. Look, it
is headed "Memorandum".'
GILBERT, supra at 229. The point is that the Bureau's name change
is insignificant to reality. This article continues to refer to the newly named agency as the Bureau
because the article was written prior to passage.
38. See infra notes 454-476 and accompanying text.
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The commingling of the administrative and insurance functions contributes to the unfair application of the workers' compensation laws and the
continuing pressure by the agency or insurer on the legislature to restrict
benefits. The agency is quite responsive to employer's demands to reduce
premiums and is correctly concerned with its economic and actuarial
health. 39 There is almost no constituency remaining to speak for workers.
Redistribution of resources from workers to employers must end. This article looks forward to a time when the Consumer Reports headline "Workers'
Compensation: Falling Down on the Job"40 is no longer true.
II.

THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BARGAIN

Labor has been the subject of a vast and contentious scholarship among
economists, historians, and sociologists. 4 1 Social and economic theory has

39. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-04-02 (Supp. 2001) (stating that "the bureau shall maintain adequate reserves to ensure the solvency of the fund and the payment of future benefit obligations,
based upon actuarially sound principles").
40. Workers Comp: Falling Down on the Job, CONSUMER REPORTS (Feb. 2000), available
at www.consumerreports.org [use search function, "workers compensation"] (last visited June 19,
2003). One of the featured injured workers in the article was a North Dakotan. Id. Consumer Reports concluded:
Workers deserve more help from the workers-compensation system than they're getting. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration should persist in its enforcement and regulatory efforts to make the workplace safer. ... Congress should
revive standards set by the National Commission on State Workmen's Compensation
Laws.... States should audit their workers-comp systems to see whether they're too
restrictive. States should also tighten deadlines for decisions and fine parties that delay, to discourage "starve out" tactics.
Id. But see Susan J. Anderson & Gerald Deloss, Are Employees Obtaining "Sure and Certain
Relief' Under the 1995 Legislative Enactments of the N.D. Workers' Compensation Act?, 72 N.D.
L. REV. 349, 385 (1996) (examining the effect of legislative changes on employee recovery). Anderson and Deloss criticize some of the legislative incursion into the value of the bargain to workers but approve others in the name of cost efficiency, concluding that "employees must take cuts
so that the Bureau is able to reduce the $228 million unfunded liability." Id. at 385. The authors
do not take account of the fact that the Bureau had reduced premiums for many years in the 1980s
and had (and has) lower workers' compensation premiums than most other states. The primary
criticism is that the authors do not appear to be aware that the appropriate level of workers' compensation benefits is a distributive value judgment, not an objective question of economic efficiency.
41. See e.g., Price V. Fishback & Shawn E. Kantor, Did Workers Pay for the Passage of
Workers' Compensation Laws? 110 Q.J. ECON. 713 (1995) (analyzing the economic impact of
workers' compensation); EDWARD BERKOWITZ & KIM MCQUAID, CREATING THE WELFARE
STATE 43-46 (Rev. ed. 1992) (arguing that workers' compensation represented a compromise
between capital and labor that benefited both employees and employers); Richard A. Epstein, The
HistoricalOrigins and Economic Structure of Workers' Compensation Law, 16 GA. L. REV. 775,
776 (1982) (delineating four historical stages of the development of workers' compensation);
James Weinstein, Big Business & The Origin of Workers' Compensation, 8 LAB. HIST. 156, 15960, 169 (1967) (noting the argument that workers' compensation was a project of liberal hegemony cloaked as humanitarian reform, and that socialist groups have different demands than more
conservative labor groups).
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significantly contributed to the evolution of work accident law. 42 As the in43
dustrial revolution proceeded, the tort system did not evolve apace.
Common-law principles held an employer responsible for injury or death of
employees if the injury resulted from the negligence of the employer.4
Until the development of the fellow-servant exception, the principle of
vicarious liability extended an employer's liability for acts of his employees
to injured fellow-servants.4 5 Unfortunately for workers, the industrial age
was fast approaching at the time the fellow-servant rule was developed and
followed in the United States. 46 This defense, one of the three common-law
tort defenses called the "unholy trinity," frequently barred employees from
recovery against an employer for work-place injury.4 7 The fellow-servant
doctrine and its analog defense, assumption of risk, were based upon notions of contract. 48 Upon entering employment, the employee assumed the
risk of fellow employee negligence because the employee was as likely to
49
know of his or her deficiencies as the employer.
Farwell v. Boston & Worcester Rail Road Corp.50 firmly established

the principle in American law. 5 1 The court concluded that unlike a passenger of the railroad who did not contract to assume the risks of passage, an
employee was in a better position to reduce the risk of accidents. 52 The as-

42. See supra note 41.
43. See Epstein, supra note 41, at 777-86 (describing the employee and employer relationship during the 1800's).
44. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL, PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 80, 569 (5th ed. 1984). The
duties of the employer at common law were the "duty to provide a safe place to work ... to provide safe appliances, tools, and equipment for the work ... [and] to give warning of dangers of
which the employee might reasonably be expected to remain in ignorance." Id.
45. 1 ARTHUR LARSON, WORKER'S COMPENSATION LAW § 2.05, 7 (1999). Under the theory of vicarious liability, the master was strictly liable for the negligence of his servants.
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 44, § 69, at 499-500. While the employer may not be negligent
by his or her own acts or ommissions, the action itself is based on negligence. Id. at 499. That is,
the fault of the servant would result in the master's liability to third parties, which had, until development of the fellow-servant rule, encompassed employees. I LARSON, supra, § 2.02-03, at 3.
46. 1 LARSON, supra note 45, § 2.03, at 3-4.
47. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 44, § 80, at 569. The unholy trinity consists of contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and the fellow-servant rule. Id. Prosser stated that "[t]he
effect of these defenses was to relieve the employer of responsibility even though he, or his other
servants, had failed in respect of the specific obligations for the protection of the servant.... [Assumption of risk and the fellow-servant rule] in particular offered formidable obstacles to any recovery for the usual industrial accident." Id.
48. See id. at 570-71 (discussing the employment bargain made between employer and employee).
49. Id. at 571.
50. 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 49 (1842).
51. 1 LARSON, supra note 45, § 2.03, at 4.
52. Farwell, 45 Mass. at 57-59. Prosser stated:
The reasons usually assigned for it [the fellow-servant rule], however, were that the
plaintiff upon entering the employment assumed the risk of negligence on the part of
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sumption of risk defense was based on the contractual concept that an employee was free to accept or reject employment, so the employee thereby
voluntarily accepted the hazards of the work. 53 The defense of contributory
negligence precluded recovery even if the employee was less negligent than
the employer.5 4 Unfortunately, the concept continues to serve as a defense
55
in certain limited circumstances.

his fellow servants, and the master did not undertake to protect him against it; that he
was as likely to know of their deficiencies and to be in a position to guard against
them as his employer; and that it would promote the safety of the public and of all servants to make each one watchful of the conduct of others for his own protection.
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 44, § 80, at 571. Prosser further commented:
While these reasons might perhaps have been appropriate to small enterprises and
shops, where the workers had close contact and acquaintance with one another, they
had little validity in the case of large industries, where the plaintiff might be injured by
the negligence of a fellow servant whom he had never seen.
Id. Professor Spieler's thesis illustrates this very point: employers are not sufficiently incentivized
to maximize safety efforts, and workers are not in a position to significantly impact injury and
occupational disease rates. Spieler, supra note 9, at 180-260; see also supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
53. Farwell, 45 Mass. at 57.
54. 1 LARSON, supra note 45, § 2.03, at 5. Prosser noted that the doctrine of contributory
negligence barred recovery in any circumstance that the worker did not "exercise reasonable care
for their own safety." PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 44, § 80, at 527. Prosser commented:
The defense was of course subject to all of the rules usually applicable to it, and the servant might
recover if it could be found that the master had the last clear chance, or that his conduct was willful or wanton. But it frequently meant that a momentary lapse of caution on the part of the worker
was penalized by casting the entire burden of his injury upon him, in the face of continued and
greater negligence of the employer.
Id. The liberalization that subsequently evolved included the elimination of contributory negligence except in mitigation of damages. I LARSON, supra note 45, § 2.04, at 6-7. However, it is
alarming to note the continued survival of this doctrine in workers' compensation law. See infra
note 55.
55. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-28(5) (Supp. 2001). The North Dakota Century Code provides:
If an employee undertakes activities, whether or not in the course of employment,
which exceed the treatment recommendations of the employee's doctor regarding the
work injury, and the doctor determines that the employee's injury or condition has
been aggravated or has worsened as a result of the employee's activities, the bureau
may not pay benefits relative to the aggravation or worsening, unless the activities
were undertaken at the demand of an employer.
Id. While the statute appears reasonable at first blush, the usual circumstance of application is to
deny benefits to a human being who does not run on a track like a trolley, and whose daily activities are not easily negotiable without expending energy, which may exceed the precise clinical
restrictions imposed by a doctor. The Bureau has applied the statute capriciously, but the court has
held that "the Bureau must prove the claimant knew of the specific work restrictions and intentionally engaged in activities exceeding those restrictions before benefits can be denied based on
aggravation of a prior injury." Holen v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 2000 ND 145, T 13, 615
N.W.2d 141, 144-45 (citing Tangen v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 2000 ND 135, 5 23, 613
N.W.2d 490, 496). The court stated that "[any other interpretation of N.D.C.C. § 65-05-28(5)
would violate the no-fault nature of the Workers Compensation Act, and seriously erode the 'sure
and certain relief' which lies at the heart of the workers compensation system." Tangen, 5 23, 613
N.W.2d at 495-96.
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In the traditional story of genesis, workers' compensation is presented
as a child born of a rare alliance between labor and capital. 56 According to
this story, employers and employees entered into the "workers' compensation bargain," a quid pro quo in which an unpredictable tort system was replaced by a simple nonadversarial, no-fault substitute. 57 The exchange was
said to benefit both employees, who gave up full tort damages to accept
predictable no-fault compensation, and employers, who gave up tort defenses and accepted the responsibility to fund the no-fault liability
scheme. 58
The story of the bargain is often told without sufficient reference to
history, minimizing or ignoring the strong opposition of many labor
groups. 59 Legislative and judicial changes had already weakened em6
ployer's tort defenses, reducing the employee's gain from the exchange. 0
For example, the Federal Employer's Liability Act of 1908, which covered
employees of common carriers engaged in interstate or foreign commerce,
provided that contributory negligence served only to mitigate damages and
eliminate the fellow-servant defense. 6 1 Some capitalists embraced workers'
compensation as a better alternative to a more comprehensive German
model of disability compensation and as a useful tool to blunt social organizing in the United States.62 The North Dakota Worker's Compensation
Despite the court's limitation on application of the statute, the logic used to resurrect a form
of contributory negligence on the part of the worker to bar recovery is unsound. The statute is
inconsistent with reasonable principles of work injury law. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-28(5).
This is yet another provision which serves to shift the workers' compensation bargain ever so
slightly in favor of employers.
Workers' compensation law also excludes, on the theory of worker fault, "a willfully selfinflicted injury, including suicide." N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(11)(b)(2) (Supp. 2001). It also
excludes "injury caused by the use of intoxicants or the illegal use of controlled substances." N.D.
CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(1 1)(b)(3). The burden of proving intentional injury or intoxication is on
the party asserting it, but drug testing that establishes a concentration level at a specified amount
creates a presumption that "the injury was due to [drug] impairment." N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-0111 (Supp. 2001). In Kackman v. North Dakota Workers' Compensation Bureau, 488 N.W.2d 623
(N.D. 1992), the court affirmed the Bureau's factual determination that the workers' suicide was
not causally related to the work injury or its effects. Kackman, 488 N.W.2d at 624. Thus, the
court did not reach the issue whether to apply the strict "New York" or "English" rule, which requires psychosis or physical damage to the brain, or the more leninient "chain-of-causation" test,
which "would have allowed compensation for the suicide if the work injuries directly resulted in
[the worker] losing normal judgment and being dominated by a disturbance of the mind, thus
causing [the worker] to commit suicide." Id. at 624-25. The chain-of-causation test is more true
to modem principles of compensation law.
56. McCluskey, supra note 3, at 670.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 669-80.
59. Weinstein, supra note 41, at 168-70.
60. Id. at 159.
61. Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1997).
62. Weinstein, supra note 41, at 168-70.
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Act-one of three major bills sponsored by the Non-Partisan League-was
passed in 1919.63
Several state courts initially concluded that workers' compensation deprived employers of property in violation of due process because the statutes provided liability without fault. 64 However, the United States Supreme
Court upheld the New York workers' compensation program on the theory
of the bargained for exchange of tort liability for no-fault compensation,
diminishing fears that workers' compensation was social welfare. 65
The metaphor of the workers' compensation bargain as a voluntary
compromise that benefits all was borrowed from economic theory, which
argued that voluntary agreements between competing interests promote efficiency in an unfettered market. 66 An efficient result is one that maximizes
aggregate resources. 67 Whether the efficiency of workers' compensation is
real, or largely metaphorical, is open to debate and is frequently criticized
by employers and employees alike.
Early economic theory assumed that the cost of workers' compensation, ostensibly borne by employers, was priced into the cost of the product
or service. The forceful statement that the cost of production "bears the
blood of the working man" 68 was reformulated to the dispassionate claim

The German workers compensation plan consisted of three distinct funds. Each fund
was assigned to provide a separate kind of benefit and included the sickness, accident
and disability insurance funds. German employees were required to contribute twothirds of the sickness fund and one-half of the disability insurance fund. Employers
alone contributed to the acccident fund and contributed the remaining portions of the
sickness and disability insurance funds.
Clare Hochhalter & Dean J. Haas, An Introduction to N.D. Workers' Compensation, 64 N.D. L.
REV. 173, 178 n.43 (1988) (citing 1 ARTHUR LARSON, WORKER'S COMPENSATION LAW, § 5.10
(1985)).
63. Hochhalter & Haas, supra note 62, at 179 nn.47-48 (citations omitted).
64. 1 LARSON, supra note 45, § 2.07, at 13-15.
65. New York Cent. R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 201-02 (1917). The court noted:
It perhaps may be doubted whether the State could abolish all rights of action on the
one hand or all defenses on the other, without setting up something adequate in their
stead.... The statute under consideration sets aside one body of rules only to establish
another system in its place.
Id. at 201.
66. See Kennedy, supra note 20, 445 (noting that efficiency analysis would likely continue
"given its enormous apologetic usefulness"). Kennedy stated that the use of efficiency as a "scientific" justification to restrain liberal social policies of social justice on grounds that "elementary
economic laws" make equity inconsistent with efficiency. Id. Kennedy further argued, "The concept of efficiency is indeterminate- it cannot yield an answer-if we try to apply it to the whole
system of private laws." Id. at 388. See also McCluskey, supra note 3, at 820.
67. McCluskey, supra note 3, at 672.
68. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 44, § 80, at 573 n.49 (citing commentators using
this phrase dating back to 1911).
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that economic loss of injury is efficiently shifted to consumers. 69 This is
said to "internalize" the cost to industry, a bedrock economic principle necessary to ensure efficient allocation of resources. 70
A.

THE BARGAIN PARADIGM

Despite increasing costs, there is little evidence that employers expend
significant efforts to prevent occupational injury and disease. 7 ' But, industry and public health experts agree that injuries at work are largely preventable. 72 Professor Spieler has provided one answer to this paradox: the bar73
gain paradigm fails to provide incentive to minimize workplace accidents.
She argues that safety efforts will improve if there is a shift in the belief
system-so that employers take responsibility for safety, rather than assume
that their employees' actions are the cause of accidents, claim filings, and
costs.

74

The famous bargain, where workers exchanged tort damages for sure
and certain relief while employers exchanged paying compensation for immunity from liability, is considered a bargain between equals. 75 However,
employers have control over the workplace conditions leading to injury and
superior knowledge for accident prevention. 76 The no-fault scheme has important ramifications. "Industrial carnage was almost universally viewed as
an inevitable, albeit unfortunate, consequence of modern industrial enterprise." 77
The perceived inevitability of work injury creates an environment in
which employers recognize no responsibility for work injury. 78 Immunity
from tort liability does not discourage negligence or unsafe workplaces. 79
The no-fault paradigm shields employers from legal liability for failing to
eliminate work hazard and shields employers from a sense of moral obligation to reduce risks of injury. 80
69. Walter Oi, An Essay on Workmen's Compensation and Industrial Safety, in I Supplemental Studies for the National Commission on State Workmen's Compensation Laws 42 (1973).
70. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
71. Spieler, supra note 9, at 123.
72. Id. at 125.
73. Id. at 238-39.
74. Id. at 238-244. "[Employers] tend to see the causes of high costs in the actions of
workers (who file unnecessary claims)[] [and] outsiders (such as doctors and lawyers who benefit
financially from the system) ...
I."
Id. at 239.
75. McCluskey, supra note 3, at 670.
76. CDC Report, supra note 10; see Spieler, supra note 9, at 211-13.
77. Spieler, at 164.
78. Id. at 164-68.
79. Id. at 169-70.
80. Id. at 170.
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Workers' compensation insurance further serves to shield employers
from the consequence of allowing an unsafe work environment. 81 The very
"purpose of ... insurance is to protect the person liable from the consequences of his liability; in so far as this protection can be bought at a reasonable price, the economic deterrent effect of liability disappears." 82
While many experts believe that experience rating encourages safety,
there are countervailing arguments. Actuarial certainty grows as information concerning an employer's payroll and level of hazard accumulates over
the years. 83 According to actuarial principles, frequency of injury is more
susceptible to accurate forecast than injury severity. 84 A small employer
provides more risk; a single severe injury can significantly alter actuarial
projections. 85
Some studies suggest a relationship between experience rating and increased safety efforts.86 However, these studies show that the relationship
exists only as to larger businesses. 87 A study from Upjohn suggests that a
large reason for variations in workers' compensation costs is due to corporate culture, high retention rates, more training, and aggressive accident
prevention strategies.88 Prevention strategies do work. 89 Studies show that
most injuries are due to old and familiar hazards, not new ones. 90
The no-fault paradigm, with the accompanying belief in the inevitability of injury and lack of employer responsibility, evolves to the worker-fault
paradigm when combined with the view that employees are in a position to
control the incident of accidents, claim filings, and costs. 91 This view of the
bargain pays lip service to safety with little true conviction. This evolving
paradigm represents no progress from the early tort system, which assumed
that employees were in the best position to manage accident rates. The ine-

81.

Id. at 168-70.

82. Id. at 186 (quoting FELICE MORGENSTERN, DETTERENCE AND COMPENSATION: LEGAL
LIABILITY IN OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH 65 (1982)).

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 196-97.
Id.
Id. at 197-98.
Id. at 200-01.
Id.

88. Id. at 200 (citing ROCHELLE V. HABECK ET AL., DISABILITY PREVENTION AND
MANAGEMENT AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION CLAIMS (1988) (hereinafter UPJOHN REPORT)).

89. Id. at 154-56.
90. Spieler, supra note 9, at 211-13.
91. Id. at 179-84. "The no-fault nature of the system masks, or perhaps obliterates, the
commitment to individual corrective justice which imbues discussions of tort liability. The nofault paradigm tends to legitimize some employers' views that the fault lies elsewhere." Id. at
182-83.
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quality of the underlying employment relationship, 92 the employer's control
over its business enterprise, and empirical evidence 93 contradict the notion
that employees control the rate of injury.
94
The workers compensation bargain was conceived as an exchange.
The no-fault paradigm inevitably devolved because while workers compensation costs are high profile, news making matters, raising the specter of a
state unable to compete due to high costs, the workers quid pro quo, release
of tort liability, is invisible. 95 The failure to implement the recommendations of the 1972 National Commission to increase benefits and the backsliding of recent reforms reducing coverage and benefits may be viewed as
the evolution from the no-fault to the worker-fault paradigm.
B.

THE WORKER-FAULT PARADIGM

The 1972 National Commission on state workmen's compensation reported an abysmal level of benefits. 96 In 1972, workers' compensation
costs were, on average, 1.14 percent of payroll costs. 97 The looming threat
of federal action contributed to an environment in which most states increased benefits. From 1974 to 1985, costs rose gradually from 1.24 percent of payroll to 1.82 percent. 98 In 1986, costs rose to 1.99 percent of payroll and grew to 2.17 percent by 1993.99 By this time, state legislatures
were in the midst of various compensation "reform", responding to the "crisis."10o

Some contend, as I do, that the reforms of the 1990s represent backsliding from the report of the 1972 National Commission. Advocates of the
1990s reforms contend that cost control became imperative,10 1 the unstated
implication that the National Commission could not have foreseen the effects of benefit increases on costs. Rising benefits, they contend, caused

92. Id. at 211-17. "Injured workers are not victims of torts committed by strangers; instead,
workers are caught within an unequal employment relationship which influences their decisions
regarding when, or whether, to file workers' compensation claims." Id. at 211.
93. CDC REPORT, supra note 10, (stating that "[m]ost incidents resulting in worker injuries
are preventable and could be averted if known prevention strategies were more widely implemented").
94. See New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 201-02 (1917); 1 LARSON, supra
note 45, § 1.03.
95. Spieler, supra note 9, at 232.
96. NAT'LCOMM'NREPORT, supra note 1, at 119.
97. See MONT, supra note 8 (statement on workers' compensation benefits and costs and
attached percentage of payroll data).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. McCluskey, supra note 3, at 679.
101. Id. at 680.
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workers to increase filing of claims for benefits: the problem of moral hazard.102 This, again, is an expression of the worker-fault paradigm.
The reforms reduced the ratio of costs to payroll to 1.67 percent in
1996. The decline of workers' compensation benefits to 1.08 percent of
payroll in 1998 was "unprecedented."1 03 Insurer profits have risen significantly.104 Reformers contend that economic efficiency compels benefit reductions, which must take precedence over redistributive goals.105 Economic efficiency requires elimination of unnecessary costs. 106 In so doing,
it is thought that maximization of aggregate benefits is achieved.107 The reformers analysis begs the question: what costs are unnecessary?
That unforgettable phrase, the cost of production must bear the blood
of the working man, starkly presents the economic principle of cost internalization.108 When costs are internalized, the decision-maker must take the
cost into account in determining his or her actions.1 09 If the cost is externalized (pollution is the classic example), it is passed on to others, which
fails to maximize aggregate benefit.ll0 Work injury has been described as
an externality of industry; the introduction of the workers' compensation
bargain internalized the cost of injury to the workplace."' The economic
principle of "cost internalization" results in a formulation in which work
injury is a cost workers impose on employers.11 2 This principle may be restated the other way-that work injury is a horrible cost imposed on workers and their families by employers and consumers. Efficiency analysis
102. Baker, supra note 21, at 238. Moral hazard is defined as the tendency of insurance
protection to create in the insured less incentive to take care to avoid losses. Id. at 239. Tom
Baker questions the popular jargon: "What moral hazard means is that, if you cushion the consequences of bad behavior, then you encourage that bad behavior." Id. at 238. In workers' compensation, moral hazard is used to establish that the presence of workers' compensation benefits
makes it more likely that workers will not avoid accident costs. McCluskey, supra note 3, at 743.
Some have argued for lower benefits or more policing of fraud. Id. at 745. But, like "externalities," moral hazard cannot be objectively distinguished from the price of an efficient transaction.
Id. at 746. Workers' compensation is a reciprocal relationship, for it not only insures workers
against disability but also insures employers from high tort damages. Id. at 747. When benefit
levels fall, the value to the employer rises in the form of lower costs. Id. "While higher benefits
provide less incentive for workers to avoid losses to employers, lower benefits give employers less
incentive to avoid losses to workers." Id. at 747-48. The appropriate level of compensation is a
distributive value judgment. Id.
103. MONT, supra note 8.
104. Id.
105. McCluskey, supra note 3, at 721-24.
106. Id. at 723.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 725.
109. Id. at 724.
110. Id. at 724-25.
111. Id. at 725.
112. Id. at 728.
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cannot answer the question, what is a cost of what. 113 Whether to charge
work injury as a liability against the balance sheet of workers or employers
is a value judgment, not an economic one.1 14
When economic theory purports to utilize the cost internalization principle to provide an objective answer as to whether injury is a cost imposed
by workers on employers or by employers on workers, it obscures the question as to who should be held responsible for workers' compensation
costs. 115 At bottom, this is a value judgment, as is the question whether
workers' compensation benefits are too high or too low. The cost internalization principle and efficiency analysis do not provide an answer as to the
economically optimal level of workers' compensation benefits."l 6
The no-fault concept suggests that workers and employers jointly bear
the cost of work injury. The view that workers are the cause of injury has
led to alteration of the paradigm from no-fault to worker-fault and gives a
false picture of who should bear the cost of work injury. In fact, the evidence suggests that the opposite is true: employer corporate culture and
safety prevention strategies can reduce injury."l 7 If injury from known, familiar hazards were reduced, costs would decline. This data suggests that
placement of work injury costs on workers may itself be ineffi113. Id. at 726-28.
114. Id.at 727.
115. Id. at 724-30.
116. Id. However, Hylton and Laymon claim that internalization of work injury requires
employers to bear the full cost of work injury. Keith N. Hylton & Steven E. Laymon, The Internalization Paradox and Workers' Compensation, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 109, 180 (1992). "[Wle
can defend workers' compensation as a mechanism for internalizing accident costs to the party
that is best-informed and most likely to respond to incentives for safety, and that will generally be
the employer." Id. The primary externalities shifting costs away from employers and to workers
are second injury funds (resulting in low premium charges), undercompensation of workers, and
litigation costs to workers, which is the most significant. Id. at 180-8 1. For further description of
the costs imposed on workers by litigation, see infra notes 477-493 and accompanying text.
117. Spieler, supra note 9, at 154-55.
Mennen Company claims to have cut back injury claims by ninety percent after instituting an aggressive safety program. John Deere Company attributes a seventy-four
percent decrease in their OSHA recordable injury rate from 1975 to 1984 to development of facility-based occupational health and safety goals supported by management.
An automobile parts manufacturing company... experienced a seventy-three percent
reduction in ... claims. Cord Moving... [implementing sound safety reduced costs
116%].. Weyerhauser company instituted a combined safety and post-injury control
program and trimmed workers' compensation costs from $700 per employee in 1984
to $300 in 1990.... In 1988, the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
completed a major study of workers' compensation claims for the State of Michigan... [and concluded] that a "significant portion of the variance among employers
[claims experience] is due to policy and behavioral differences that are under company
control."... [L]ow claims employers consistently showed less suspicion of both injured workers and the compensation system. They were more likely to treat their employees as "stakeholders."
Id. at 154-57 (quoting UPJOHN REPORT, supra note 117, at 1-3 to 1-4, V-I 1).
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cient-externalizing costs to workers and creating insufficient incentives
8
for safety.''
The concept of moral hazard is utilized in economic theory to explain
the tendency of the insured to take less care to avoid loss, or in cases of
health services, to use more than he or she would otherwise use. 119 Moral
20
hazard thus distinguishes efficient from inefficient policies and practices.1
Moral hazard theory expects an increase in the length of time off work and
use of medical benefits in the presence of compensation.'21 Moral hazard is
presented as an objective marker of economic efficiency, justifying reductions in benefits and vigorous policing.122 Like the cost internalization
principle, moral hazard turns on value judgments.1 23 Insurance exists so
that individuals can take risks (drive a car, work a hazardous job, improve a
property). The economic gain to society because a person takes the risk to
work and grow the business illustrates that the concept of moral hazard is
not a simple principle of economic efficiency. 124
Workers' compensation insures workers against medical costs and
wage loss, but it also insures employers from tort damages. 25 The reciprocal nature of the bargain ensures that a reduction in the moral hazard of one
party shifts the moral hazard to the other. 126 Economic theory cannot be

118. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. But see supra note 20 (citing Coase for the
proposition that in reciprocal relationships economic theory cannot answer "what is a cost of
what"). Nevertheless, state legislatures that reduce workers' compensation benefits on efficiency
arguments are misinformed about the nature of economic efficiency. The efficient and appropriate level of compensation is a distributive value judgment, not a question of objective economic
efficiency. See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
119. McCluskey, supra note 3, at 742-43.
120. Id. at 742.
121. Id. at 743.
122. Id. at 747.
123. Id. at 747-48.
124. Id.; see also Baker, supra note 21, at 275. Baker states:
[M]oral hazard has largely been addressed in the law and economics literature as a
problem that afflicts liability and compensation regimes which benefit workers and
consumers, not as a problem that equally afflicts regimes more favorable to manufacturers and employers ....
[Tihe economics of moral hazard are anything but onesided.... If we understand the initial entitlement of manufacturers and employers to
leave manufacturers and employers free to impose the costs of products and workrelated accidents on consumers and employees (which is arguably the position of the
late nineteenth century common law), then we will regard legal rules that "interfere"
with that entitlement as "redistributions."
Id.
125. McCluskey, supra note 3, at 670.
126. Baker, supra note 21, at 275. Baker shows that the argument that compensation insurance reduces the level of care workers take to prevent injury is not supported in the empirical literature. Id. at 286. He concludes that "the moral argument against social responsibility systematically undervalues efforts to protect the injured, the sick, and the poor." Id. at 291.
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used to justify benefit reductions as efficient by reducing moral hazard in
the aggregate; rather, benefit reductions simply redistribute moral hazard.
Low benefit levels and employer or insurer disputation of benefits
likely cause workers to file fewer claims, shifting health care costs to their
general health insurer or themselves.127 In all likelihood, no significant increase or decrease in net economic efficiency occurs because of benefit reduction. Similarly, it is likely that benefit increases do not significantly increase or decrease economic efficiency.
Therefore, the proper level of compensation is an issue left to socioeconomic analysis. Benefit levels have never approached actual loss of income. 1 28 The thesis of this article supports the recommendations of the
1972 National Commission, urging coverage and benefit increases. The
goals of the National Commission remain valid. An examination reveals
that North Dakota's reforms have reversed the early promise of fulfilling
these goals. The safety paradigm espoused by Professor Spieler lends support to the thesis that benefit reforms are not a reasonable method to reduce
worker injuries, claim filings, and ultimately costs. The safety paradigm
recognizes that incidence of work injury is best addressed by inducing employers to embrace the fact that their safety activities are important (since
most injuries are from known hazards) and through enacting state OSHA
plans. 129
Empirical data also supports the thesis that benefit reforms have been
unfortunate-shifting costs to workers.130 Studies have indicated that a sig-

127. McCluskey, supra note 3 at 704 (noting that "one study of reporting in Michigan
found that the OSHA records on which the Labor Bureau data are based vastly understate the
number of lost workdays resulting from work-related injuries"). Further, "the United States has
kept 'abysmal' data on work fatalities.... [Data collection efforts] omit[] deaths due to occupational disease-which account for the overwhelming majority of job-related deaths." Id.
McCluskey notes that "data on occupational disease estimated that.., only 5% of these medical
costs were paid by workers' compensation." Id. at 775-76. Moreover, "the greatest amount of
medical cost shifting may occur in the reverse direction, from workers' compensation to general
health care systems. Studies and anecdotes suggest that medical treatment for the vast majority of
work illnesses and injuries may be funded outside workers' compensation." Id at 849. See
Spieler, supra note 9 at 216 (stating that "workers with compensable injuries are filing claims
which they may have previously chosen not to file, particularly when benefits were low"). This is
consistent with my experience; normally private insurance pays medical benefits while workers
fight for workers' compensation coverage. While it is the general perception that cost shifting
works against workers' compensation insurers-the Monday morning injury-the reverse is true.
The effect of employer disputation of benefits is well known. See supra note 18; infra note 423.
Health care costs are discussed in more detail infra notes 404-432 and accompanying text.
128. NAT'L COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 18.
129. Spieler, supra note 9, at 256-59. "Some of these states are achieving better coordination of regulatory and compensation activities through reorganization of the state administration,
placing both the state OSHA and workers' compensation programs into one department." Id. at
257.
130. See generally McCluskey, supra note 3, at 713 (citing John F. Burton).
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nificant number of work injuries go unreported. 131 The number and value
32
of uncompensated injuries is much higher than overcompensated injuries.1
Workers file fewer claims if an employer regularly contests claims, shifting
133
costs to general insurers and workers.
The number of uncompensated occupational disease cases is also very
135
large.134 Income protection covers, at most, two-thirds of the loss.
6
Workers also lose fringe benefits.13 However, it is the lengthy disabilities
where the reforms bite most-leaving some permanently totally disabled
workers and their families destitute.137 North Dakota reduces long term
disability payments through its vocational rehabilitation program, in which
most workers are found partially, not totally, disabled. Partial disability
benefits must be discontinued after five years.138 North Dakota illustrates
that much of the modem reform activity has resulted in cost-shifting against
workers, so they no longer receive the sure and certain relief for which they
39

bargained.1

The goals of the 1972 National Commission are farther away from realization now than they were in 1989, when the vocational rehabilitation
chapter was added.140 Recent reforms are not justified by economic effi131. Spieler, supra note 9, at 217 n.393.
132. Supra, note 127, infra note 133.
133. Spieler, supra note 9, at 232.
[T]he price that workers have paid for the availability of compensation is the loss of
the right to bring common law suit. The price is unvarying, cannot be quantified, and
tends to be invisible. Workers are therefore generally viewed as having paid nothing
for their compensation. The price paid by the employer, on the other hand, is contingent not upon the occurrence of injuries but rather upon the filing and resolution of
claims.... The benefit which the employer derives from this arrangement is immunity from suit. The employer, therefore, does not benefit from the increased costs
which may result from increasing numbers of claims filed by its workers.... Prevention becomes equated with the prevention of claims (or the reduction of costs associated with claims) rather than the prevention of injuries.
Id. McCluskey notes, "If employers and their insurers wrongly deny or delay payment of legitimate benefits in an effort to minimize costs or to combat purported fraud, workers may use other
funds to pay for needed medical care (or go without) .... " McCluskey, supra note 3, at 850; see
also Hylton & Laymon, supra note 116, at 154 (stating that "firms may try to discourage injured
workers from reporting injuries, they may pressure supervisors to resist or denounce workers'
claims, or they may formally challenge more claims, hoping to reduce the amount of the award").
134. McCluskey, supra note 3, at 775-76.
135. Id. at 810.
136. Id. at 823.
137. ld. at 811.
138. N.D. CENT. CODE 65-05-10(2) (Supp. 2001).
139. See generally, McCluskey, supra note 3, at 814-16.
140. The onset of reform in North Dakota dates from 1989 when the vocational rehabilitation chapter was added. See infra notes 358-368. The Bureau sought the legislation as a way to
terminate benefits. Id. The Legislature also enacted the first of many caps on benefits, limiting
vocational rehabilitation benefits to two years and overturning the court's holding in Smith v.
North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau, 447 N.W. 2d 250 (N.D. 1989). In the 1990s, a
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ciency arguments, and, in fact, they implicitly disavow the employer's primary responsibility for safety.' 4 It is useful to review the recommendations of the 1972 National Commission and the underlying facts and policies to determine to what extent North Dakota has met those
recommendations. An analysis of North Dakota's reforms in the 1990s will
also be undertaken, with critical examination of the assumptions that support these reforms.
III. THE 1972 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKERS'
COMPENSATION
The United States Congress, in enacting the Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970, noted that there were "serious questions about the fairness and adequacy of present workmen's compensation laws" in light of
economic, medical, and technological changes. 42 The Act established the
National Commission on State Workmen's Compensation Laws "to determine if such laws provide an adequate, prompt, and equitable system of
compensation" for workers. 143 The bipartisan National Commission, appointed by President Nixon, issued a unanimous report in 1972 finding that
"[t]he inescapable conclusion is that state workmen's compensation laws in
general are inadequate and inequitable." 44 The report listed eight "essential recommendations," estimating that the cost to an average employer
would increase from 1.1 percent of payroll to 1.5 percent of payroll. 145 The
Commission recommended that if states did not make considerable progress, Congress would consider federal intervention.14 6 Although most
states enacted benefit increases over the next decade, the liberalization leveled off substantially short of the recommended goals.
The National Commission set forth five broad objectives: "broad coverage of employees and of work-related injuries and diseases; substantial
protection against interruption of income; provision of sufficient medical
care and rehabilitation services; ... encouragement of safety.

effective system for delivery of the benefits and services."' 147

.

. [;and] an

plethora of benefit reductions and limits on access to benefits were enacted, moving the state farther and farther away from the vision of the National Commission.
141. See generally, McCluskey, supra note 3; Speiler, supra note 9.
142. NAT'L COMM'NREPORT, supra note 1,at 13.
143. Id. at 13-14.
144. Id. at 118-19.
145. Id. at 128-29.
146. Id. at 127.
147. Id. at 35.
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A.

BROAD COVERAGE OF EMPLOYEES, INJURY, AND DISEASE

1.

Coverage of Employees

The National Commission noted that about eighty-five percent of employees were covered by workers' compensation insurance. 48 The Commission also recommended that the scope of coverage be substantially extended.149 The Commission recommended coverage of low-wage workers
150
often excluded by statute.
The Commission recommended that workers' compensation be made
compulsory.151 It also concluded that workers' compensation should be
extended to agricultural employees if the employer's income exceeds
$1,000,152 and it it should be extended to household and casual workers to
the extent they are covered by social security.153 The Commission concluded that conflict of laws statutes provide employees an election for the
employee to file in the state of hire, the state where the employment is prin54
cipally located, or the state of injury.1
2.

Coverage of Injury and Disease

In order to further extend the scope of coverage, the Commission recommended that states drop the accident requirement as a test for compensability.155 Although the definition of compensable injury as injury by accident "arising out of' and "in the course of' employment had not been
consistently applied from state to state, or even within a state, the Commission believed that the value of precedent outweighed any potential gain to
56
be achieved by reformulating the causation definition.1
The Commission also noted that many compensation systems did not
provide adequate coverage for work-related disease under many theorieslack of a sudden accident, suspicions about gradual worsening, and causation concerns. 157 The Commission stressed that states must afford full cov148. Id. at 43.
149. ld. at 46.
150. Id.
151. NAT'L COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, Recommendation 2.1, at 45 (hereinafter Recommendation).
152. Recommendation 2.4, at 46.
153. Recommendation 2.5, at 47.
154. Recommendation 2.11, at 48.
155. Recommendation 2.12, at 49.
156. NATL COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 50; see also Recommendation 2.14, at 50
(recommending "that the 'arising out of and in the course of employment' test be used to determine coverage of injury and disease").
157. Id. at 49-50.
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erage for occupational disease. 58 The Commission also concluded that
states should provide full payment of benefits if an injury or death results
from both nonwork and work-related causes if the work cause is a significant contributing cause. 159
The Commission also contemplated that workers' compensation is an
employee's exclusive remedy.160 The Commission recommended to continue to permit suit against negligent third parties. 161
B.

INCOME PROTECTION

The Commission observed the inadequacy of income replacement,
noting that the majority of employees receive less than two-thirds of their
wage loss.' 62 Because most states cap benefits at the state's average weekly
wage, high-income workers lose a larger percentage of income. 163 Tax consequences reduce this effect somewhat. The Commission believed that
wage replacement at eighty percent of spendable earnings would better reflect a worker's preinjury economic circumstances.1 64 The Commission
made several recommendations to protect an injured worker's income.
1.

Temporary Total Disability

The Commission recommended "that the waiting period for benefits be
no more than three days" and the retroactive period no more than fourteen
days.165 The Commission also believed that the maximum benefit "should
be at least 200% of the state's average weekly wage." 66 It was essential
that the benefit be at least equal to 100% of the average weekly wage.167
Finally, the Commission recommended that benefits be at least two-thirds
of the worker's gross weekly wage,168 with a goal of income replacement
equaling eighty percent of spendable weekly earnings.169

158. Recommendation 2.13, at 50.
159. Recommendation 2.16, at 51.
160. Recommendation 2.18, at 52.
161. Recommendation 2.19, at 52.
162. NAT'L COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 56.
163. Id.
164. Recommendation 3.1, at 56.
165. Recommendation 3.5, at 59.
166. Recommendation 3.9, at 62.
167. Recommendation 3.8, at 62.
168. Recommendation 3.7, at 60.
169. Recommendation 3.6 at 60.
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2.

PermanentTotal Disability

The Commission recommended that permanent total disability benefits
be paid to the injured worker without regard to limits of dollars or time.1 70
It also recommended that the total disability benefit be reduced by the
amount received on account of social security disability. 171
3.

PermanentPartialDisability

The Commission made several useful observations regarding permanent partial disability benefits. It noted that there was a wide variation from
state to state in the ratio of permanent partial disability benefits to total disability benefits, which were based upon different definitions, use of medical
impairment, schedules, use of criteria of age, education, skills, and work restrictions to determine loss of earning capacity.172 The Commission observed that the AMA Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment
were useful to evaluate medical impairment, not disability. 7 3 The Commission recommended a separate study for thorough examination of permanent partial disability benefits. 174
The National Commission believed that impairment benefits are justified due to lifelong loss of ability to participate in activities of daily living.175 However, most states purport to pay permanent partial disability
based upon medical impairment, which does not take into account the variables that determine disability-age, education, experience, and work restrictions.176 The Commission recommended that states explicitly separate
impairment and disability benefits.177 Finally, because schedules used to
pay permanent partial disability have large error rates and do not account
for differences in the effects of medical impairment on disability, the
Commission recommended that states eliminate schedules from the workers' compensation statute. 178

170. Recommendation 3.17, at 65.
171. Recommendation 3.18, at 66. The National Commission recommends that the Federal
Social Security System offset state workers' compensation disability, not that state insurers offset
the federal payment. Id.
172. NAT'L COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 66-67.
173. Recommendation 3.19, at 69.
174. NAT'L COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 67-70; see also recommendation 3.19, at 67
(calling for state evaluation and federal study of permanent partial benefits).
175. NAT'LCOMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 69.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 68-69.
178. ld. at 69.
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Death Benefits

The Commission made similar recommendations in regard to death
79
benefits as to those regarding disability benefits. 1
C.

MEDICAL CARE AND REHABILITATION

The Commission recommended that workers "be permitted the initial
selection of [a] physician"80 and that "there be no statutory limits of time
81
or dollar amount for medical care or physical rehabilitation services."1
The Commission also suggested that states establish a medical rehabilitation division to supervise medical care and rehabilitation services. 182 The
medical rehabilitation division should have the responsibility to ensure
every worker who can benefit from vocational rehabilitation be offered
those services 8 3 and "establish a second-injury fund with broad coverage of
pre-existing impairments."184
D. SAFETY
The Commission recommended that "subject to sound actuarial standards, the experience rating principle be extended to as many employers as
practicable."1 85 The Commission also recommended that all insurance carriers be required to provide loss prevention services, and that the state
1 86
workers' compensation agency should carefully audit these services.
State funds and self-insureds should also be audited by independent procedures.' 87
E.

EFFECTIVE DELIVERY SYSTEM

The Commission recommended that attorney fees for all parties be reported, that fees be regulated under the rule-making authority of the workers' compensation administrator, 88 and that each state utilize a workers'
179. Recommendations 3.20-3.27, at 71-73.
180. Recommendation 4.1, at 79.
181. Recommendation 4.2, at 80.
182. Recommendation 4.5, at 80.
183. Recommendation 4.7, at 82.
184. Recommendation 4.10, at 84; but see Hylton & Lymon, supra note 116, at 166-70
(contending that second injury funds externalize losses because the cost of injury are not borne
entirely by the employer).
185. Recommendation 5.3, at 98. The Commission made a further recommendation that the
"relationship between an employer's favorable experience [rating] ... be more equitably reflected
in the employer's insurance charges." Recommendation 5.4, at 98.
186. Recommendation 5.2, at 93.
187. Id.
188. Recommendation 6.15, at 109.
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compensation agency to fulfill administrative obligations and supervise all
employees, except members of the appeals board.189 In accordance with
recommendations of the Council of State Governments, the Commission
urged that all appeals boards be independent of the politically appointed
administrator of the workers' compensation agency and be appointed by the
Governor. 190 The Commission noted that the agency should collect data on
all insurers, including state funds, and review the rate-making procedures of
private carriers and state funds. 191
The Commission recommended that states be free to continue their present insurance arrangements, allow self-insurance, allow state funds, or allow private insurance as no method had proved to be superior over the others. 192 It was also important for states to provide a procedure for payment
of benefits to employees if a carrier or employer became insolvent or if an
employer failed to purchase workers' compensation insurance.1 93
Finally, the Commission asserted that the statute of limitations for initiating a claim should be three years from the date the claimant knew, or
should have known, of the relationship to employment. 194
IV. NORTH DAKOTA IS NOT IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE
ESSENTIAL RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE 1972 NATIONAL
COMMISSION
A. BROAD COVERAGE OF EMPLOYEES
Most low-wage workers are part of a large socioeconomic group often
unattended to by the greater society and legislative bodies. A prime example is the exclusion from coverage of "any individual delivering newspapers
or shopping news." 195 Not surprisingly, when the Newspaper Association
lobbied for and testified in favor of the exclusion, no paperboy or girl was
present to give the legislators the opposing view. The National Commission noted in 1972 that groups of low-wage workers are often excluded
from workers' compensation coverage by specific statutory exclusion.1 96
189. Recommendation 6.1, at 101. Recommendations 6.2, 6.3, and 6.5 concern the importance of an independent appeals board. Id. at 103.
190. Recommendation 6.5, at 103.
191. NAT'L COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 113-14. The National Commission noted,
"The agency should collect, analyze, and publish such data for all types of insurers, including
State funds." Id. at 114.
192. Recommendation 6.20, at 113.
193. Recommendation 6.21, at 114.
194. Recommendation 6.13, at 107.
195. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(17)(b)(6) (Supp. 2001).
196. NAT'L COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 44.
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The National Commission made several recommendations in this regard,
noting that the most certain way to increase the number of employees covered by workers' compensation is to make coverage mandatory.1 97 The
North Dakota Legislature has made coverage mandatory, but it continues to
98
exclude certain groups of workers from coverage.1
1. Agricultural Workers
Despite the social and economic desirability of broad coverage of employees, the North Dakota Legislature has not seen fit to end the statutory
exclusion of agricultural workers.199 It is apparent that the exclusion will
exist into the foreseeable future. The legislature is not motivated to mandate coverage of agricultural workers. It is the legislature that must act, because the court is reluctant to find any legislative scheme regarding workers' compensation to be unconstitutional.
The North Dakota Supreme Court has upheld the exclusion against
200
challenges that the classification violates equal protection of the law.
The court noted, "The agricultural exclusion from workers compensation
coverage is 'an issue with economic implications' . . . [wherein] we have

applied the rational basis test to classifications contained in economic and
social legislation." 20 1 Although the legislature did not bother to explain its
purpose in excluding agricultural workers from coverage, the court took
notice of "[u]narticulated legislative purposes" to serve as the rational basis
for the classification, benefiting both employer and employee. 202 The court
concluded, "The legislature may have intended to benefit agricultural employees by retarding the mechanization of agriculture, thereby preserving
agricultural job opportunities that would be lost if coverage of agriculture
hastened the mechanization of the industry." 203 This rationalization is economically inefficient, and anachronistic. Though courts have been loath to
strike down this legislatively enacted exclusion of agricultural workers, reasoned analysis fails to show any valid purpose for the exclusion.

197. Id.
198. E.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(22)(a) (excluding agricultural workers from coverage).
199. Section 65-01-02(22)(a) of the North Dakota Century Code provides that the term
"hazardous employment" does not include "[aigricultural or domestic service." N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 65-01-02(22)(a) (2001).
200. Haney v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 518 N.W.2d 195 (N.D. 1994).
201. Id. at 199.
202. Id. at 202.
203. Id.
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North Dakota is an agricultural state, and the legislature has granted
preferences to agriculture, the state's most important industry. 0 4 The exclusion of agricultural employees from workers' compensation coverage is
for the benefit of employers, for any agricultural employer who elects coverage may "pay... into the fund the premiums... is not liable to respond in
damages at common law or by statute for injuries or the death of any employee, wherever occurring." 205 Although an agricultural worker may, prior
to injury, elect not to accept coverage of workers' compensation, 0 6 few, if
any, have done so. While tort damages might look attractive, many small
family farms are likely to be unable to pay a significant judgment, and
comparative fault may significantly reduce any recovery to the injured farm
worker. The statute does not alternatively require employers to purchase
liability insurance.
In an earlier case, three justices of the North Dakota Supreme Court
closely examined the purposes for excluding agricultural workers. 207 The
court examined four possible purposes for the exclusion. 208 First, "The
purpose of excluding agricultural employees was to overcome political opposition to passage of a workmen's compensation act by a farm-oriented
legislature."20 9 The court answered:
Legislatures were quick to perceive that farmers would oppose
such increased liability, and that they would not insure their hired
help .... There were many individual and small farmers in the
early twentieth century, not only on the farms, but as members of
the legislatures in legislative halls, and it was feared that extension
of the compensation acts to them would defeat the proposed bills.
Exceptions were therefore made for farmers and farm laborers.
One legislature followed the other in incorporating the exception,
an exclusion with hollow but happy sound which echoed its way

204. See Benson v. N.D. Workmen's Comp. Bureau, 283 N.W.2d 96, (N.D. 1979) overruled by Haney, 518 N.W.2d 195 (N.D. 1994) (noting the importance of agriculture to North Dakota and discussing the purpose of the exclusion). In 1979, three of the five justices of the North
Dakota Supreme Court found the exclusion of agricultural workers' compensation coverage to be
unconstitutional. Benson, 283 N.W.2d at 107. However, under the North Dakota Constitution,
four of five justices are required to "declare a legislative enactment unconstitutional." N.D.
CONST. art. VI., § 4. The Benson court noted that the legislature had created "seventeen readily
identifiable exemptions for agriculture and a number which are not readily recognizable but are
preferences in fact." Benson, 283 N.W.2d at 103.
205. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-04-29 (1995).
206. Id. A farm employee electing to retain the tort remedy must notify the employer and
Bureau in writing prior to injury. Id.
207. Benson, 283 N.W.2d at 103-04.
208. Id. at 104-06.
209. Id. at 104

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 79:203

across the country, leaving in its wake only confusion and disaster
for injured farm workers. 210
The court noted another possible explanation for the exclusion, "Farm
employees should be excluded because their work is not as hazardous as
other employment and compulsory coverage for them is not needed." 211
The evidence has always been to the contrary. 212 The court in 1979 pointed
to the large number of injuries and fatal accidents in agriculture. 213 Not a
year passes without several deaths on a farm or ranch. Many more individuals die in farm or ranch accidents than in all industrial site accidents. 214
The third rationale for the exclusion is, "Farm employees should be excluded because the 'family farm' is a closely knit community of relatives
and friends who care for each other's needs and injuries and no other protection is needed."2 5 This is not true. Family care is more consistent with
paying the premium to protect against the economic consequences of catastrophic injury or death. The court also noted that "there undoubtedly are
many migrant, temporary, part-time employees who have no reason whatsoever to expect to be cared for, if injured, out of any beneficence of their
farmer-employer." 216
The court offered a final possible excuse for the legislative exclusion of
farm laborers, "Farm employees should be excluded because farm employers cannot afford to pay the premium." 217 The court stated, "We accord this
justification considerable weight and perceive more than an element of truth
in it."218 The court noted that "economic factors" might justify the exemption because "a farmer, unlike a manufacturer, cannot add the costs of
workmen's compensation premiums to the price for which he will sell his
products." 219 However, economic theory has cast some doubt about
whether employers pass along workers' compensation costs to consumers.

210.

Id. (quoting HOROvrIz, INJURY AND DEATH UNDER WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

LAWS, "EMPLOYEES AND EMPLOYERS," 214-15 (Wright & Potter Printing Co. 1944)).
211. Id.
212. Id. at 104-05.
213. Id.
214. D.H. Cordes & Dorothy Rea, Health Hazards of Farming Vol. 6 OCCUPATIONAL
MEDICINE No. 3 (1991). Many agricultural employees perform heavy labor, resulting in a higher
level of injury, as well as the hazards inherent in working with heavy equipment. Workers are
exposed to the elements, as well as chemicals. The highest death rate occurs in agriculture. Id. at
332; see generally DAVID C. GRIFFITH & ED KISSAM WORKING POOR: FARMWORKERS IN THE

UNITED STATES (Temple University Press 1995).
215. Benson v. N.D. Workmen's Comp. Bureau, 283 N.W.2d 96, 105 (N.D. 1979).
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 106.
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Rather, evidence suggests that workers bear the large part of premiums in
the form of reduced wages. 220 Moreover, if all states made coverage of agricultural workers compulsory, there would be no competitive disadvantage
in the domestic market. The justification is not in accord with economic
theory.
In any event, the Benson court found the cost burden to employers an
insufficient purpose to exclude agricultural employees from coverage because "[tihe burden still rests upon the injured farm employee, if not economically, surely in the loss of dignity." 221 Agriculture remains among the
most hazardous jobs in our nation. This hollow exemption should be
ended.
2.

Householdand Casual Workers

North Dakota statute excludes from coverage employees in "domestic
service" 222 and "[a]ny person whose employment is both casual and not in
the course of the trade, business, profession, or occupation of that person's
employer." 223 The legislative determination to exclude casual and domestic
workers from coverage is not justified by any significant state interest.
These low-wage workers have little or no voice in the legislature. This exclusion is certain to remain, notwithstanding Recommendation 2.5 of the
National Commission calling for an end to the exclusion of domestic and
causal l aborers. 224
3.

Other Exclusions

Also excluded from compensation coverage in North Dakota are real
estate brokers or salespersons, 225 newspaper delivery persons,2 26 members

220.

MICHAEL J. MOORE & KIP ViscusI, COMPENSATION MECHANISMS FOR JOB RISKS 3-

11 (Princeton Univ. Press 1990).
221. Benson v. N.D. Workmen's Comp. Bureau, 238 N.W.2d 96, 107 (N.D. 1979). The
author of the case comment on Haney also critiqued the court's analysis. LeAnne K. Jabs, Equal
Protection Challenge to the Agriculture Exemption and Use of Rational Basis Scrutiny in Haney
v. N.D. Workers CompensationBureau, 71 N.D. L. REv. 781, 794-96 (1995).
222. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(22)(a) (Supp. 2001).
223. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(17)(b)(1).
224. Recommendation 2.5, at 47.
225. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(17)(b)(4); see also 1991 N.D. Laws 713, § 1 (reenacting
the exclusion of real estate brokers and real estate salespersons from coverage).
226. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(17)(b)(6) (2001); see also 1993 N.D. Laws 616, § I (defining newspaper delivery person for workers compensation purposes). As stated in the text, the
exclusion of newspaper delivery persons from coverage is a disturbing example of the triumph of
special interests over those without status. Low-wage workers typically do not have a voice in the
legislature. After setting a precedent by exempting realtors from mandatory coverage in 1991, it
was easy to exempt a group with even less political clout in 1993.
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of the clergy and religious organizations, 227 railroad employees, 228 and certain persons employed "for the transportation of property or persons by
nonresidents." 229 These exclusions are also contrary to the recommenda230
tions of the National Commission.
4.

Use of Independent Contractorsto Escape Coverage

Some employers have attempted to escape payment of workers' compensation premiums by utilizing "independent contractors" rather than employees to perform work because independent contractors are exempt from
coverage. 231 In 1977, the legislature attempted to broaden application of
this exclusion when it mandated that the common-law "right to control" test
determined the matter. 232 In 1991, the legislature substituted the "commonlaw" test. 233 The legislature left intact the presumption that persons per234
forming work are employees.
The competing "relative nature of the work" test presents a more logical set of inquiries than the right to control test:

227. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(22)(d).
228. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(22)(b).
229. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(22)(c).
230. Recommendation 2.3, at 46.
231. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(17). Workers' compensation coverage is mandatory for
any "employee"; see id. (providing, "'Employee' means a person who performs hazardous employment for another for remuneration unless the person is an independent contractor under the
'common law' test").
232. See 1977 N.D. Laws 579, § 3. The right to control test allows employers considerable
leeway to structure an employment relationship in such a way as to appear to be a independent
contractorship. See infra note 234.
233. See 1991 N.D. Laws 533, § 3 (removing the language "right to control" and adding
"common law" to the test that determines whether a person qualifies as an independent contractor).
234. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-03 (Supp. 2001). Section 65-01-03 states, "Each person
who performs services for another for renumeration is presumed to be an employee of the person
for whom the services are performed, unless it is proven that the person is an independent contractor under the 'common law' test." Id. The competing relative nature of the work test focuses
on whether workers are in an independent calling and hold themselves out to render services to the
general public. 3 LARSON, supra note 45, §§ 60.05, 62.01. This test provides the most difficult
obstacle for an employer to evade compensation responsibility because those in an independent
calling who hold themselves out to render services are much more likely to have several clients
and be true independent contractors. However, the common law test includes those formulations
as factors to consider, along with the control elements. In most cases, the result should be the
same. The common law and control test allows room for an employer to maneuver and structure
the relationship to ensure that workers who carry out its business are treated as independent contractors, saving the employer both workers' compensation premium and the employers' payroll
tax contribution. This ability to maneuver provides an economic incentive to exclude employees
from coverage, and a lax rule for determining independent contractorship provides the means for
an employer to accomplish the scheme.
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The character of the claimant's work or business-how skilled it
is, how much of a separate calling or enterprise it is... and its relation to the employer's business .... whether it is continuous or

intermittent, and whether the duration is sufficient to amount to the
hiring of continuing services as distinguished from contracting for
the completion of a particular job.235
The control test provides more opportunity for an employer to escape
compulsory coverage. For example, a sales business or building contractor
may contract with each salesman or laborer job by job, provide specific
terms for contract termination, provide the worker the right to control the
details of the work, require the worker to provide tools, and pay by the job
rather than by time, thereby escaping payment of workers' compensation
premium. The exclusion of real estate sales people from coverage came
into being as a result of lobbying by that industry after the bureau found its
sales workers to be employees under the common law test. 236 Unfortunately, the legislature is prone to curtail coverage, rather than extend it.
5.

Broad Coverage Through Liberal Conflicts of Laws
Provisions

North Dakota statute provides coverage for employees whose "employment is principally localized in this state," 237 normally when the employee "is working under a contract of hire made in this state.' 238 The statute could result in confusion as to whether an employee whose employment
and contract of hire are principally localized and entered into in another
state can elect North Dakota benefits if injured in North Dakota. North Dakota will always cover a death claim where the injury occurred in its jurisdiction, 239 but it requires "significant contacts" to cover an injury in North
235. 3 LARSON, supra note 45, § 60.05(2), at 60-11.
236. See 1991 N.D. Laws 713, § I (enacting into law the exclusion of real estate brokers and
real estate salespersons from coverage). Prior to the Legislature's exemption of real estate salespeople from coverage, I represented the Bureau in litigation in which it prevailed in a lengthy administrative hearing that established that these salespersons fit the criteria for employees under the
common-law test. Once again the Legislature saw fit to exempt a powerful interest group from
coverage. In my view, the exemption is not founded on any legitimate policy. If employers cannot prove that they utilize independent contractors, the Legislature should not simply exempt them
from coverage. The policy behind exempting independent contractors is that these businesses will
normally offer services to the general public and must purchase workers' compensation coverage
for their own employees.
237. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-08-01(1)(a) (Supp. 2001).
238. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-08-01(l)(b).
239. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-08-01(3). This section provides for North Dakota coverage of
an "employment relationship that is principally localized outside of this state ... while the employee is temporarily within this state ... for the employee or the dependents of an employee who
died as the result of an injury in this state." Id.
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Dakota if the employment was principally located elsewhere. 240 Taken as a
whole, North Dakota has reasonably broad coverage for all covered employees who come into contact with the state.
However, in regard to coverage of all employees, North Dakota has not
fulfilled the goal of the National Commission to end statutory exclusions of
certain classes of workers. 241 If anything, these exclusions have proliferated over the years. North Dakota should end this arbitrary exclusion of
some workers from compensation coverage.
B.

COVERAGE OF INJURY OR DISEASE

The recommendation of the National Commission to extend coverage
to employees for all work-caused injury or disease is generally agreed upon

243
as appropriate. 242 Most states claim to provide such broad coverage.

Initially, the purpose of workers' compensation was to compensate sufferers of sudden industrial trauma. Occupational disease was gradually accepted to be within the scope of compensation acts, but it is often contested
244

on the facts.
Due to the "crisis" of "skyrocketing" costs, advocates of "reform" focus on several kinds of injuries as being subject to fraud, abuse, and manipulation: (1) repetitive or cumulative trauma, (2) occupational disease, (3)
soft tissue injury, (4) mental stress claims, (5) heart attack, and (6) aggravation of disease by work. 245 In this view, these injuries raise questions about
the cause of the injury or disease, the severity, and even whether an injury

240. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-08-01(4).
241. Recommendation 2.3, at 46.
242. Recommendation 2.5, at 46.
243. McCluskey, supra note 3, at 773. North Dakota's general test is whether the work is a
"substantial contributing factor" to the injury or disease. Satrom v. N.D. Workmen's Comp. Bureau, 328 N.W.2d 824, 831 (N.D. 1982). Broad coverage of injury or disease can only be reasonably accomplished when the fact-finding is fair and liberal construction applies. However, in
the reform of the 1990s, the legislature amended the Century Code as follows: "This title may not
be construed liberally on behalf of any party to the action or claim." N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-0101 (1995). The fact that times have changed since the 1990s is starkly illustrated by comparing
the premise of this paper with what Clare Hochhalter and I wrote in 1988:
The mere fact that a claimant did not immediately report the alleged accident and seek
treatment, that the claimant does not remember all of the details, or that the claimant
alleges disabling symptoms beyond what may be expected is not determinative of
compensability.... Moreover, in most cases, a liberal construction of the Act will
avoid forfeiture of benefits in favor of compensation.
Hochhalter & Haas, supra note 62, at 195-96 (citations ommitted).
244. Thomas S. Cook, Workers' Compensation and Stress Claims: Remedial Intent and
Restrictive Application, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 879, 889-95 (1987) (discussing the history of
occupational disease).
245. McCluskey, supra note 3, at 769.

2003]

FALLING DOWN ON THE JOB

occurred.2 46 North Dakota's legislature has enacted various mechanisms to
cope: excluding recovery for certain types of mental injury, 247 requiring
"objective" evidence of injury, 248 and for certain injuries such as heart attack and mental stress from physical injury-requiring that an employee
prove what may be impossible to prove-that employment contributed "at
least 50 percent of the cause of the injury or disease." 249
North Dakota's definition of compensable injury reflects a "reform"
standard meaning "injury by accident arising out of and in the course of
hazardous employment which must be established by medical evidence
supported by objective medical findings."250 The purpose may be to cull
out those who suffer only from pain, or more likely, to discover malingering. Compensable injury includes "disease caused by a hazard to which an
employee is subjected to in the course of employment." 251 "Accident" no
longer requires a sudden, unexpected event, but it does include injuries
from .the "unexpected result of the routine performance of the claimant's
2
duties." 52
Many courts no longer stringently apply the separate elements of the
compensation causation test "arising out of' and "in the course of' employment, favoring a more general causal nexus standard.2 53 A condition
that is due solely to a preexisting condition is not compensable. 254 Under
North Dakota law, an employment event that "triggers" a preexisting condition to produce symptoms in a preexisting injury, condition, or disease is
compensable only if employment "substantially accelerates its progression
246. Id.
247. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(11)(b)(10) (Supp. 2001).
248. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(1 1).
249. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 65-01-02(l1)(a)(3) (heart attack), 65-01-02(1 1)(a)(6) (mental or
psychological condition caused by a physical injury).
250. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(11). McCluskey notes that "[n]o objective line can
separate injuries or illnesses caused by work from those caused by nonwork factors.... All human beings normally age and normally have particular genetic, physical, and psychological weaknesses as well as strengths." McCluskey, supra note 3, at 765-96.
251. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(l)(a)(1).
252. Stout v. N.D. Workmen's Comp. Bureau, 236 N.W.2d 889, 894 (N.D. 1975) (quoting
2 LARSON, supra note 45, § 38.00, at 7-18).
253. 2 LARSON, supra note 45, chapter 29. The phrases "arising out of' and "in the course
of" employment are terms of art. Professor Larson devotes Chapters 3-10 to "arising out of'
problems and Chapters 12-17 and 20-28 to "course of' employment problems. "Any distinction
between compensable 'accident' and occupational 'disease' has become blurred." Hochhalter &
Haas, supra note 62, at 194-95 (citing Syverson v. N.D. Workmen's Comp. Bureau, 406 N.W.2d
688, 690-91 (N.D. 1987) (finding that expert testimony that the workers' heavy lifting contributed
to the development of his arthritis sufficient to reverse the Bureau and order payment). The
"course" element has to do with time, place, and manner of injury, and the "arising" element has
to do with work risk. Id. at 194-95 n.155-56; see also Westman v. N.D. Workers' Comp. Bureau,
459 N.W.2d 540, 545 (N.D. 1990) (finding an injury arose out of the course of employment).
254. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(11)(b)(7).
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or substantially worsens its severity." 255 The statute has been offered as a
2 56
vigorous defense in a large number of claims.
Contentions that employment merely "triggered" a condition-that is,
did not cause a substantial worsening-is a Bureau staple. The usual argument is that a condition (such as degenerative disc disease) preexists the
work injury, and the work injury merely triggered the condition to become
symptomatic, which, it is argued, is noncompensable. Contention that a
"mere triggering" work injury that transforms degenerative disc disease
from an asymptomatic condition to a symptomatic state is a noncompensable event is a narrow view of causation. First, causation matters are
difficult to untangle. If, for example, an independent medical evaluation
(IME) states that a worker's fall from a ladder merely triggered symptoms
in degenerative disc disease but did not alter the course of the disease, one
must ask what is being measured. The IME opinion will almost certainly
rest on the fact that the condition itself, as measured radiographically by
narrowing of the disc space, did not show any change after the fall. Yet, the
worker's life might be utterly shattered. If the fall triggers symptoms that
require medical attention and result in disability, the worker certainly suffers a significant worsening in the severity of his or her condition. The answer should be that we look to the effect of the fall on the worker's health,
life, his need for medical attention, and disability, not on whether the fall
altered the appearance of an MRI.257 On a hopeful note, administrative law
judges have almost universally ruled for the worker on such facts. Unfortunately, these disputes continue to arise.
The Commission also recommended that states pay full benefits if the
employment is a "substantial cause" of the injury or disease. 258 Most states
have complied and provide full benefits in such a circumstance. North Da-

255. Id.
256. E.g., Geck v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 1998 ND 158, 583 N.W.2d 621. In Geck,
the court remanded the case so the Bureau could consider whether a fall at work had "triggered" a
worsening of her preexisting arthritis of the knee. Id. 5 14, 583 N.W.2d at 624. Prior to the fall,
her condition had been asymptomatic. Id. 9. The majority found the distinction between worsening the "condition itself' and the symptoms to be without significance. Id. 10.
The court remanded another case so the Bureau could consider the discrepancies in an IME report
it had used to determine that the workers depression was preexisting rather than related to her
chronic pain. Negaard-Cooley v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 2000 ND 122, T 22, 611 N.W.2d
898, 905. The perplexing thing is the court's willingness to give the Bureau another bite at the
apple to prove its case through remand. The court should reverse when the findings are not sustained by the facts.
257. See generally Geck v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 1998 ND 158, 583 N.W.2d 621.
258. NAT'L COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 51. "We recommend that full workmen's
compensation benefits be paid for an impairment or death resulting from both work-related and
non-work-related causes if the work-related factor was a significant cause of the impairment or
death." Recommendation 2.17, at 51.
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kota has a law, the "aggravation" statute, which reduces benefits under
some circumstances when employment and nonemployment factors com259
bine to cause injury or disease.
North Dakota technically meets the first recommendations of the
Commission but not the last. The focus on certain injuries as especially
prone to manipulation is long on anecdotal evidence but lacking in empirical data. The first of these, repetitive trauma, has been especially contentious, grabbing national headlines. Despite the overwhelming evidence that
repetitive trauma is rampant in the workplace, Congress rescinded OSHA's
ergonomics regulations designed to minimize the incidence of cumulative
injury on the job.260
1.

Cumulative Trauma

Most states, by legislation or judicial decision, have recognized that

cumulative injuries are part of the workers' compensation bargain. Thus,
most states comply with the Commission's recommendation to eliminate
the "accident" requirement in compensation acts. 261 North Dakota's test is
whether the employment is a substantial contributing factor to the condition.262
OSHA has provided credible evidence as to the occupational nature of
repetitive injuries. 263 There are studies that link jobs to specific injury, such
as jobs that require long periods of standing immobile to plantar fascitis, repetitive use of a joints to arthritic change, and truck driving to degenerative
disk disease. 264

259. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-15 (Supp. 2001); see infra notes 315-318 and accompanying text.
260. Karen Masterson, Congress Quashes Ergonomics Edict, HOUSTON CHRON., Mar. 8,
2001, at Al. Congress rescinded these rules despite overwhelming evidence that repetitive injuries are a primary cause of work place harms to employees. See infra notes 269-270 and accompanying text.
261. Recommendation 2.12, at 49. North Dakota has complied. See supranote 252.
262. Satrom v. N.D. Workmen's Comp. Bureau, 328 N.W.2d 824, 831 (N.D. 1982).
263. Preparedstatement of Joseph A. Dear, Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational
Safety and Health, before the House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, 1995 Fed.
News Serv. (Fed. Information Systems Corp.) (July 12, 1995); Safety and Health:Sprains, Strains
Lead Workplace Injury Types; Repetitive Motion Cases Detailed, 80 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) 30,
at D-30 (April 28, 1994) (discussing Bureau of Labor survey released April 26, 1992); see infra
note 266 (referencing a definitive study by the National Academy of Science linking repetitive
motion in the workplace to a number of injuries, termed "repetitive motion injury").
264. An interesting example of the Bureau's shotgun litigation strategy is Klein v. N.D.
Workers Comp. Bureau, 2001 ND 170, 634 N.W.2d 530. In Klein, the Bureau argued that my
client, Jeryle Klein, knew that his bilateral arthritis of the knee was work related, did not file a
claim within one year of obtaining this knowledge as required by section 65-05-01 of the North
Dakota Century Code, and that Klein had not proven that his bilateral arthritis of the knee was
work related. Id. 5, 634 N.W.2d at 532. Klein's job at the nursery required frequent bending at
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The theoretical case for including cumulative trauma as compensable
under workers' compensation law is not controverted. But, many employers and insurers contest these cases on the facts-denying that the employment is a significant cause of the repetitive injury.265 There is a perception
that employees doctor shop to support these claims. Yet many insurers, including the North Dakota State Fund, frequently require the worker to submit to an independent medical examination to defend these claims.2 66 Insurers, not employees, have the greater incentive to doctor shop. In most
cases, medical experts can be found to deny that the causal relationship exists.267

the knee, which his doctor believed, to a reasonable degree of medical probability, substantially
contributed to the development of Klein's bilateral knee arthritis. Id. The court reversed and remanded on the timely filing issue. Id. 5 20, 634 N.W.2d at 536-37. In support of Klein's claim,
we presented at the physician's deposition medical literature that established a causal connection
between repetitive bending at the knee and arthritis. See Cyrus Cooper et al., OccupationalActivity and Osteoarthritisof the Knee, 53 ANNALS OF RHEUMATIC DISEASE 90, 90-93 (1994) (testing
whether occupational physical activities are risk factors for knee osteoarthritis); see also Maetzel
et al., Osteoarthritisof the Hip and Knee and Mechanical Occupational Exposure - A Systematic
Overview of the Evidence, 24:8 J. OF RHEUMATOLOGY 1599, 1599-1606 (1997) (examining evidence linking work related exposure to osteoarthritis of the hip and knee). It is helpful to bring
such studies to a physician's deposition for many reasons, primarily to embolden the physician's
testimony. See N.D. R. EvID. 803(18) (providing a limited exception from hearsay exclusion for
learned treatises). Medical studies may be found to establish or refute causal nexus in a bewildering variety of injuries, diseases, and conditions. As another example, depression has, not surprisingly, been related to injury and accompanying disability. See Negaard-Cooley, supra note
256, at T 8-16. The court reversed and remanded the Bureau's denial of her claim for work related
depression because the Bureau had not explained the "glaring discrepancies" in the report of its
IME doctor. Id. 5 21, 611 N.W.2d at 904-05. Three more examples of the extensive literature
concerning occupational injury and disease include: Daniel E. Banks & Mei-Lin Wang, Occupational Asthma, 15 OCCUPATIONAL MED. No. 2 (2000); Linda Rosenstock, OccupationalPulmonary Disease, 2 OCCUPATIONAL MED. No. 2 (1987); and Peter Schnall et al., Workplace and CardiovascularDisease, 15 OCCUPATIONAL MED. No. 1 (2000). Some of the texts discuss a type of
injury or disease, such as occupational disease in general, occupational skin disease, psychiatric
injury, upper extremity injury, back injury, and more. There are titles devoted to a discussion of
the various injuries and diseases that certain groups of workers are susceptible to, including workers in agriculture, plastics, rubber, chemical, petroleum, pharmaceuticals, health care, trucking, or
mining industries. Ergonomics, especially in office workers, has become an important area of
study. An early effort to evaluate ergonomics in the workplace is found in Steven Moore & Arun
Garg, Ergonomics, 7 OCCUPATIONAL MED. No. 4 (1992). More contemporary studies on repetitive injury have been completed by OSHA and the National Academy of Science. See infra notes
269-270. Finally, for a good discussion of the mechanisms and protocols by which various studies
evaluate the risk of work exposure to the development of injury or disease see Ki Moon Bang,
OccupationalEpidemiology, 11 OCCUPATIONAL MED. No. 3 (1996).
265. See generally Klein v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 2001 ND 170, 634 N.W.2d 530
(claiming injury was not work related).
266. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-28(3) (Supp. 2001) (providing that "[tihe bureau may at
any time require an employee to submit to an independent medical examination").
267. E.g., Diane Eicher, The Risk of Repetition Those 'cumualtive trauma disorders':Cause
is disputed, but the pain is real, DENV. POST, Aug. 22, 1994, at E-01 (discussing that injuries,
such as carpal tunnel syndrome, are over diagnosed and often not work related). Dr. Nortin
Hadler believes that cumulative trauma injury is primarily attributable to social and psychological
factors and is not a discernable entity at all. Id. Hadler claims that the injuries "are an 'iatrogenic
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Employers and insurers often point to other factors to explain repetitive
injuries. These other factors might be additional activities (musical instrument or tennis play contributing to carpal tunnel syndrome) or psychological factors. Employers and insurers may attribute repetitive injury claims to
risk factors such as gender, aging, or even malingering. The National
Council on Compensation Insurance contends that repetitive injury claims
are fifty percent more costly than "other" work-related injuries or illnesses. 268 OSHA has estimated that improvements in workplace ergonomics could reduce workers' compensation injuries and costs substantially,
saving $14 billion in costs and over half million fewer injuries. 269 The National Academy of Science estimates that repetitive injury costs about $50
billion in economic loss per annum. 270 The overzealous defense of these
claims, attempting to blame the workers' genetics and the like, ultimately
shift the cost of injury away from employers and insurers, where it belongs,
to workers. As a result, many legitimate claims are denied, and other
27
claims are not filed at all. 1

2.

OccupationalDisease

As with claims of cumulative trauma, it is widely accepted that occupational disease is part of the workers' compensation bargain. All states
now comply with the Commission's recommendation for "full coverage for
work-related disease."2 72 Also similar to cumulative trauma, a dispute
normally arises over the cause of the disease. Although the employer takes
the employee as is, an argument is often made that an employee's illness is

concept,' which is defined as 'induced in a patient by a doctor's words or actions."' Id. The Bureau's predilection is to conduct IME's in most causation, disability, or rehabilitation disputes.
The Bureau is always on the lookout for "defense-minded" physicians to perform IME's. In contrast, most employees seek out treatment from a local physician, not an expert in the art of testifying in a disputed proceeding.
268. David Heilbroner, The Handling of an Epidemic: Repetitive Stress Injury, WORKING
WOMAN, Feb. 1, 1993, at 60 (citing the NCCI regarding the high cost of repetitive injury and Bureau of Labor statistics concerning the significance of the numbers of repetitive injury cases).
269. Occupational Health & Safety, Ergonomic Draft Eases Burden, Allows More Flexibility for Employers, 24 OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH & SAFETY LETTER No. 6 (Apr. 23, 1995).
270. The National Academy of Science recently reported that "conservative estimates of
economic burden posed ... are between $45 and $54 billion annually." NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
SCIENCE, MUSCULOSKELETAL DISORDERS AND THE WORKPLACE: LOW BACK AND UPPER

EXTREMITIES, ES-I (National Academy Press 2001). The report concluded that "[tlhe scientific
studies reviewed support the conclusion that repetitive mechanical strain exceeding tolerance limits, imposed in a variety of ways, results in chronic skeletal muscle injury." Id. at 5-18. The book
by the National Academy of Science contains a goldmine of information concerning back and upper extremity conditions, their etiology, and mechanism of injury. Available at
http://books.nap.edu/catalog/10032.html?onpi-newsdoc0 11701 (last visited July 3, 2003).
271. Seesupra notes 18, 127.
272. Recommendation 2.13, at 50.
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due to nonwork related incidents. 273 For example, an employer will argue
that a respiratory disease is due to smoking or a genetic defect rather than
on account of chronic exposure to grain dust. 274 There is a concern that the
costs of determining which diseases are occupational are disproportionately
high and that employees file many occupational disease claims to shift the
costs from nonwork to work activities. 275

273. See, e.g., Teegarden v. N.D. Workmen's Comp. Bureau, 313 N.W.2d 716 (N.D.
1981).

274. Id. at 717. The court reversed the Bureau's denial of the claim as not timely filed under
North Dakota Century Code section 65-05-01, stating:
The Bureau made no specific finding of fact as to when the claimant knew or should
have known that his disability was fairly traceable to his employment, nor are we
aware of any evidence that establishes this fact. The evidence establishes that the physician advised only that the claimant was to avoid dust and to quit smoking, but does
not otherwise establish any basis that claimant should have known that the work
caused the disease. The evidence may have been sufficient to convince the doctor that
the work caused the injury, but the doctor did not articulate this to the claimant. We
cannot expect the ordinary claimant to have knowledge in medical matters comparable
to that of a doctor.
The letters of Dr. R. W. McLean clearly disclose that the Doctor had formed some
very definite opinions or conclusions that Teegarden's injury (disease) was workrelated and that smoking affected his health. However, the letters do not disclose if
the doctor ever informed Teegarden that the injury (disease) was caused by his working conditions. Nor do the letters disclose if Teegarden was ever told to quit working
at the elevator.
The Doctor also advised the claimant to quit smoking. Does this compel a conclusion
that the injury (disease) was caused by smoking and that the claimant knew or should
have known that smoking caused his injury (disease)? No one has suggested such a
conclusion. The parallel between this and the dust is obvious.
Also, upon receipt of the claim by the Bureau an interoffice memo shortly thereafter
contained the observation that pneumonia and bronchitis are diseases common to the
general public and that aggravation should be considered if the claim was accepted.
This clearly gives another indication that it was not obvious to the Bureau and therefore was not obvious for the claimant to know or that he should have known that his
disease was work-related.
Id. at 719. The court further stated:
The record contains no evidence of facts indicating that the claimant was informed by
anyone that the injury or disease was caused by or was work-related, nor is there any
evidence that a worker comparable to the one in question here under the conditions of
employment should have known that his injury or disease was caused by work or was
work-related. As was observed by the Bureau, pneumonia and bronchitis are diseases
that are common to the general public.
Id. The Bureau contended that Teegarden had not timely filed the claim, all the while disputing
causation. Id. at 720. This case is eerily similar to the Bureau's defense in Klein v. North Dakota
Workers' Compensation Bureau, 2001 ND 170, 634 N.W.2d 530, decided twenty years later. See
supra note 264.
275. ORIN KRAMER
&
RICHARD BRIFFAULT, WORKERS' COMPENSATION:
STRENGTHENING THE SOCIAL COMPACT, 9-10 (Insurance Information Institute 1991). The
authors theorize that workers' compensation for occupational disease may "subsidize" nonwork
illness caused by other factors such as lifestyle and genetics. Id. at 10. See JOHN D. WORRALL &
DAVID APPEL, WORKERS' COMPENSATION, IN WORKERS'

COMPENSATION BENEFITS:

ADEQUACY, EQUITY & EFFICIENCY 11-12 (ILR Press 1985) (noting that the "great uncertainty"
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Despite the perception that employees shift nonwork risks for disease
to their occupations, studies reflect that most cost shifting is the other direction. 276 The studies suggest that this "savings" to the workers' compensation system is substantial, perhaps as much as $4 billion.277 One of the
reasons for this undercompensation of occupational disease is that many
employees do not know about the work relation or are dissuaded from filing
by the prospects of litigation. 278
The concern, incorrect though it may be, is that occupational disease
claims present special problems in workers' compensation that contribute to
the low report and compensation rates for such disease. 279 The damages
due to occupational disease can be more serious than for injury claims. 280
More fatalities occur due to occupational disease than from injury. 281
Moreover, according to economic theory, higher wages should be paid for
heightened risk. 282 It is unclear if workers have information about job risk
available to them. Absent an increase in wages to compensate for the risk
of occupational disease, workers' compensation should be available. 283
3.

Soft Tissue Injury

Soft tissue injury to muscle and ligaments is given other labels such as
musculoligamentous injury, confused with myofasciitis or fibrositis, or
"garbage can" diagnosis. Although some claim that fibrositis, for example,

about the work relatedness of disease claims may render the costs to ascertain the answer higher
than the benefits of occupational disease coverage).
276. See PETER S. BARTH & H. ALLAN HUNT, WORKERS' COMPENSATION AND WORKRELATED ILLNESSES AND DISEASES 16 (2d ed. 1982) (noting that commentators in the medicalscientific community believe that occupational disease "vastly exceeds" the number of claims
made in workers' compensation systems). See generally infra, notes 277-278. Occupational disease includes a variety of respiratory diseases, such as the recently recognized latex allergy afflicting health care workers. The medical literature on occupational injury and disease is significant. An excellent place to start is to search the database of Medline.
277. McCluskey, supra note 3, at 776. "One estimate placed the annual cost of occupational disease covered by Social Security and welfare systems at over $2.2 billion." Id. (citing
ASSISTANT SEC'Y FOR POLICY EVALUATION & RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, AN INTERIM
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE 66 (1980)).
278. Id. "According to one study, insurers and employers contest occupational disease
claims at six times the rate of other work injury claims." Id. (citing Occupational Diseases, 1977:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Human Resources, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 240 (1977) (statement of Prof. Peter Barth)).
279. Id. at 773.
280. Id.
281. Paul J. Leigh et al., Occupational Injury and Illness in the United States, 157
ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 1557 (1997) (reviewing data from the Bureau of Labor, the NCCI,
and other governmental agencies and NGOs).
282. See McCluskey, supra note 3, at 752 (stating that the wage premium theory is that
wages adjust to reflect the risk of injury.)
283. Id. at 773-74.
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is evidenced by "objective evidence" reporting pain at specific "trigger
points," all are susceptible to doubt. The concept of a traumatic muscle
strain is not in dispute, for certain occupations, such as nursing, exhibit high
rates of back strain. 284 Soft tissue injury is often the result of sudden
trauma, but it may also be attributable to cumulative trauma. 285
Sprains and strains are the most common type of injury (over forty percent). 286 The NCCI estimates that back injuries cost nearly forty percent
more than the average time loss claim, and since soft tissue injuries are, according to insurers, "subjective," these injuries are perceived to be susceptible to fraud, abuse, or malingering. 287
Primarily to address the perceived nebulous nature of soft tissue injury,
the North Dakota Legislature amended the definition of compensable injury
to require that injury be "established by medical evidence supported by objective medical findings."288 This reform is one method of restricting
claims for benefits due to soft tissue injury. The Legislature has also precluded this "subjective" report of pain from contributing to a permanent
impairment award. 289 Although everyone has experienced the objective reality of pain, there remains this reference to "objective evidence" that allows compensation decision-makers to reject certain soft tissue claims as
based on "subjective" complaints. Unless it is assumed that workers are
prone to misrepresenting pain, it makes little sense to deny that an injury
occurred simply because the soft tissue injury was primarily diagnosed on
the basis of pain complaints. Pain is occasionally the sole indicia of soft
tissue injury. It is more productive to implement the goal of occupational
medicine by accepting the claim, providing appropriate therapy, and encouraging return to work as soon as medically practicable because early
return to work improves medial prognosis and prevents physical deconditioning. 290
284. See Gary Orr, Ergonomics Programs for Healthcare Organizations, 12
OCCUPATIONAL MED., The Health Care Worker 687, 689 (1997) (citing Bureau of Labor Statistics for the significant incidence of injury in the healthcare industry due to lifting patients).
285. McCluskey, supra note 3, at 782.
286. NCCI, 'Moral Hazard' Explains 30% Rise in Soft Tissue Injuries, in Back from the
Brink.
287. Id. at 42-43.
288. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(9) (1995); see Geck v. N.D. Workers' Comp. Bureau,
1998 ND 158, 55 9-10, 583 N.W.2d 621 (noting that pain triggered by work activities and requiring need for medical treatment was compensable because the medical evidence established that
work triggered the worsening pain).
289. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-12.2(8) (Supp. 2001).
290. Dean M. Hashimoto, The Future Role of Managed Care and Capitation in Workers'
Compensation22 AM. J.L. & MED. 233, 251-52 (1996). Hashimoto, an M.D., presents a "public
health paradigm" that emphasizes "rehabilitation and prevention of injuries and diseases ." Id. at
251. He notes:
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4.

Mental Injury Claims

For many years, workers' compensation defense seminars offered
courses concerning the defense of psychiatric injury claims.2 9' Stress
claims are deemed by some to be problematic because it is thought difficult
to diagnose the nature of the mental injury, ascertain the cause, and determine the "objective" basis of the alleged work stress. Some believe that
mental injury claimants are likely afflicted with preexisting personality
problems, are more prone to malingering and long treatment courses, and
increase costs. 292 The NCCI contends that stress claims are much more expensive than others. 293 Despite the concerns, the cost of stress claims has
294
never exceeded one percent of total compensation costs.
Professor Larson contends that mental injury is no less real than physical injury and should be compensated.2 95 Workers' compensation systems
typically distinguish three types of stress claims. There is little controversy
in physical-mental cases, which are cases where a physical injury also
causes a psychiatric disorder.2 96 Mental-physical claims are those in which
mental stress causes a physical injury, such as hypertension or heart attack. 297 The controversy arises as to mental-mental claims, as where witnessing of a traumatic event causes posttraumatic stress disorder or chronic
stress causes depression. 298 In the vast majority of these cases, litigation
regarding cause is undertaken in which the defense highlights other possible
causes, including preexisting personality disorder, past psychiatric diagno-

[Elncouraging accident prevention and injury mitigation could become just as important as monitoring treatment. ... Occupational medicine also involves the study and
application of ergonomics, a discipline that examines the effects of physical and emotional stress on workplace performance. Some ergonomics programs have been shown
to improve health and workplace productivity by preventing back and repetitive
trauma injuries. Additional prevention-oriented activities include preplacement physical examination, drug testing, and compliance with health and safety regulations. Finally, occupational medicine physicians routinely walk through workplaces to familiarize themselves with job functions and to identify hazardous exposures.
Id. at 251-52.
291. I attended many such seminars while serving as counsel to the Workers' Compensation
Bureau, and I met at one such seminar a psychiatrist who testified for the Bureau that a workers'
injury and disability played no role in a workers' depression and suicide. See supra note 55.
292. Aya V. Matsumoto, Reforming the Reform: Mental Stress Claims under California's
Workers' Compensation System, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1327, 1337 (1994).
293. McCluskey, supra note 3, at 787 (citing N. Mike Helvacian, Workers' Compensation
Paranoia: Mental-Stress Claims, NCCI, (Aug. 1993)).
294. McCluskey, supra note 3, at 784 (citing Meg Fletcher, States Tighten Regulations;
Work Comp Stress Claims Decline, Bus. INS., Aug. 30, 1993, at 2).
295. 3 LARSON, supra note 45, § 56.04, at 56-16.
296. Id. § 56.03, at 56-9.
297. Id. § 56.02, at 56-3.
298. Id. § 56.04, at 56-16, 56-23.
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sis and treatment, nonwork stressors, and more. Workers seeking benefits
for mental injury from mental stimulus must be prepared for detailed questioning of the most personal nature.
North Dakota has joined the "reform" group by enacting an exclusion
of coverage for "[a] mental injury arising from mental stimulus." 99
Moreoever, any mental injury resulting from an employment termination is
not compensable. 300
Denial of coverage for mental injuries is a return to outdated thinking,
in which these injuries are not real or due to "weakness." Accordingly,
North Dakota has retreated from the goal of broad coverage of injury and
disease. North Dakota law provides:
A mental or psychological condition caused by a physical injury
[is compensable] only when the physical injury is determined with
reasonable medical certainty to be at least fifty percent of the cause
of the condition as compared with all other contributing causes
combined, and only when the condition did not preexist the work
injury. 301

Similarly, physical injury caused by mental stress must be due to "unusual stress" with at least fifty percent of the cause due to work. 302 The
statute is unrealistic and begs for speculation. The defense will almost certainly present an expert to testify that the work stress was not at least fifty
percent of the cause of the mental condition, pointing out genetic factors
and the like. The difficulty a worker will have to meet the heightened standard unfairly shifts the cost of mental-physical claims (work-aggravated
mental illnesses) and physical-mental claims (physical injury, such as hypertension, emanating from mental stress) to workers.
In response to "skyrocketing" costs, other states have also enacted statutes requiring workers to satisfy stricter standards of proof that their injury
is caused by work. 303 A rationale for the stricter causation standard is the
perception that other standards, such as "substantial contributing cause," are
insufficient to weed out claims only peripherally related to work. 304 But,
299. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(l1)(b)(10) (Supp. 2001).
300. Choukalos v. N.D. Workers' Comp. Bureau, 427 N.W.2d 344, 345 (N.D. 1988).
301. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(1 1)(a)(6).
302. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(1 1)(a)(3).
303. McCluskey, supra note 3, at 792-99.
304. Id. at 804-08.
Recent reform efforts often have subjected "mental-mental" claims ... to particular
restrictions on the assumption that the source of physical trauma is more readily discemable than the source of mental trauma. This assumption is complicated by evidence that traces much physical illness to mental stress. For example, one study found
that more than two-thirds of all visits to family doctors are prompted by stress-related
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uncertainty of causation can lead to overcompensation or undercompensation, where some valid claims are denied. No objective criteria exist to
clearly separate injuries or disease caused by work from those caused by
other factors. If, as Professor Prosser notes, Eve is the cause of all our woe,
then no condition is proximately caused by a particular accident. 05 In the
final analysis, every condition results from an interaction between environment and human body. The statute creates an unworkable framework for
reasonable evaluation of physical-mental and mental-physical injury claims.
5.

Heart Attack

North Dakota is one of several states with special rules for "heart attack
and other heart-related disease," requiring both that the stress constitute
"unusual stress" and work is at least fifty percent of the cause. 306 In a 1975
case, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that heart attack claims were
compensable if the employee's usual exertion of work caused the infarction.3 07 In 1977, the Legislature enacted the "unusual stress rule," which
was based upon dire predictions of an increase in costs to employers. 308

symptoms.... Below the surface, the concern about determining the cause of mental
stress claims represents an attempt to cast in neutral, factual terms a more fundamental
value judgment that such claims are less deserving of compensation.
Id. at 806-07.
305. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 44, § 41, at 236.
306. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(1l)(a)(3) (Supp. 2001); see also 2 LARSON, supra note
45, § 44.04 (discussing the development of tests used in heart cases).
307. Stout v. N.D. Workmen's Comp. Bureau, 236 N.W.2d 889, 892 (N.D. 1975).
308. Nelson v. N.D. Workmen's Comp. Bureau, 316 N.W.2d 790, 793 n.2 (N.D. 1982) (examining the legislative history of the 1977 amendment to section 65-01-02 of the North Dakota
Century Code). The Bureau complained to the legislature about the huge cost increases that
would result if heart attack claims are compensated based on the normal causation standard.
Grace v. N.D. Workmen's Comp. Bureau, 395 N.W.2d 576, 580 (N.D. 1986). Therefore, the
legislature enacted the "unusual stress" rule for compensating workers who sustain myocardial
infarction as a result of work. Id. The unusual stress rule coupled with the limited standard of
review makes it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for a worker to recover benefits in North
Dakota for a heart attack. I am unaware of any case in which a court has reversed the Bureau's
denial of a claim for benefits due to a heart attack. A bleak example, which establishes that even a
great deal of stress is not unusual, is the seminal case Grace v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau. Id.
James Grace was employed as a masonry foreman and had been in that line of work for 38
years. Id. at 577. On the day of his heart attack, Grace had been laying cement block in a building with outside walls but no roof. Id. The work site was described as "being in a big, open box
with the sun shining directly in." Id. Grace was foreman and felt uneasy about being behind
schedule. Id. His physician ascribed Grace's myocardial infarction to the heavy work in the heat.
Id. The bureau did not contest the district court's determination that Grace's heart attack was
causally related to his employment. Id. at 580. The sole issue for the supreme court was whether
the heart attack was precipitated by "unusual stress." Id. The court noted that the unusual stress
rule was adopted by the legislature to save money, and the Bureau had advised the legislature that
the number of heart attack claims rose 500% after Stout v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 236 N.W.2d 889, 892 (N.D. 1975), where the court held that heart attack claims were
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Subsequently, all appeals seeking benefits as a result of heart attack have
failed, probably due to the deference the courts give to the administrative
agency, which typically denies these claims. This denial of nearly all heart
attack claims undoubtedly shifts costs away from employers to the detriment of workers.
The harsh results of the standards of proof for heart attack are completely alleviated for qualified law enforcement officers and fire-fighters
who suffer from hypertension, heart, or respiratory disease. 309 Several other
states have also enacted this presumption to benefit public servants in
stressful jobs. The presumption contains a medical thesis that the stress of
such work "affects risk factors and causes heart disease." 31 0 In fact, there
are many medical studies that support the relationship between stress and
hypertension, hyperlipidemia, and coronary artery disease. 311 The presumption precludes an unenlightening "battle of the experts" as to whether
stress causes heart disease. 3 12 In this instance, the bargain shifts towards
these public servant workers.
6.

Aggravation of Injury by Work

The National Commission recommended that full compensation be
paid to an employee when both work and nonwork causes substantially
contribute to an injury or disease. 313 North Dakota follows the general rule
in part, affording compensation when work is a "substantial contributing

compensable on the same grounds as other injuries -usual stress. The Bureau also projected that
Stout would require a 17% increase in premiums. Grace, 395 N.W.2d at 580. The court affirmed
the Bureau's conclusion that Grace was not under unusual stress because, as a mason, he was accustomed to heavy work in the elements. Id. at 582. It is difficult to imagine a circumstance in
which a laborer could recover under such a test.
309. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-15.1 (2001). The presumption applies in favor of law enforcement and fire fighters for hypertension, heart disease, and respiratory disease. The public
servant must have passed a preemployment physical. Id. Moreover, a worker who uses tobacco is
not eligible for these benefits unless the worker "provides yearly documentation from a physician
which indicates that the [worker] has not used tobacco for the preceding two years." N.D. CENT.
CODE § 65-01-15 (2001).
310. Robertson v. N.D. Workers' Comp. Bureau, 2000 ND 167, 1 40, 616 N.W.2d 844,
855.
311. E.g., J. Siegrist et al., Chronic work stress is associated with atherogenic lipids and
elevatedfibrinogen in middle-aged men, 242 J. OF INTERNAL MED. 149 (1997); Robert Karasek et
al., Job Decision Latitude, Job Demands, and CardiovascularDisease: A Prospective Study of
Swedish Men, 71 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 694 (1981); Hans Bosma et al., Two Alternative Job Stress
Models and the Risk of Coronary Heart Disease, 88 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH No. 1 (1998); Susan A.
Everson et al., Interaction of Workplace Demands and CardiovascularReactivity in Progression
of CarotidAtherosclerosis: Population Based Study, 314 BRIT. MED. J. 553 (1997).
312. City & County of San Fransisco v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 583 P.2d 151, 15556 (Cal. 1978).
313. Recommendation 2.17, at 51.
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factor" to the condition.314 However, reduced benefits are paid when a preexisting condition is worsened by a compensable injury or when a nonwork
injury worsens a prior compensable injury. 3 15 North Dakota is among a
small minority of states that impose this restriction. 3 16 In the past, the
North Dakota Supreme Court construed the aggravation statute liberally in
favor of injured workers, 3 17 but recent decisions by the court have not followed that trend. 31 8 The statute and court decisions are inconsistent with

314. Satrom v. N.D. Workmen's Comp. Bureau, 328 N.W.2d 824, 831 (N.D. 1982).
315. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-15 (Supp. 2001).
316. 5 LARSON, supra note 45, § 90.03, at 90-5 (noting that under the "great majority" of
compensation acts the problem of apportionment does not arise). Larson notes that the "apparent
harshness of the rule has been softened in most of the principal states having such statutes by an
exception for cases coming within the Second Injury Fund provisions." Id. Second injury funds
cover employees with preexisting conditions, the precise workers that North Dakota penalizes
with a fifty percent reduction in benefits. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-15 (Supp. 2001). Since there
is no sound compensation reason for the statute and it is applied arbitrarily, I submit that the aggravation statute should be repealed.
317. See Jepson v. N.D. Workmen's Comp. Bureau, 417 N.W.2d 184, 185 (N.D. 1987) superseded by 1989 N.D. Laws 766, § 5 (finding repeated prior left shoulder injuries not sufficient
to justify reduced aggravation award). The Jepson court failed to mention in its opinion that the
Bureau had introduced the AMA Guides, showing prior shoulder dislocations are disabling.
Elliott v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 435 N.W.2d 695, 698 (N.D. 1989) superseded by 1989
N.D. Laws 766, § 5 (rejecting a workers' prior impairment as sufficient to invoke the aggravation
statute, for the prior condition must be disabling-impairment of earning capacity-at the time of
injury). The court was properly concerned that "[p]utatively, almost every injury could, with sufficient scrutiny, be linked to some preexisting weakness or susceptibility." Id. at 696 (quoting
Balliet v. N.D. Workmen's Comp. Bureau, 297 N.W.2d 791, 794 (N.D. 1980)). The court's current construction of the statute is unduly harsh. See infra note 318.
318. Mikkelson v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 2000 ND 67, 5 1, 609 N.W.2d 74, 75.
Mikkelson injured her back and neck while lifting a child from a wheel chair on October 6, 1997.
Id. T 2, 609 N.W.2d at 75. As a result, she was restricted to "light-medium" work, which precluded her from continuing to work as a teacher's aide. Id. The court upheld the Bureau's reduction of her claim to a 50% award pursuant to North Dakota Century Code section 65-05-15 because she had injured her neck in a motor vehicle accident in June 1993. Id. 55 1-3. An
independent medical evaluator concluded that the first accident and injury causally contributed to
the severity of Mikkelson's work injury in 1997. Id. 5 3-4. In order to reduce benefits, the court
required the Bureau to show that the preexisting condition constituted an impairment or disability
(previous work restrictions or interference with function) that was "known in advance of the work
injury." Id. 5 12, 609 N.W.2d at 77 (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-15). The record reflected
that after her car accident in 1993, Mikkelson "missed about two weeks of work before returning
to employment without any medically mandated work restrictions." Id. 14, 609 N.W.2d. at 78.
Remarkably, the court allowed application of a reduced award even though the 1993 injury resulted only in a temporary disability that ended over four years prior to her work injury, noting
that "[e]vidence that Mikkelson's preexisting condition was 'active' at the time of her compensable injury was not required to invoke the aggravation statute." Id. 5 17, 609 N.W.2d at 79.
The court held that the aggravation statute applies even if the impairment or disability is no longer
in evidence at the time of the work injury. Id.
Nearly any prior injury can theoretically qualify under this interpretation of the aggravation
statute to reduce a worker's benefits to half of what they should be. See Balliet v. N.D. Workmen's Comp. Bureau, 297 N.W.2d 791, 794 (N.D. 1980) (stating "Putatively, almost every injury
could, with sufficient scrutiny, be linked to some preexisting weakness or susceptibility. To read
'condition' so broadly would vest an unacceptable amount of discretion in the Bureau and threaten
the express policy of construing the Workmen's Compensation Act liberally in favor of the
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the Commission's recommendation for full compensation. 3 19 The lack of
any sound compensation rationale for the aggravation statute is reason
enough to repeal it.
C.

INCOME PROTECTION

As part of the bargain, employees exchanged tort damages for sure and
certain relief, retaining medical and wage replacement damages. Disability
benefits have never provided full income replacement. In 1972, most employees received less than two-thirds of their wage loss. 320 The National
Commission noted that most states did not regularly adjust these maximum

workman." (citation omitted)). The use of this lax causation test, approved by the Mikkelson
Court, is insufficient to ensure that workers are protected from arbitrary application of the aggravation. Causation, like beauty, is in the eye of the beholder. As noted before, causation is a notoriously broad concept. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 44, § 41, at 236 (noting "the fatal
tresspass done by Eve was cause of all our woe"). The Bureau can easily find an IME physician
to opine that a prior injury played a causal role in recurrence. See Mikkelson, T 15, 609 N.W.2d.
at 78-79 (quoting testimony of Bureau doctor). A more objective standard to decide whether application of the aggravation statute is legitimate is to examine the workers' disability and impairment status. If the worker is laboring under work restrictions or has a permanent impairment as
evaluated under the AMA Guides, at least there are some objective criteria to apply the aggravation statute to.
In Bruns v. North Dakota Workers' Compensation Bureau, 1999 ND 116, 595 N.W.2d 298,
the court, in a strained reading of North Dakota Century Code section 65-05-15, held that "active
impairment (interference with function)" under this statute is not the same as a "permanent impairment" under North Dakota Century Code section 65-01-02(26), which defines "permanent
impairment" as "loss of or loss of use of a member of the body." Id. 1 16, 595 N.W.2d at 302-03.
The reasoning is unsound. Since "active impairment" under North Dakota Century Code section
65-05-15 is illustrated in the statute as "interference with function," and the definition of "permanent impairment" is "loss of or loss of use of a member of the body," it is evident that both concepts are attempting to measure whether there is interference with the function of a member of the
body. The reason that the definition in North Dakota Century Code section 65-01-01(25) is useful
to determine apportionment under North Dakota Century Code section 65-05-15 is because the
guidelines for awarding impairment benefits are well known. This will result in clear delineation
of the preexisting impairments that are sufficient to invoke the aggravation statute. Unfortunately,
the court's decision in Bruns allows the Bureau to call a witness to testify that the preexisting condition constitutes an impairment without the use of any guideline. Bruns, 5T 19-20, 595 N.W.2d
at 303-04. Workers who claim a permanent impairment award must establish its existence
through application of the AMA Guides. Reduction in benefits to fifty percent should require no
less evidentiary basis.
The court's two holdings illustrate that while a worker must bear the burden of proof with
"objective evidence," the Bureau, in rebuttal, can offer nothing more than the opinions of a doctor
to establish a causal connection between the worker's current condition and a prior injury. Mikkelson, 17, 609 N.W.2d at 79, Bruns, 16, 595 N.W.2d at 302-03. Furthermore, the current severity of a prior injury is not objectively measured in any fashion. Thus, the statute can be invoked without reference to whether the worker has current work restrictions or ratable
impairment. This lack of reference allows the Bureau to apply North Dakota Century Code section 65-05-15 in an arbitrary fashion. The Bureau's ability to rebut a workers claim for full benefits without utilization of any objective standard of reference is a further shift of the bargain
against the interests of workers.
319. Recommendation 2.17, at 51.
320. NAT'LCOMM'NREPORT, supra note I, at 18.
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benefits levels for inflation, resulting in a decrease of the maximum benefit
level as a proportion of average wages. 32' The Commission reported that,
as a result of this decrease of the maximum weekly benefit, many workers
and their families were left below the poverty level. 322 Examining the
statutory limits on income replacement, the Commission concluded that
benefit levels were inadequate, and recommended that states raise the caps
and place no dollar or time limits on receipt. 323
Following the Commission's report, many states raised the maximum
benefit caps, and most states regularly adjust the caps to recognize changes
in the state's average weekly wage. Recent reforms in many states represent a shift back toward the limits on economic damages that the 1972
Commission rejected. North Dakota is part of this trend. North Dakota's
maximum benefit was raised to 110 percent of the state's average weekly
wage and is adjusted yearly. 324 Supplementary benefits were granted to
workers injured when wages and compensation rates were low. 325 Until recently, there were no limits on the duration of benefits. Statutory changes
in 1991 eliminated permanent partial disability, 326 and utilization of the rehabilitation chapter has sharply reduced permanent disability awards. 327
Benefits "offsets" to elderly workers have curtailed permanent total disability benefits as well. 328
Limiting compensation in cases of permanent total or permanent partial
disability (as opposed to little change in temporary total) clearly shifts costs
to injured workers with more serious disabilities. This practice is rationalized as imparting economic efficiency to workers' compensation on the
theory that reduced benefits provide incentive to injured workers to return
to work earlier. 329 This, it is thought, will reduce malingering and litigation.
The concept of moral hazard gives rise to a concern that an individual
compensated for a loss has less incentive to defer the cost of the loss. The

321. Id.
322. Id. "In general, workmen's compensation programs provide cash benefits which are
inadequate. The majority of disabled beneficiaries receive less than two-thirds of the lost wages.
In most States, the most a beneficiary may receive, 'the maximum weekly benefit,' is less than the
poverty level of income for a family of four. Moreover, many States limit the duration or the total
amount of cash payments." Id.
323. Recommendation 3.17, at 19.
324. 1999 N.D. Laws, 556, § 2; see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-09 (Supp. 2001).
325. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05.2-01 (Supp. 2001).
326. 1991 N.D. Laws, 714, § 47; see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-10(2) (Supp. 2001).
This section caps partial disability benefits at five years in duration. Id.
327. See infra notes 358-368 and accompanying text.
328. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-09.3; see also infra notes 352-357 and accompanying text.
329. McCluskey, supra note 3, at 816.
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workers' compensation insurer may refer to this as malingering. A study by
economist Kip Viscusi estimates that a ten percent increase in workers'
compensation benefits results in a three percent increase in time off the
job.330

In response to a similar moral hazard argument by opponents of the
Federal Employers Liability Act, 331 it was noted that even though FELA offers one hundred percent wage replacement, about eighty-nine percent of
FELA claimants returned to their previous jobs.332 The incentive to stay out
of work is greater for railroad workers than it is for workers receiving
workers' compensation benefits because payments to the railroad workers
are higher. This empirical evidence indicates that most workers would
rather work than receive disability compensation.
While evidence of increased receipt of benefits by workers in association with higher benefit rates is typically interpreted as a rise in worker
moral hazard, it may also be viewed as a reduction of employer and insurer
moral hazard. 333 The choice is not one of pure economics but is a social
judgment, an evaluation of the bargain, as to whose moral hazard should be
controlled. 334 When disability benefits are less than wages, employees are
motivated to quickly return to work, and employers have fewer incentives
to reduce the total cost of work accidents, including safety programs. 335
For example, large damage awards (including punitive damages) may
be thought to provide heightened concern for safety since manufacturers
may expend more resources to ensure safety of consumers than would be
the case if damages were capped. Professor McCluskey notes:
The purported efficiency rationales for maintaining and even widening the gap between disability benefits and economic losses
mask distributive choices about how much workers deserve to be
compensated for work injuries and illnesses. Reforms limiting
disability benefits are about moral judgments, not economic incentives. The practice of limiting disability benefits is evidence of
a prevailing assumption that workers' compensation is a system
guided by principles of charity more than by the ideal of a con-

330. Id. at 817 (citing W. Kip Viscusi, Product and Occupational Liability, 5 J. ECON.
PERSP. 71,78 (1991)).
331. See 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1994) (providing a fault based compensation system for
workers in the high accident railroad industry).
332. Jerry J. Phillips, An Evaluation of the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 25 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 49, 59 (1988).
333. McCluskey, supra note 3, at 818.
334. Id.
335. Id.
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tract-like bargain. The recent reforms express an implicit moral
judgment that workers receiving compensation benefits are at best
deserving of charitable handouts, and at worst suspect of criminal
336
theft of employers' property.
The concept of the bargain representing an agreement between equals
is not always consistently applied. State legislatures are pressured by business and insurance interests to control "skyrocketing" costs. "Benefit reform" is justified as necessary for economic efficiency and to remain competitive with neighboring states. 337 The reforms represent a judgment that
the employer's obligation inherent to its half of the bargain-providing sure
and certain relief with lifetime replacement of income and medical care-is
only a goal, which may be compromised.
1.

Temporary Total Disability

Temporary total disability is the least controversial of workers' compensation benefits. North Dakota has exceeded the Commission's recommendation to provide a maximum benefit of one hundred percent of the

state's average weekly wage. 338 North Dakota's waiting period of five days
is near the Commission's recommendation that the wait be no more than
three days. 339 Nevertheless, the state has not changed its disability formula
to replace eighty percent of spendable earnings.
The Commission's rationale for utilizing "spendable earnings" is the
importance of taxes and fringe benefits for which the measure of gross
wages often fails to account. 340 Because wage income is taxed and disability income is not, some disabled workers could receive more spendable income than when they were working. North Dakota law precludes this from
34
occurring. 1

336. Id. at 820.
337. Supra note 17.
338. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-09 (Supp. 2001) (providing a maximum benefit of 110% of
North Dakota's average weekly wage).
339. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-08 (Supp. 2001). This section provides, "No benefits may
be paid for disability, the duration of which is less than five consecutive calendar days." Id.
However, in cases of "reapplication," which occurs after benefits have been discontinued and the
worker requests reopening on the ground of change in medical condition, the retroactive period of
loss could be significant because "the award may commence no more than thirty days before the
date of reapplication." N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-08(1); see also infra note 347-348.
340. NAT'L COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 36 (noting that an employee's losses due to
injury include wages and "fringe benefits, such as health insurance, and legally mandated expenditures, such as employers' contributions for Social Security").
341. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-09(2). This section provides that "[tihe disability benefit... may not exceed the weekly wage of the employee after deductions for social security and
federal income tax." Id.
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Often ignored in the calculation is the fact that employees receive a direct economic gain from work in the form of fringe benefits, which most
states do not include in disability benefit calculations. Though often dismissed as hyperbole, disability often results in an inability to perform unpaid household labor. In some circumstances, workers must purchase these
services in the labor market, resulting in real pecuniary losses. Finally,
many states prohibit payment if defined wage losses do not exceed a certain
level. The 1972 Commission endorsed the view that it is appropriate to
"reallocate resources" and require threshold loss of ten percent medical impairment or ten percent earnings loss. 342 North Dakota's legislature enacted
a fifteen percent "deductible" for permanent impairment and requires disability loss to exceed ten percent. 343 The failure of reform to redefine disability in terms of spendable income to account for the increasing difference
between actual and gross income suggests that costs of work accidents are
redistributed further to workers and their families and away from employers
and insurers.
Temporary total disability benefits continue until the worker is found to
be permanently disabled or attains maximum medical recovery and is released for work suitable to restrictions, education, and training. 344 The Bureau will issue a decision when it concludes that a worker is able to return
to work. The Bureau provides notice of the impending termination of disability benefits, but no pretermination hearing is required. 345 The Bureau
decision is res judicata as to the worker's disability status as it then ex342. NAT'L COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 70.
Drastic reform may be necessary in some States to shift benefits to workers with the most serious
impairments. A possible strategy would be to increase the maximum weekly benefits at the rate
we have recommended for other classes of benefits, while simultaneously proscribing permanent
partial payments unless the worker experiences a permanent impairment of at least 10 percent of
the whole body or an actual wage loss of at least 10 percent of the pre-disability wage.
Id.
343. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-12.2(10) (Supp. 2001) (providing a fifteen percent deductible for all permanent partial impairment awards); N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-08(8) (providing that partial disability will not be paid "unless the loss of earning capacity exceeds ten percent").
344. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-09; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05.1-01(4) (Supp. 2001)
(providing that the first option is return to work, and training is allowed only when no work of any
kind is suitable).
345. Beckler v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 418 N.W.2d 770, 774-75 (N.D. 1988). In
many states, the regulatory agency must provide approval to the insurer to terminate benefits.
McCluskey, supra note 3, at 868. McCluskey argues that providing an insurer unilateral control
to terminate claims amounts to redistribution of friction costs from insurers to workers. Id. This
unilateral control rests, by definition, in the Bureau because there is no separate oversight agency
in North Dakota. Moreover, the threat of benefit termination gives substantial negotiating power
to insurers who wish to reduce costs or offer low settlements. Id. Many workers fail to challenge
inappropriate or questionable benefit cutoffs due to lack of knowledge or skills in negotiating the
system. Id.
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ists.346 However, workers may reapply for disability benefits if they have
sustained a significant change in medical condition.
In 1989, the legislature enacted a provision to deal with these recurrent
claims, which had become a significant problem because the compensation
act did not contain any mechanism to avoid indefinite retroactive payments. 347 While the statute is arguably necessary, the history and develop346. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-03 (1995); see also Lass v N.D. Workmen's Comp. Bureau, 415 N.W.2d 796, 800 (N.D. 1987) (holding, "An unappealed Bureau decision is res judicata
unless the Bureau reopens a claim").
347. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-08(1) provides:
When disability benefits are discontinued, the bureau may not begin payment again
unless the injured employee files a reapplication for disability benefits on a form supplied by the bureau. In case of reapplication, the award may commence no more than
thirty days before the date of reapplication. Disability benefits must be reinstated upon
proof by the injured employee that:
The employee has sustained a significant change in the compensable medical condition;
The employee has sustained an actual wage loss caused by the significant change in
the compensable medical condition; and
The employee has not retired or voluntarily withdrawn from the job market ....
Id. The statute was enacted in 1989 in reaction to Lass, which correctly decided that because
status may change over time (a worker's condition may worsen and require surgery, resulting in
permanent restrictions that are more significant than before), a prior disability determination that a
worker is not disabled is not res judicata when the worker reapplies for disability benefits at a later
date under different medical circumstances. Lass, 415 N.W.2d at 799-800. The Bureau was not
taken by surprise by the decision because counsel had informed the commissioners that the court
would decide the case in this manner. The Commissioners, led by the enlightened labor representative, Richard Mikkelson, desired a decision to teach the bureaucracy to view reapplications
on current evidence of disability. However, after Lass, there was no time limit for reapplication,
so benefits would be paid retroactive to the first date of disability. In the interim period, the Bureau, not being on notice of this change, was unable to assist the worker with medical and vocational rehabilitation to minimize the disability period. While reform to reduce the period of back
due benefits was arguably necessary and the legislature's enactment of North Dakota Century
Code section 65-05-08 warranted, the Bureau has taken an unduly harsh stance as to the meaning
of the statute. In recent years, the Bureau has aggressively asserted that a worker has not proved
"actual wage loss" under North Dakota Century Code section 65-05-08(l)(b) in any case in which
the worker was not working at the time of reapplication. This argument turns on its head the very
notion of what it means to be disabled. Workers who are unable to perform or obtain employment
due to injury are disabled. See Jimison v. N.D. Workmen's Comp. Bureau, 331 N.W.2d 822, 827
(N.D. 1983) (holding that because Jimison could still do some work, he was not totally disabled).
However, on reapplication these workers may find themselves confronted with a paradoxical argument: the workers' very disability the Bureau seeks to refute serves as a defense to the Bureau
on reapplication because the Bureau argues that the worker has not proved "actual wage loss" (a
disabled person has, by definition, been out of work and is thus unable to show a loss of actual
wages). Unfortunately, this defense has actually been successful in a trio of cases decided in
2003. See Gronfur v. N.D. Workers Comp. Fund, 2003 ND 42,
14-15, 658 N.W.2d 337, 343;
Lesmeister v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 2003 ND 60, 5J24, 659 N.W.2d 350, 358; Bachmeier
v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 2003 ND 63, T 16, 660 N.W.2d 217, 222.
The reference to "actual wage loss" in North Dakota Century Code section 65-05-08(1)(b)
was enacted in 1991. 1991 N.D. Laws 714, § 43. The Bureau's initial view was that the term
"actual wage loss" meant what the dissent in Gronfur claims: that the inability to obtain work due
to injury is sufficient to show unavailability of wage income. The words "actual wage loss" do
not have the talismanic significance the North Dakota Supreme Court appears to give them in
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ment of the law regarding reapplication further illustrates a shift of the bargain against workers. 348 Finally, as further evidence of this shift, the North

Gronfur, Bachmeier, and Lesmeister. Workers have actually lost wage income if their injury precludes them from obtaining or performing employment. The court does not appear to express any
surprise that this trio of cases first raised this issue over ten years after enactment, nor does the
record appear to reflect the Bureau's altered construction of the statute. See infra, note 348.
348. Gronfur, 2003 ND 42, 5J 11-14, 652 N.W.2d 337, 342-43. Gronfur injured his back in
1996 and received disability benefits for a period. Id. 2, 658 N.W.2d at 339. In 1997, the Bureau terminated total disability benefits but awarded temporary disability benefits, claiming he
could do light work. Id. He did not appeal, and the order became final. Id. He reapplied in 2000,
claiming that his back condition had worsened. Id. 9 3. In fact, Gronfur had back surgery, which
is, as a matter of medical fact, disabling. Id. at 340. The Bureau denied his reapplication because
he had not established "actual wage loss." Id. In fact, Gronfur had not worked since 1996. Id.
The court noted that the legislature used the term "actual wage loss" in N.D.C.C. § 65-0508(1)(b), rather than the more expansive term "earnings capacity." Id. 5 13, 658 N.W.2d at 34243. This proved to the court that if a worker was not working prior to filing the reapplication, no
benefits could be paid. Id. T 15, 658 N.W.2d at 343. However, the court noted, "Gronfur concedes that, after he was awarded partial disability benefits, he made no attempt to find employment with the restrictions recognized by the Bureau's findings he was capable of light duty work.
Consequently, this opinion does not address the possibility that an actual wage loss may be shown
by a claimant's unsuccessful diligent efforts to obtain wages from employment." Id. 12, 658
N.W.2d at 342 n.2. While the Court did not reach the issue, reopening under those circumstances
should be mandatory because North Dakota Century Code section 65-05-08 must be interpreted in
conjunction with North Dakota Century Code section 65-05.1-04(4), which provides "[i]f the employee meets the burden of proving that the employee made a good faith work trial or work search
and that the work trial or work search was unsuccessful due to the injury, the Bureau shall reevaluate the employee's vocational rehabilitation claim." (emphasis added). N.D. CENT. CODE §
65-05.1-04(4) (Supp. 2001).
The problem is that most workers come to lawyers having been disabled ever since initial
termination of benefits and do not search for work because they are disabled. The opinion is a
harsh interpretation of the statute because in most cases, workers are not working at the time of reapplication. The Bureau thereby achieves an implicit reversal of Lass v. North Dakota Workers
Compensation Bureau, 415 N.W.2d 796 (N.D. 1987) because change in medical condition with
inability to work is no longer sufficient to reinstate benefits. The essence of the Gronfur, Bachmeier, and Lesmeister holdings is that a change in the workers' medical and vocational circumstances (renewed proof of an inability to obtain employment) is insufficient for reinstatement of
benefits. North Dakota Century Code section 65-05-08(6) provides that "[it is the burden of the
employee to show that the inability to obtain employment or to earn as much as the employee
earned at the time of injury is due to physical limitation related to the injury, and that any wage
loss claimed is the result of the compensable injury." N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-08(6) (Supp.
2001). This is consistent with the definition of disability, which is the inability to perform or obtain employment. Jimison v. N.D. Workmen's Comp. Bureau, 331 N.W.2d 822, 827 (N.D. 1983).
As the dissent stated in Gronfur:
Therefore, "actual wage loss" can be established by showing an inability to obtain employment. The Bureau takes the position that this inability to obtain employment is
proven by a job search and evidence of rejection for jobs based on the physical impairment caused by the work injury. I am at a loss as to why "an inability to obtain
employment" cannot be proven by medical evidence that the employee is totally disabled from any work as a result of the work injury. Such is the case here from April
14, 2000, through October 5, 2000.
Gronfur, 9 17, 658 N.W.2d at 344. It is interesting to note that despite the Bureau's admission,
the majority did not reach the issue whether a worker could establish actual wage loss by proving
an unsuccessful job search and rejection due to injury. Perhaps the majority is not conceding this
point.
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Dakota Supreme Court has stringently construed the provisions of a statute
requiring the worker's doctor to submit "verification of disability," elevating form over substance. 349 The court thereby absolved the Bureau from

Since disability is a blend of medical and vocational factors, capable of change over time, the
courts rationale in Lass applies with equal force to both. Lass, 415 N.W.2d 799-800. Workers
might decide to renew the search for work, only to find that the medical condition preludes them
from obtaining work. Surely this constitutes a disability. The court has recognized that a change
in vocational circumstances can warrant reopening. Wendt v. N. D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 467
N.W. 2d 720 (N.D. 1991). Similarly, workers might have had their disability benefits terminated
wrongfully if they were not able to return to work. A worker who establishes both a change in
medical condition and a change in vocational circumstances-thetwo factors constituting mutually reinforcing proof that work is unobtainable-should be entitled to reinstatement of disability
under North Dakota Century Code section 65-05-08(1)(b). The issue concerning actual wage loss
arises most frequently in cases where the worker has never returned to work. See, e.g., Bachmeier
v. N.D. Worker's Comp. Bureau, 2003 ND 63, 660 N.W.2d 217. "Bachmeier reapplied for disability benefits in July 2000, alleging new medical evidence showed his 1995 surgery had not
fully corrected his back problems and he had been disabled and unable to work at all times after
his May 1996 termination." Id. 5, 660 N.W.2d at 219. "Bachmeier's argument on appeal focuses upon her contention that new medical evidence shows Randy Bachmeier was disabled and
unable to work both before and after he was fired from his employment in May 1996." Id. 5 15,
660 N.W.2d at 221-22.
In these cases, it is unrealistic to expect the worker to show a work search. No one will think
to conduct a fruitless work search upon arising from a surgical table or hospital bed. The Bureau's construction of the statute approves of the concept that two wrongs make a right; that is (1)
the worker may be wrongly found capable of work and the order becomes final, and then (2) the
medical condition worsens further, yet the Bureau claims that the workers' inability to show actual
wage loss-because he was never able to return to work-precludes reinstatement. The Bureau's
argument is Kafkaesque; the vicious circle precludes the worker from proving disability on reapplication for the very reason that he is disabled -unable to perform or obtain work - at the time
of the reapplication.
349. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-08.1(2) (Supp. 2001). The statute provides in relvant part:
A doctor certifying disability shall include in the report filed with the bureau:
a. The medical basis established by medical evidence supported by objective medical
findings for the certification of disability;
b. Whether the employee is totally disabled, or... a statement of the employee's restrictions and physical limitations; and
c. A professional opinion as to the expected length of, and reason for, the disability.
Id. In Lindell v. North Dakota Workers' Compensation Bureau, 1998 ND 174, 584 N.W.2d 520,
the court strictly applied this statute, requiring that each element in the statute be included within a
single form supplied by the Bureau. Id. 5T 16-20, 584 N.W.2d at 524-25. The court rejected the
worker's argument that the requirements were satisfied because each element could be found in
the doctor's reports that were on file with the Bureau. Id. 5 16, 584 N.W.2d at 524. The dissent
noted that this injured worker, a truck driver, sustained an injury to the right arm that was diagnosed as traumatic bursitis or tendonitis. As a result, the physician opined that the worker was
unable to do any overhead work or repetitive work but was able to perform light duty. Id. 5 2930, 584 N.W.2d at 525-26. The doctor noted that more would be known after the worker had an
MRI. Id. T 29. The dissent correctly noted that the Bureau cannot "prescribe impossible or unprofessional predictions." Id. 5 34, 584 N.W.2d at 527. It is not at all unusual for a physician to indicate that a disability is expected to continue indefinitely, pending the response to treatment. This
strict application of North Dakota Century Code section 65-05-08.1 absolves the Bureau from
payment of legitimate work-related disability simply because information may not be contained in
the appropriate form (even though the Bureau is aware of its existence) or because a doctor cannot
predict how long a disability will last. See Lindell, 20, 584 N.W.2d at 525 (stating that there is
no medical opinion suggesting how long the disability will last).
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payment of disability benefits to the truly disabled, shifting costs of disability to workers.
2.

PermanentTotal Disability

The National Commission recommended that disability benefits be reduced by the amount received on account of social security, and that there
be no limits of dollars or time.350 Although North Dakota does not place a
direct dollar limit on total disability, its legislature has enacted a procedure
under which injured workers of retirement age receive significantly reduced
benefits. All workers' benefits are reduced by social security disability and
retirement benefits.351
The initial legislative scheme enacted in 1995 terminated disability
benefits at age sixty-five altogether. 352 The North Dakota Supreme
Court held that the Bureau unlawfully applied the statute retroactively and
restored benefits to a class of workers already receiving these benefits when
the statute was enacted. 353 The legislature subsequently provided an "additional benefit" to injured workers of retirement age at a level from five percent to fifty percent of the weekly benefit otherwise payable (which is already reduced by the social security offset).354 These benefits cannot
exceed the total length of time the employee received disability benefits. 355
The retirement scheme unfairly reduces the benefits of workers over age
sixty-five, a class most in need of income support.
The "reverse" social security offset, a questionable policy that saves
workers' compensation programs at the expense of the federal government, 356 does not result in loss to employees because one program or the
other will offset disability benefits to avoid "duplicate payment to workers."
But this statement does not extend to social security retirement benefits.357
350. Recommendation 3.17 & 3.18, at 65-66.
351. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-09.3 (Supp. 2001).
352. 1995 N.D. Laws 623, § I codified at N.D. CENT. CODE 65-05-09.3(2) (1995).
353. Ash v. Traynor, 2000 ND 75, 609 N.W. 2d 96.
354. 1997 N.D. Laws 543, § I codified at N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-09.4 (1997).
355. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-09.4 (Supp. 2001).
356. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-09.1 (1995). North Dakota is one of a few "reverse offset"
states, where the workers' compensation payor reduces the state disability payment by one-half of
the federal benefit. Id. The National Commission believed that "workmen's compensation should
be the primary source of benefits for work-related injuries and diseases." Recommendation 3.3, at
58. Further, the Commission recommended that "the Disability Insurance program of Social Security continue to reduce payments for those workers receiving workmen's compensation benefits." Recommendation 3.18, at 66. The reverse offset provision removes the primary obligation
from the workers' compensation insurer, where it belongs, to the federal government's Social Security System.
357. Sasso v. Ram Property Mgmt., 431 So.2d 204, 217-18 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983). In
Industrial Claim Appeals v. Romero, 912 P.2d 62, 68 (Colo. 1996), the court held that payment of
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The offset of retirement benefits represents a further erosion of the bargain.
The retirement offset, which significantly reduces benefits to the elderly
injured worker, poses grave danger to the economic well-being of these
workers and their spouses.
A frequently litigated issue in workers' compensation is whether the
worker is permanently totally disabled or permanently partially disabled,
due to the differences in payment structure between the two. North Dakota
utilizes its vocational rehabilitation chapter 65-05, enacted in 1989, to address this distinction.358 The vocational rehabilitation chapter, on its face, is
a salutary effort to encourage return to work, and if a worker is unable to
return to work, it provides vocational retraining. 359 For qualifying workers,
the benefits are reasonably calculated to rehabilitate earnings capacity, including disability benefits, books, tuition, benefits to relocate, funds to assist maintaining two households, and to assist with searching for work. 360
Vocational rehabilitation of injured workers is awarded only when the
worker is unable to return to "substantial gainful employment," 36 whether
it be a return to the former line of work, modified work, or any other work
to which the worker is suited on account of his or her education, experience,
workers' compensation benefits and Social Security retirement benefits were not a duplication of
benefits. "Social Security retirement benefits do not serve the same purpose as workers' compensation benefits" because old age benefits serve "the same function as pension payments," and
workers' compensation disability is intended to compensate an employee for loss of income "in
exchange for the employee's forbearance from suing the employer in tort." Id. at 67-68.
358. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 65-05. North Dakota Century Code section 65-05.1 is very versatile in adjudicating all disability claims, so long as the worker is found to be at maximum medical improvement for the purposes of evaluation of disability status through functional capacities
assessment or evaluation (FCA) and (FCE). I authored this chapter intending it to be utilized to
provide a formal assessment by which workers' physical capacities, education, experience, and
training would facilitate final determination of disability status. The worker would be found permanently disabled (rare), able to work (common), or require vocational retraining (thought to be
relatively rare but not impossible to achieve.) North Dakota previously had no recognized method
by which to terminate disability payments. As the program has evolved, training has become too
difficult to obtain. The income test was originally intended by the Commissioners and counsel to
require real vocational rehabilitation up to ninety percent of the state's average weekly wage. No
one foresaw that the legislature would so easily respond to lobbying and reduce the income test to
near minimum wage levels. The current "income test" under the vocational rehabilitation scheme
is sixty-six and two-thirds percent of North Dakota's average weekly wage. N.D. CENT. CODE §
65-05.1-01(3) (Supp. 2001). The Bureau pressured the Legislature to lower the income test to
direct vocational rehabilitation plans in the direction of cost savings, so most rehabiliation plans
must identify return to work as the appropriate option rather than retraining benefits. Lowering
the income test means that minimum wage jobs satisfy the requirements of "substantial gainful
employment" and thus require the vocational consultant to identify "return to work" as the appropriate option rather than retraining benefits. See infra notes 363, 395.
359. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 65-05.1
360. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05.1-01 to 06.2. The primary problem is that too few workers
qualify for these benefits. However, vocational rehabilitation benefits are limited to two years in
duration, which is inconsistent with the recommendations of the National Commission. Recommendation 4.2, at 80.
361. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05.1-01(3) (Supp. 2001).
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skills, and work restrictions. 362 The "goal of vocational rehabilitation [is] to
return the disabled worker to substantial gainful employment with a minimum of retraining, as soon as possible after an injury." 363 Vocational rehabilitation is not available if an employee retains an "earnings capacity" of
ninety percent of her pre-injury wage, or the capacity to earn sixty-six and
two-thirds percent of the state's average weekly wage, whichever is less. 364
This is referred to as the "income test."
In the initial years after enactment of this chapter, a significant number
of workers were rehabilitated through vocational rehabilitation. However,
362. Id.
363. Id. A large number of cases have been decided under the rehabilitation chapter, which
I drafted in 1989. The statute was, admittedly, an attempt to install a rigorous procedure by which
workers who were receiving disability benefits for long periods of time to be evaluated, and if
found to have some ability to earn a living, they were terminated from disability benefits. However, since 1989, the "income test" to determine whether to award rehabilitation retraining benefits or to terminate disability benefits has changed from ninety percent of the state's average
weekly wage to just sixty-six and two-third percent of the state's average weekly wage. The "rehabilitation" chapter is now a misnomer, for it is the "termination" statute. The great majority of
workers are now found capable of returning to work without retraining, even workers restricted to
light duty, with no skills for light duty work, because rehabilitation "experts" say the worker is
competitive in the work force for certain generic jobs. See supra note 358; infra note 395. The
court has, for the most part, affirmed the Bureau in these rehabilitation cases on the penultimate
administrative agency ground-deference to the fact-finder. See Held v. N.D Workers Comp.
Bureau, 540 N.W.2d 166, 169 (N.D. 1995) (finding that a preponderance of the evidence supported the Bureau's finding that the employee being trained would reasonably attain employment
upon the completion of his training); Thompson v. N.D. Workers' Comp. Bureau, 490 N.W.2d
248, 254 (N.D. 1992) (holding this chapter does not require that the Bureau's rehabilitation plan
guarantee plaintiff a job upon completion of the program); Lucier v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau,
556 N.W.2d 56, 59-60 (N.D. 1996) (finding that the rehabilitation plan gave claimant a reasonable
opportunity to obtain substantial gainful employment in the state, and the fact that some of the
jobs claimant applied for may have required physical demands beyond the classification he was
assigned did not make the plan unfeasible; neither a rehabilitation plan nor a vocational consultant
can guarantee a claimant a job or a particular wage); Maginn v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 550
N.W.2d 412, 415-16 (N.D. 1996) (finding that proffered employment as truck driver was at the
same rate as worker had previously earned, and because she was offered the opportunity to meet
the wage threshold under the statute, her argument she could not drive enough miles to meet the
wage threshold was purely speculative and did not excuse her failure to make a good faith work
trial); Olson v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 419 N.W.2d 894 (N.D. 1988) (Bureau found that the
claimant was not entitled to rehabilitation benefits, even though the claimant was "aggressively
searching for alternative suitable employment," and although it was not successful, the search in-'
dicated that she had marketable skills.); Johnson v. N.D. Workers' Comp. Bureau, 539 N.W.2d
295, 298 (N.D. 1995) (finding that nothing in section 65-05.1-02.1 requires the vocational consultant to include in the report an assessment of the worker's specific job. Instead, section 6505.1-02(7) instructs the vocational consultant to assess the worker's job options in light of the
worker's restrictions and limitations to identify the category of work in which the worker can
fairly engage). In Emery v. North Dakota Workers' Compensation Bureau, 477 N.W.2d 202
(N.D. 1991), "[t]he Bureau found that the worker is now capable of performing unskilled laborer
jobs in the 'medium work' category that would give him earnings of about $4.50 an hour, which is
the amount that he was receiving at the time of his injury." Id. at 204. The Bureau also found that
such jobs were available. Id. The court affirmed the Bureau's conclusion that the worker was not
entitled to receive retraining because the first appropriate option under the section was for him "to
return to a related occupation in the local or statewide job pool." Id.
364. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05.1-01(3).
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in recent years, significantly fewer workers have received vocational rehabilitation awards. The reduction in awards has been accomplished in two
ways. First, the legislature has consistently lowered the "income test."
When enacted in 1989, vocational rehabilitation was required if workers
were unable to obtain employment that paid one hundred percent of their
preinjury wage or one hundred percent of North Dakota's average weekly
wage, whichever was lower. The legislature reduced the income test in
1991 and again in 1995.365
The other reason that vocational rehabilitation awards have declined is
a cost control attitude. As always, the devil is in the details. As is the case
in medical causation disputes, vocational rehabilitation hinges upon expert
testimony. 366 In recent years, vocational experts have consistently identified low wage, low skilled, generic jobs as sufficient employment for an
injured worker. The same job classes are utilized in case after case.
An unhappy example is Zimmerman v. North Dakota Workers' Com-

pensation Bureau,367 in which the injured worker brought suit against his
employer, alleging an intentional tort. In deciding the case, the North Dakota Supreme Court noted that Joshua Zimmerman's right arm was torn
from his body in the work accident, and that the Bureau "denied disability
and vocational rehabilitation benefits, finding he had not sustained a catastrophic injury under North Dakota Century Code section 65-05.106.1(2)(c)(1), and that Joshua could earn wages equal to his pre-injury
wages as a pizza delivery boy." 368
The conservative approach to vocational rehabilitation is further evidence that protection of worker benefits is a vague goal that is to be compromised, but the employer's rights to exclusivity of the compensation remedy is rigorously enforced. The reform efforts imply that vocational
365. 1991 N.D. Laws 714, § 55; 1995 N.D. Laws 628, § 2. In 1991, the income test was
reduced to seventy percent of the state's average weekly wage and in 1995 to sixty-six and twothird percent. Id.
366. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05.1-02.1 (Supp. 2001) (requiring a vocational consultant's report to identify the "first appropriate rehabilitation option"). The consultant identifies a
broad class of jobs he believes the worker can perform, along with the anticipated earnings. N.D.
CENT. CODE § 65-05.1-02.1(2)(a). In most cases, the vocational consultant hired by the Bureau
(under a contract with a rehabilitation vendor) concludes that the worker is "employable" and retains a "substantial earnings capacity," thus disqualifying the worker from vocational retraining.
The job need only be available in the statewide job market. If a worker is found to have this retained earning capacity, entitlement to total disability benefits ceases, and the worker is eligible
for partial disability benefits. Benefits are two thirds of the difference between the worker's preinjury wage and the predicted "earning capacity." N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-08 (Supp. 2001).
Furthermore, these partial disability benefits end after five years. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-10(2)
(Supp. 2001). Nearly all workers are subject to a five-year limit on disability under these procedures.
367. 1997 ND 203, 4, 570 N.W.2d 204, 205.
368. Id. T 2-4.
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benefits are not entitlements, but charitable handouts. When workers'
compensation fails to rehabilitate a worker in need the costs are shifted
from the employer and insurer, where they belong, to injured workers, their
families, and society. Other agencies, whether welfare or the Division of
Vocational Rehabilitation, might assume costs that should have been borne
by workers' compensation. The skewed focus emphasizing return to work
over rehabilitation reinforces the distributive vision in which economic interests of employers (reducing costs and retaining competitive insurance
rates) takes precedence over the economic interests of workers.
3.

Permanentand Temporary PartialDisability;Impairment
Benefits Distinguished

The National Commission recommended further study of permanent
partial disability benefits due to the wide variation in the methods by which
such benefits are calculated. 369 The Commission did, however, recommend
the elimination of schedule benefits to pay partial disability, 370 and it further
advised states to explicitly separate impairment and disability benefits. 37'
North Dakota no longer makes permanent payments of partial disability
since payments are limited to five years in duration. 372
Nevertheless, a history of the evolution of permanent partial disability
benefits in North Dakota may be useful. Permanent partial disability benefits are theoretically paid on account of disability, which takes into account
the nature of the worker's injury, the functional limitations of injury (work
restrictions), age, education, experience, and skills. 373 In fact, the initial
workers' compensation acts provided only for wage loss replacement. 374
New Jersey's Act in 1911 "appears to have been the first example of a state
statute that contained a schedule from the beginning." 375
It is the payment of disability benefits based upon a fixed schedule that
resulted in a departure from the wage loss principle to the medical impair-

369. Recommendation 3.19, at 67.
370. NAT'L COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 69.
371. Id. at 68-69.
372. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-10(2) (Supp. 2001). The previous sections discuss total disability, but this section analyzes partial disability. Section 65-01-02(15) provides that "disability
means loss of earnings capacity and may be permanent total, temporary total, or partial." § 65-01 02(15).
373. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(15) (Supp. 2001) (defining disability as "loss of
earnings capacity.") The courts define disability as the inability to "perform or obtain" the
worker's previous occupation or "any other" for which he may be suited. Jimison v. N.D. Workmen's Comp. Bureau, 331 N.W.2d 822, 827 (N.D. 1983) (citing Lyson v. N.D. Workmen's Comp.
Bureau, 129 N.W.2d 351, 356 (N.D. 1964)).
374. 4 LARSON, supra note 45, § 80.05(3), at 80-18.
375. Id. § 80.05(3), at 80-18.

2003]

FALLING DOwN ON THE JOB

ment principle. 376 In the typical schedule, a list describes various members
of the body and fixes a number of weeks of compensation for their loss or
loss of use. 377 Benefits are then paid regardless of actual wage loss. 378 At
the conclusion of the specified number of weeks of compensation benefits
cease. 379 The schedule was intended as a conclusive presumption of the
extent of the disability.380 Schedules proliferated and extended to include
any part or system of the body. 381 Courts confused the issue further, often
stating that compensation under these schedules was "measured by the impairment of earning capacity," when it obviously was not. 382 As to nonschedule injuries, states compensate based upon principles of wage loss.
Most states combine approaches, utilizing a schedule for certain losses and
compensating some disabilities based upon wage loss.
As Professor Larson notes, North Dakota was the first state to break
judicial ranks. 383 In Buechler v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation
Bureau, 384 the North Dakota Supreme Court held that a worker could receive both a permanent total disability award and a permanent partial disability award under the theory that the former is for loss of earnings capacity and the latter for permanent physical impairment. 385 Justice Erickstad,
in dissent, correctly noted that no other jurisdiction had reached a similar
result, and concluded that any total disability recipient could also describe
his condition, or some part of it, as a partial disability. 386 Although the
majority reached its decision in defiance of the language of the statutes, the
result, as a policy matter, was correct. 387 The North Dakota Legislature
subsequently amended the statute so as to provide a permanent partial im388
pairment benefit based upon medical impairment.

376.
377.
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.

Id. § 80.05(5), at 80-26 & 80-27.
Id. § 80.05(4), at 80-21.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 80-23.
Id. § 80.05(5), at 80-25.
Id. at § 80.05(6), at 80-27 & 80-28.

383. Id. § 80.05(7), at 80-3 1.
384. 222 N.W.2d 858 (N.D. 1974).
385. Id. at 862.
386. Id. at 863.
387. Id. at 862-63.
388. North Dakota originally recognized permanent total and permanent partial disability
benefits as compensation for wage loss, similar to other states. But in Buechler v. North Dakota
Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 222 N.W.2d 858 (N.D. 1974), the court held that a worker
could receive both a permanent total disability award and a permanent partial disability award under the schedule. Id. at 862. In Kroeplin v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 415
N.W.2d 807, 809-10 (N.D. 1987), the court noted:
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Under current law, impairment awards begin at sixteen percent whole
body impairment, creating a fifteen percent "deductible." 389 No justification other than cost saving is apparent. 390 Awards are based upon the AMA
Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment.391 North Dakota dif-

ferentiates between disability and medical impairment, thereby complying
with the recommendation of the National Commission. North Dakota's restriction of this "schedule principle" to medical impairment is logically
forthright. Impairment awards in North Dakota are not compensation for
wage loss, but rather for medical impairment.
Partial disability benefits are paid based upon loss of earning capacity. 392 However, the loss of earning capacity must exceed ten percent, 393 and,

most importantly, it may not exceed a period of five years. 394 Because parWhile the Bureau has cautiously avoided suggesting that Buechler was wrongly decided, it has gone to some lengths to apprise us of Professor Larson's criticism of that
decision as "unsound compensation theory." See 2 LARSON'S WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION LAW § 57.14(f). Nevertheless, the Bureau concedes that, in amending
§§ 65-05-12, 65-05-13, and 65-05-14, N.D.C.C., after Buechler, "[t]he legislature intended to endorse this court's holding and clarified that these sections were indeed intended to cover the loss of or the loss of use of a member of the body."
Id. The new award was wholly distinct from disability and was awarded for loss of use of a member of the body. The new permanent partial disability benefit was similar to the permanent total
disability benefit, in that both compensated for loss of wage and were true disability benefits. See
Jimison v. N.D. Workmen's Comp. Bureau, 331 N.W.2d 822 (N.D. 1983); Wendt v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 467 N.W.2d 720 (N.D. 1991).
389. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-12.2(10) (Supp. 2001).
390. For example, Texas awards impairment benefits under the traditional schedule principle, wherein such awards substitute for wage loss. See An Analysis of Texas Workers with Permanent Impairments, RESEARCH AND OVERSIGHT COUNCIL ON WORKERS' COMPENSATION
(Dec. 1996) available at http://www.roc.capnet.state.tx.us/impair.htm (last visited July 9, 2003)
(examining the Texas system). A government study of the Texas' impairment rating system concluded that many workers below the fifteen percent threshold for receiving permanent impairment
benefits were nonetheless in need of such benefits, and thirty-four percent of injured workers with
impairment ratings of eight to fourteen percent were not working due to their injury several years
later. Id. Although North Dakota's impairment benefit does not substitute for wage loss, there is
no justification to eliminate these benefits to workers with impairment under fifteen percent of the
whole body. Such medical impairment may be significant to the worker. Id. The statute contains
two other important bars to medical impairment awards. North Dakota Century Code section 6505-12.2(4) provides that no impairment award may be granted for "impairment findings due to
unrelated, noncompensable, or preexisting conditions, even if these conditions were made symptomatic by the compensable work injury, and regardless of whether section 65-05-15 [aggravation
statute] applies to the claim." N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-12.2(4). North Dakota Century Code
section 65-05-12.2(8) provides that no impairment award may be "due solely to pain." N.D.
CENT. CODE § 65-05-12.2(8). The fifteen percent impairment deductible is another shift of the
bargain in favor of employers to the detriment of workers.
391. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-12.2(6).
392. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-10 (Supp. 2001) (specifically using the term "earning
capacity after injury"). House Bill 1060, amends North Dakota Century Code section 65-05-10,
increasing the maximum partial disability benefit to 110% of the state's average weekly wage.
H.B. 1060, 2003 N.D. Laws 562, § 6.
393. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-08(8) (Supp. 2001).
394. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-10(2).
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tial disability payments are limited to five years in duration, the determination as to whether a worker is permanently totally disabled or partially disabled is crucial. 395 The Bureau need only show that the employee retains
some earning capacity to find partial, rather than total, disability.396 This is
often established through referral to the vocational rehabilitation program. 397 Although the rehabilitation experts normally conclude that the injured worker retains earning capacity, many workers never return to work.
After five years of reduced partial disability benefits, these workers are left
to their own devices. Rather than rely upon workers' compensation, some
pursue education on their own in order to rehabilitate their earning capacity.
The North Dakota Supreme Court has approved a legislative scheme in
which workers are channeled through vocational rehabilitation to jobs that
offer the worker income at seventy-five percent (as of this writing it is
sixty-six and two-third percent) of the state's average weekly wage and
caps disability benefits at five years in duration. 398 This recurrent emphasis
on cost saving further redistributes economic gains away from injured
workers in favor of employers and insurers.

395. Disputes in other states also tend to concentrate on this issue. However, in North Dakota, a finding of partial disability pursuant to the vocational rehabilitation procedure is, perhaps,
the single most effective device utilized to reduce lifetime disability benefits. N.D. CENT. CODE §
65-05.1 to 06.1; see supra notes 358-368. The Bureau does not ensure actual employment.
Thompson v. N.D. Workers' Comp. Bureau, 490 N.W.2d 248, 254 (N.D. 1992). Instead, the vocational consultant's report identifies an "earnings capacity," which may or may not be realistic.
These reports frequently provide a generic laundry list of jobs the worker is said able to do. The
vocational consultant normally correctly determines whether the job is within the worker's physical limitations set by the physician but commonly errs by identifying an employment in which the
worker has no experience, aptitude, or interest.
396. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05.1-01(3) (Supp. 2001). This is because North Dakota Century Code section 65-05.1-01(3) provides that return to work is the preferred option so long as the
workers have the capacity to earn the lesser of ninety percent of preinjury wage or sixty-six and
two-third percent of the state's average weekly wage. Id. However, workers with high preinjury
wages do receive larger partial disability benefits under North Dakota Century Code section 6505-10 and are more likely to receive training because of this, that is, to avoid large partial disability benefit payments for five years. Partial disability benefits are sixty-six and two-third percent
of the difference between preinjury earnings capacity and earnings capacity after injury. N.D.
CENT. CODE § 65-05-10.
397. See supra notes 358-368 and accompanying text.
398. See Baldock v. N.D. Workers' Comp. Bureau, 554 N.W.2d 441 (N.D. 1996) (challenging the reduction in the income test to seventy-five percent of North Dakota's average weekly
wage rather than challenging the five year cap in disability benefits directly). Id. at 444. The
court upheld the constitutionality of the statute. Id. at 446-47. The current "income test" under
the vocational rehabilitation scheme is sixty-six and two-third percent of North Dakota's average
weekly wage. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05.1-01(3). The Bureau lowered the income test to identify
return to work as the appropriate option rather than retraining benefits. See supra, note 358.
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Death Benefits

North Dakota now pays death benefits at the same rate as disabilities. 399 Benefits continue until death, and until new amendments take effect, benefits are reduced on remarriage. 400 Scholarship monies are also
available for dependents. 40 ' However, benefits are capped at a total sum of
$197,000, which the 2003 legislative assembly increased to $250,000 for
claims filed on account of deaths that occur after August 1, 2003.402 For a
young family, the $197,000 cap could be a significant limitation because
benefit payments at the maximum amount would cease in about eighteen
years. In some circumstances, the economic consequences might be severe,
depriving the spouse of ongoing assistance with living expenses and children of funds to assist them in paying the rising costs of college tuition.
This cap fails the Commission's call that no limits be placed on death benefits.403 As with limits on disability benefits, this cap is further redistribution
of economic costs to the families of deceased workers, saving costs for the
benefit of employers and insurers.
D.

MEDICAL BENEFITS

The second major damage portion of workers' compensation is medical
expenses. 40 4 There was widespread recognition, even before the National
Commission made its recommendations that medical benefits should be
40 5
paid without limits on dollars or duration.

399. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-17(1) (Supp. 2001).
400. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-17(1). House Bill 1060, section seven amends North Dakota Century Code section 65-05-17(1) to eliminate the remarriage penalty effective August 1,
2003. H.B. 1060, 2003 N.D. Laws 562, § 7. North Dakota Century Code section 65-05-21 provides a marriage settlement to a spouse. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-16 (Supp. 2001) (regarding general provisions pertaining to adjudication of death claims).
401. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-20.1 (Supp. 2001).
402. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-17(1). House Bill 1060, section seven amends North Dakota Century Code section 65-05-17(1) to increase the cap on death benefits to a total sum of
$250,000. H.B. 1060, 2003 N.D. Laws 562, § 7. House Bill 1060, section 14 provides that the
increase applies only to claims made an account of death occurring "after the effective date of this
Act." H.B. 1060, 2003 N.D. Laws 562, § 14. North Dakota Constitution Article IV, section 13
provides that most legislation "takes effect on August first after its filing with the secretary of
state." N.D. CONST. art. IV, § 13.
403. NAT'L COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 72. "The failure of more than two-thirds of
the States to provide benefits without limit is indefensible." Id.
404. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-07 (providing that "[tihe fund shall furnish to an injured employee reasonable and necessary medical, surgical, and hospital service and supplies necessary to treat a compensable injury").
405. Recommendations 4.2 & 4.4, at 80.
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The concerns about cost prominently focus on medical benefits, which
make up about forty percent of workers' compensation costs. 406 While the
inflation rate for nonwork medical costs averaged about seven percent from
1984 to 1990, data showed that workers' medical costs increased more than
twice as fast, increasing 15.6 percent per year.40 7 Although only about three
percent of total national health care expenditures are for workers' compensation injury and disease, 408 the prevalence of managed care outside the
compensation system and the absence of copayments or deductibles in
workers' compensation create a concern that providers engage in costshifting to workers' compensation, increasing the frequency of treatment.
Data from studies show that average medical costs in workers' compensation cases are two and a half to four times more than average nonwork
medical costs.409
Workers' compensation reformers promote managed care to reduce
medical costs. 4 10 North Dakota was one of the first states to enact a utilization review mechanism in 1991411 The statute requires binding dispute
resolution to resolve any disputes.4 12 The managed care program is admin-

406. MONT, supra note 8, at 9 (stating that "[tihe total share of state workers' compensation
benefits that were for medical care was 39.4 and 39.5 percent in 1997 and 1998, respectively").
407. John F. Burton, Jr., Workers' Compensation Benefits and Costs: Significant Developments in the Early 1990s, 1996 WORKERS' COMPENSATION Y.B. I-1, 1-5, Table 1 (LRP Publications). A Texas study showed that the Texas Fund pays higher medical charges for similar services. Health Care Costs in the Texas Workers' Compensation System, RESEARCH AND
OVERSIGHT COUNCIL ON WORKERS'
COMPENSATION (March 1999) available at
http://www.roc.capnet.state.tx.us/healthcare.htm (last visited April 6, 2003); see generally
SPARROW supra note 32.
408. Debra T. Ballen, The Sleeper Issue In Health Care Reform: The Threat to Workers'
Compensation,79 CORNELL L. REV. 1291, 1293 (1994).
409. William G. Johnson et al., The Excess Costs of Health Carefor Work-Related Injuries,
1996 WORKERS' COMPENSATION Y.B., 1-79 (LRP Publications). A Minnesota study found that
medical care for back injuries treated through workers' compensation cost an average of two times
the medical costs charged to health insurers and a study from California showed the average
workers' compensation medical billing to be four times the average nonwork medical cost. Id.
410. Hashimoto, supra note 290, at 234 (noting that "commentators have recently made a
vigorous call for the implementation of managed care... [and] an increasing number of states are
considering ways to implement managed care in workers' compensation"). Hashimoto concludes
that "[t]he most common form of current managed care involves reliance on treatment guidelines
and utilization review." Id. at 235.
411. 1991 N.D. Laws 714, § 31; see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-02-20 (Supp. 2001).
412. Id.
If an employee, employer, or medical provider disputes a managed care decision, the
[aggrieved party] shall request binding dispute resolution on the decision. The bureau
shall make rules providing for the dispute resolution.... A dispute resolution decision under this section requested by a medical provider concerning payment for medical treatment already provided or a request for diagnostic tests or treatment is not reviewable by any court. A dispute resolution decision under this section requested by
an employee is reviewable by a court only if medical treatment has been denied to the
employee.
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istered by a contracting provider. 41 3 North Dakota requires that psychologists and physicians making utilization review decisions be licensed in the
state.4 14 This raises the question whether utilization decisions constitute the
4
practice of medicine or constitute an insurance decision. 15
North Dakota has promulgated, pursuant to statutory authority, extensive medical aid rules, including guidance concerning frequency of certain
treatments, payment levels, a labyrinth of definitions, procedures, and dispute resolution.4 16 Dispute resolution is accomplished through peer review. 4 17 North Dakota also has enacted a provision under which an employer may select a preferred provider.4 1 8 If the employer has designated a
preferred provider, an employee "may elect to be treated by a different provider provided the employee makes the election and notifies the employer
in writing prior to the occurrence of an injury." 4 19 Change of provider is
possible after giving notice and opportunity to be heard to the employer,
with Bureau approval. 420 Many employees do not know they must opt out
Id. If "treatment" is not construed as including diagnostic testing, then the debate concerning
payment of "rule-outs" will end unfavorably to workers. It is my view that diagnostic testing is an
important element of competent medical treatment protocol; thus an employee should be able to
challenge a decision not to pay for an MRI. Often, the lack of "objective evidence" is the Bureau's ground for denial of the claim. If the Bureau also denies payment for the diagnostic test
that would prove the Bureau wrong, workers might have to pay for a necessary medical test on
their own, once again shifting costs to workers. Id.
413. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-02-21 (Supp. 2001).
414. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-02-21.1 (Supp. 2001).
415. David Pate, M.D., J.D., REGULATION OF HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONALS 82 (2000)
(On file with Author). Professor Pate notes:
[L]icensing boards are interested in the issue whether a medical director for an insurance company [is] making medical decisions and therefore subject to discipline by the
state medical board, insurance decisions and therefore subject to regulation by the department of insurance, or merely administrative decisions not subject to review except
through the insurance company's internal review process ....
Id.
416. N.D. ADMIN. CODE §§ 92-01-02-27 to -46 (2000). These are the rules concerning
medical and hospital fees, medical necessity, acceptance of rules and fees, medical services, who
may be reimbursed, PA and NP rules, utilization review and quality assurance, authorization, preservice and retrospective review, change of doctors, palliative care, independent medical review,
home nursing care, special programs, Bureau responsibilities, provider responsibility and billings,
and medical services disputes. Id. North Dakota Century Code section 65-02-08 provides the Bureau with broad statutory authority to promulgate rules, including those regulating "fees on claims
for medical and hospital goods and services." N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-02-08 (Supp. 2001).
417. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-07(3) (Supp. 2001).
418. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-28.2 (Supp. 2001).
419. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-28.2(2).
420. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-28.2(4). The Bureau also has authority to "require the employee to begin treating with another doctor, to better direct the medical aspects of the injured employee's claim." N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-28 (Supp. 2001). The Bureau should take due care in
selecting a physician to treat a worker. Larson contends that a cause of action should lie against
an insurer for negligent selection of a physician. LARSON, supra note 45, § 114.08; see also infra note 515.
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of the preferred provider scheme or do not wish to make trouble. Employers have an incentive to choose doctors agreeable with a philosophy that favors early return to work and less medical care.
Employers undoubtedly assume that utilizing a preferred provider will
save in both medical and disability costs. While this is probably true in
certain cases, some studies suggest that workers who choose their medical
provider have lower medical expenses and shorter periods of disability.21
Such measures aimed at medical cost containment are premised on the
theory that workers are consuming too much medical care. Shifting costs to
the worker's general health insurer may be the larger problem. Several
studies reflect that workers frequently fail to claim workers' compensation
benefits not only for occupational disease but even for work-related injuries, such as work trauma followed by surgery.4 22 Workers may elect not to
file workers' compensation claims because they have other medical insurance and because the employer or insurer has shown predilection to contest
claims.4 23 As is the case with disability, shifting of medical costs goes both
421. Silvana Pozzebon, Do Traditional Health Care Cost Containment PracticesReally
Work?, 1994 WORKERS' COMPENSATION Y.B. 1-106, 1-107 (LRP Publications).
Policymakers argue that placing limits on the choice of provider will reduce medical
spending for workers' compensation claims. They assert that a measure of control
over the nature and quality of services provided to injured workers helps to ensure that
appropriate medical care is promptly administered in the most cost-efficient manner.
My findings for the period 1979 to 1987 clearly do not support this hypothesis. States
with mandated restrictions to initial provider selection or subsequent provider changes
have average medical expenditures that are twenty-four percent higher than do jurisdictions not using these cost containment approaches.
Id. The National Commission also recommended that the worker "be permitted the initial selection of his physician." Recommendation 4.1, at 79.
422. McCluskey, supra note 3, at 849. "Studies and anecdotes suggest that medical treatment for the vast majority of work illnesses and injuries may be funded outside workers' compensation." A RAND institute survey found that workers' compensation paid the hospital bill for
only about half of workers injured during work time, and that it paid outpatient bills for only about
46% of those injured workers. Shifting costs from workers' compensation to general health care
is particularly likely to be a problem in the case of occupational diseases. For example, one study
of 1992 data showed that 95% of medical treatment costs for some types of serious work illnesses
were paid by sources outside workers' compensation. Another study found that, out of a sample
of 1,609 injuries and illnesses in Michigan, 40% of workers who had back surgery and 46% of
those who had wrist or hand injury did not file a workers' compensation claim even though their
company doctor reported their injury as occupational. Of the workers in this study who did not
file workers' compensation claims, nearly 37% gave as reason that they had other medical insurance. Id. This is in accord with my experience. A large number of my clients first sought medical coverage through their general insurance carrier, the majority through Blue Cross Blue Shield
of North Dakota. See supra notes 18, 127.
423. Spieler, supra note 9, at 218-19.
To the extent that workers are capable of continuing to work, and to the extent that
they fear adverse consequences at work, they may choose not to file claims when they
are injured at work. . . . 'Good' workers become those employees who do not file
claims, even when they meet the eligibility requirements for benefits.... Underreporting becomes a primary characteristic of such a system.
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42 4

The appropriate level of medical care is a distributive value-a
425
question of whose moral hazard should be controlled.
Fee schedules are a favorite mechanism to control medical costs.
While an economic study of the merits of such price controls is beyond the
scope of this article, the economic literature tends to view price controls
with skepticism. 426 Two problems may arise: the fee schedules act to standardize fees at the maximum, 4 27 and as choice of provider falls, quality of
ways.

4

care falls too. 28
Although studies have questioned the short-term cost benefit of fee
schedules and preferred provider laws, it is conceivable that some cost savings may result. However, the long-term result will be to shift costs to
workers. The cost consists of less control over choice of doctor and loss of
quality of care. 429
Reform should focus on implementation of the principles of occupational medicine. 430 Occupational medicine physicians treat patients but are
primarily concerned with prevention, involving the study and application of
ergonomics, which lessens incidents of cumulative trauma and back injuries. 43 1 Prevention may also take the form of work environment analysis of
hazardous environmental and exposure, and compliance with health and
safety regulations. 432 Finally, to the extent that medical fraud exists, it
draws appropriate attention from employers, insurers, and compensation
agencies.

Id.
424. McCluskey, supra note 3, at 851.
425. Id.
426.

RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ECONOMIC REGULATION CASES AND MATERIALS 173

(1994). Pierce states:
[When] price controls are imposed in structurally competitive markets for reasons independent of any natural monopoly rationale, e.g., to control inflation... to redistribute wealth.., or to preclude firms from earning windfall profits... [t]he results invariably are disastrous. Price controls with respect to healthcare... must be capable
of changing the ways in which information flows among market participants and the
incentives of third party decision makers.
Id.
427. Under the "new" managed care DRG payment system for hospitals and RBRVS system for physicians, price maximums often become the new minimum. THE LAW OF AMERICAN
HEALTH CARE, REGULATION & REIMBURSEMENT OF PHYSICIANS AND OTHER INDIVIDUAL

HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS 536 (1998).
428.
McCluskey, supra note 3, at 853. Economists argue that price controls create incentives to reduce quality. Id.
429. Id.
430. Hashimoto, supra note 290, at 251.
431. Id.at252.
432. Id. at 251-52.
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Safety in the work place is a mantra we all share. However, as Professor Spieler notes, the no-fault paradigm contributes to a general sense
among employers that accidents are inevitable, workers are responsible, and
the workplace is already as safe as efforts allow.4 33 Empirical evidence,
however, suggests that most injuries still result from known hazards. 434
The North Dakota Workers' Compensation Bureau has a safety department that promulgates rules, conducts inspections, and provides enforcement.435 North Dakota utilizes experience rating to set premiums as
some incentive for safety.4 36 A discount is available for implementation of
a preapproved risk management program.4 37 Professor Spieler has concerns
about whether these programs work.438 Instead, Spieler argues that each
state should adopt a state-OSHA safety plan. 439 A report concerning the
state's safety efforts must be included in the "biennial independent performance evaluation of the bureau." 440

433. Spieler, supra note 9, at 211-14.
434. CDC REPORT, supra note 10.
435. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-03-01 to -04 (1995 & Supp. 2001).
436. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-04-17 (1995). Retrospective rating is also available. N.D.
CENT. CODE § 65-04-17.1 (Supp. 2001).
437. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-04-19.1 (1995). The premium discount is set at five percent of
the annual premium. Id.
438. Spieler, supra note 9, at 251-53. Spieler states:
Statutory provisions which are designed to entice employers to adopt safety or loss
management programs through providing a prospective premium discount appear to
be the most common form of workers' compensation 'safety' legislation.... Premium discount provisions generally fail to solve the problem that financial incentives
tend to encourage many employers to circumvent rather than reduce injuries ....
Notably, the AFL-CIO Department of Safety and Health does not include premium reduction programs in its enumeration of safety initiatives.
Id. Hylton and Laymon state, "The problem is that once an experience rating system is put into
place,
the....insured
has every
incentive
in orderprevention,
to keep rates
increasing
Terence
Ison argues
thatto itminimize
is claimsreported
control, claims
not accident
thatfrom
is promoted by shifting accident cost responsibility to employers." Hylton & Laymon, supra note 116,
at 154 (citing Ison, supra note 18, 725-29).
439. Spieler, supra note 9, at 259-63.
[T]he enforcement of the Oregon OSHA (OR/OSHA) plan was substantially strengthened. The number of employees assigned to enforcement grew from about 90 to 243
and the visibility of OSHA enforcement was vastly increased. [The] administrator of
the OR/OSHA program, says that employers now practice safety because there are a
sufficient number of inspectors to "encourage" them not to ignore safety standards.
The OR/OSHA program changed its focus from "happy worker posters and gimmicks" to "ergonomics and engineering controls" during this period. Meanwhile, assessed penalties rose ...
Id. at 260.
440. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-03-04 (Supp. 2001).
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DELIVERY SYSTEM

The 1972 National Commission recommended that each state utilize a
workers' compensation agency to fulfill administrative and other needed
obligations.441 The concept is a good one; it centralizes the oversight function in one agency. An alternative in which the insurance commissioner
sets premium rates, a state OSHA plan regulates safety, and an industrial
commission resolves claim disputes will not provide an overall sense of direction to the industry. The Commission found no preference as to the form
that insurance should take, leaving it to the states to decide whether to allow
self-insurance, state funds, private insurance, or any combination thereof.442
The Commission recommended that the workers' compensation agency
should collect data on all insurers, including state funds, and review the
ratemaking procedures of private carriers and state funds. 443 The National
Commission believed that state funds, like private carriers, should be regulated by the state workers' compensation agency. 444 Indeed, many states
have state funds that are subject to oversight authority regarding claim disputes and ratemaking by the state agency.
North Dakota is unusual not only in that it has a state compensation
fund, but because it commingles the function of insurer and the state regulatory agency in one entity-the North Dakota Workers' Compensation Bureau. This mistake is compounded by the lack of political accountability.445
The legislature has not set forth any mechanism to separate the regulatory
oversight function from the insurance function. Rather, the North Dakota
Workers' Compensation Bureau is an exclusive insurer of state workers'
compensation risk, which regulates itself. The Bureau has departments:
claims, legal, underwriting, safety, accounting, administrative, human resources, as does any large insurer. All department heads report to the director. 446 The Director serves at the pleasure of the Board. The authority to
carry out the Bureau's day-to-day operations resides in the Director.447 The
441.
Recommendation 6.1, at 101.
442. Recommendation 6.20, at 113.
443. NAT'L COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 114.
444. Id.
445. The initial Board consisted of "the members of the state advisory council on December
15, 1996." 1997 N.D. Laws 528, § 3. The Advisory Board was created in 1989, and the Bureau's
Executive Director appointed its members. 1989 N.D. Laws 768, § 1. Thus, the Bureau's Director chose the Advisory Council, which later became the Bureau's board. This cozy relationship is
nothing new at the Bureau. The problem with this arrangement is that the Bureau is not politically
accountable to the executive branch. This arrangement violates a recommendation of the National
Commission. Recommendation 6.5, at 103; see infra notes 454-476 and accompanying text.
446. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-02-01 (Supp. 2001).
447. The "'Bureau' means the North Dakota workers compensation bureau, or the director,
or any department heads, assistants, or employees of the bureau designated by the director." N.D.
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Board, then, has limited power; it presents an annual report to the Legislative audit and fiscal review committee, prepares the Bureau's budget, and
appoints the Director and sets his compensation, but it primarily assists in
"formulating policies and discussing problems." 448 The Board, however,
serves one important function: it insulates the Bureau from political accountability. 449 The foundations of this nation are set in the bedrock of political accountability, and the blithe assumption that North Dakotans are
better served by a self-interested bureaucracy at the helm rather than a po4 50
litically responsive executive branch is truly astounding.

CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(9) (Supp. 2001). It is the Bureau (defined as director), rather than the
Board, that is authorized, under every section of the North Dakota Century Code, to act. Id. The
"Bureau" makes initial decisions under North Dakota Century Code section 65-01-16, and "[any
investigation, inquiry, hearing, or decision and every order by the director is deemed to be the order of the bureau." N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-02-12 (1995). The Bureau establishes binding arbitration. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-02-15 (1995) (but note that the 2003 Legislature has repealed this
section. See H.B. 1060, 2003 N.D. Laws 562, § 13; see also infra notes 482-89 and accompanying text). The Bureau also establishes managed care in North Dakota Century Code section 6502-20 (Supp. 2001), vocational rehabilitation in section 65-05.1-01 (Supp. 2001), promulgates
rules on medical and legal fees pursuant to section 65-02-08 (Supp. 2001), monitors safety under
section 65-03-01 (1995), classifies employments and determines premiums under section 65-0401 and section 65-03-01 (1995), and classifies employments and determines premiums under 6504-01 (1995). Any appeal to the courts is from a Bureau decision. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-10-01
(Supp. 2001).
448. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-02-03.3 (Supp. 2001).
449. According to an article from the Charleston Daily Mail that was posted on the Bureau's
website:
In Edison's opinion, the most important change lawmakers made was to create a board
of directors to oversee the agency and insulate it from the winds of politics. Previously, appointees of the governor ran the Bureau, so leadership would change with
each new governor, but now it's up to the board to choose the executive director.
"Now the constituent parts of the system are at the table and able to take a long-term
view and make changes for the good of the whole system," Edison said. "So I think
the board of directors has been a crucial part of the success that we've enjoyed."
Jim Wallace, N.D. Reforms Slash Comp Rates, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, April 7, 2003 available at http://www.dailymail.com/news/Money/2003040713/ (last visited July 15, 2003).
Actually, the Bureau's "success" is due, almost completely, to the reforms that have taken so
much from injured workers, while lowering employer rates to the lowest in the nation. The Bureau agrees that is it no longer politically accountable noting that the board "insulate[s] it from the
winds of politics." Instead, the Bureau is a captive of the employers who pay premiums. Workers
may legitimately dispute the benefit of this lack of political accountability.
450. The Bureau Director's claim that the "winds of politics" is detrimental to good operational policy is not thought through. If taken at his word, it means that the Bureau believes that
autocratic operation of the Fund is superior to political control by the executive. Benevolent kings
and religious autocrats have always claimed to know what is right, denigrating the "politics" of
interest groups as destructive. Presumably, the Bureau believes that it will treat employers and
employees alike in administering its duties outside these "winds of politics". The central point of
this thesis rejects the notion that the Legislature and Bureau have accorded equal treatment to
these competing factions and provides considerable evidence to the contrary. Even if the Bureau
does not intend George Orwell's version of equality in Animal Farm- "All animals are equal. But
some animals are more equal than others."-its blithe contention that autocratic rule is preferable
to political rule is nevertheless an astonishing claim.
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Administrative agencies are given significant deference on judicial review. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirms an agency unless "the
findings of fact... are not supported by a preponderance of the evidence"
or "the conclusions of law ... are not supported by its findings of fact," 45 1
but the court will not substitute its judgment, determining "only whether a
reasoning mind reasonably could have determined the findings were supported by the weight of the evidence." 452
An agency is likely to be affirmed, especially concerning questions of
fact. The decision of the administrative law judge who heard a case is subject to review by the Bureau. The administrative law judge issues recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law, which the Bureau may reject, so long as it explains why it has done so. 453
A vast literature exists on the nature of political accountability, and resolution of this issue is
at the very roots of modem western society. The basic ignorance of political philosophy inherent
in the contention that a government agency must be insulated from "politics" reveals a basic truth
about this agency, which prefers to operate its fiefdom without that troublesome notion of political
accountability. For James Madison, political accountability was necessary to a good society, and
that is accomplished by balancing the diverse interest groups against one another. In Federalist
Paper 10, he suggested that society is divided into various factions, which he defined as "a number
of citizens ... who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest .... " Since removing the causes of factions would be both unwise (factions are desirable) and
impossible (they are also rooted in human nature), Madison recognized that government must
control the effects of factions. Federalist Paper 10 is available online at: memory.loc.gov/const
(last visited July 10, 2003.) At root, the competing interests of the nation must be free to seek political influence; the United States has long ago decided that openness and transparency of political influence is preferable to inevitable influences felt behind closed doors. Professor Vaughn
notes that "[p]olitical accountability rests upon the right of free expression and the right of free
association. These rights allow citizens to organize, to advocate and to challenge the decisions of
the government representing them. These rights allow them to affect political change." Robert G.
Vaughn, Transparency-The Mechanisms: Open Government and Accountability,
ACCOUNTABILITY IN GOVERNMENT 3 (August 2000) at http://usinfo.state.gov/joumals (last visited July 10, 2003). It may be in the nature of bureaucracies to seek control over the programs
they adminsiter without "meddling" by politics, but this short sighted and uninformed view is usually not candidly expressed by a director. The Bureau's fear of the "winds of politics" is primarily
a fear of loss of control. But, it is also a fear that worker factions may again present their claims
for attention to the politicians and effect change that will change the balance between employers
and workers-a balance that the Bureau has assiduously conspired to favor employers.
451. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-46(5) (Supp. 2001). The court will also reverse if the party
was not afforded a fair hearing or if the order is in violation of the constitutional rights of the appellant. Id.
452. Shiek v. N.D. Workers' Comp. Bureau, 2002 ND 85, T 10, 643 N.W.2d 721, 725.
453. Blanchard v. N.D. Workers' Comp. Bureau, 1997 ND 118,5 13, 565 N.W.2d 485, 487.
The Blanchard Court explained:
Under NDCC 54-57-03(1), "all hearings of administrative agencies under chapter 2832, except hearings conducted by... the workers' compensation bureau ... must be
conducted by the office of administrative hearings in accordance with the administrative hearings provisions of chapter 28-32." As an agency exempt from the requirement to use the office of administrative hearings in all cases, the Bureau may make a
written request to that office to designate an ALJ to preside over a Bureau's administrative proceeding. NDCC § 54-57-03(2) and (5). Under NDCC § 54-57-04, a designated ALJ must comply with NDCC § 28-32-08.5(4) and (6) that require hearing offi-
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The North Dakota Workers' Compensation Bureau Should be
Split Into Two Entities: An Insurance Fund and a
State Administrator

The North Dakota Supreme Court has instructed the Bureau that it
should not act as an adversary because it should be primarily concerned

cers to "issue a recommended order, when appropriate," and to "issue a final order, if
required by statute or requested by an agency." NDCC § 28-32-13 directs:
2. If the agency head, or another person authorized by the agency head or by law to
issue a final order, is presiding, the order issued is the final order.
3. If the agency head, or another person authorized by the agency head or by law to
issue a final order, is not presiding, then the person presiding shall issue a recommended order which becomes final unless specifically amended or rejected by the
agency head. The agency head may adopt a recommended order as the final order.
The agency may allow petitions for review of a recommended order and may allow
oral argument pending issuance of a final order. An administrative agency may adopt
rules regarding the review of recommended orders and other procedures for issuance
of a final order by the agency.
Blanchard,$ 13 565 N.W.2d at 487-88. The court's citations to North Dakota Century Code
Chapter 28-32 are to the version prior to significant amendments made by the 2001 legislature.
The current description regarding the duties of hearing officers is found at North Dakota Century
Code section 28-32-31 (Supp. 2001). In most cases under the state A.P.A., the ALJ will make
recommended findings. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-31(4) (Supp. 2001). In workers' compensation matters, the Bureau retains authority to issue the final order. The Blanchardcourt also stated
that there are "standards for an agency's rejection of an ALJ's recommendation." Blanchard,
21, 565 N.W.2d at 489. The court further noted:
In Schultz v. North Dakota Department of Human Services, 372 N.W.2d 888, 892
(N.D. 1985) we ruled, if an administrative agency rejects a hearing officer's recommendation, the agency should sufficiently explain its rationale for not following the
recommendation. See also Maginn v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 550 N.W.2d 412,
414 n.1 (N.D. 1996) ("sufficient to explain"); Carlson v. Job Serv. N.D., 548 N.W.2d
389, 393 (N.D. 1996) ("after careful review and consideration of the record"); Kackman v. N.D. Workers' Comp. Bureau, 488 N.W.2d 623, 625 (N.D. 1992) ("must adequately explain its rationale"); Marion v. Job Serv. N.D., 470 N.W.2d 609, 613 (N.D.
1991) ("should be sufficient to explain the rationale"). In Schultz, we also said an
agency may even reject a hearing officer's recommendation on findings of the credibility of contradictory witnesses. Schultz, 372 N.W.2d at 892. But cf. Paulson v. Meinke, 352 N.W.2d 191, 193-94 (N.D. 1984) (finding under N.D. R. Civ. P 63 if successor judge is not satisfied with findings, conclusions and decision of predecessor
judge, successor judge is limited to granting new trial); Holzer v. Jochim, 557 N.W.2d
57, 58-59 (N.D. 1996) (successor judge abused discretion in redeciding the merits of
case tried before predecessor judge without affording the parties an opportunity to retry case). As Holzer at 59 explained, a major tenet of due process anticipates that a
party receive adequate notice and fair opportunity to be heard by the decision maker.
Blanchard, 21, 565 N.W.2d at 489.
While the Bureau can reverse the decision of the ALJ, the court has held that the Bureau's
litigation counsel may not have an ex parte conversation with the Bureau official who renders the
decision. Scott v. N.D. Workers' Comp. Bureau, 1998 ND 221, 55 7-12, 587 N.W.2d 153, 15456. Such ex parte contact violates North Dakota Century Code section 28-32-12.2 and proper due
process of law. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-12.2 (1991). The provision regarding ex parte contact
is now found at section 28-32-37. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-37 (2003).
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with the fair and impartial adjudication of claims. 454 The National Commission recommended that the State Workers' Compensation Agency oversee the state fund's rate setting procedures. 455 The National Commission
also recommended that even within the state workers' compensation
agency, the appeals board be independent.4 56 North Dakota has flatly
flunked this test. The commingling of the insurance function and the oversight function certainly gives the appearance of impropriety. The watchdog
function of a regulatory body does not exist.
The Commission also recommended that "the members of the appeals
board or commission and the chief administrator be selected by the Governor." 457 Moreover, "[t]he primary argument against indefinite tenure [of
the appeals board] is that it might be desirable to hold the Governor accountable for agency operations, in which circumstance he would require
authority to select agency policy-makers." 458
In 1997, the Legislature wrested political control of the Bureau away
from the Governor and vested it in an advisory board, which in turn had
been picked by the Bureau Director.4 59 The scheme now provides that six

454. Steele v. N.D. Workmen's Comp. Bureau, 273 N.W.2d 692, 702 (N.D. 1978). The
court stated:
We believe the adversary concept employed in our judicial system has only limited
application to claims for benefits. The Bureau in carrying out its statutory duties acts
in a quasi-judicial capacity and should be primarily concerned with the proper, fair,
and just determination of any claim submitted. In making this observation we are fully
cognizant that the existing case law places the burden upon the claimant, but nevertheless the Bureau should not place itself in a true or full adversary position to the
claimant. In resolving an issue the Bureau should take the position of an administrative agency acting in a quasi-judicial capacity even though it also acts as an investigative body.
Id. at 702.
455. NAT'L COMM'N REPORT, supra note I, at 114.
456. Recommendation 6.2, at 103.
457. Recommendation 6.5, at 103.
458. NAT'L COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 102. The Bureau is the sole large administrative agency not politically accountable to the executive branch. The Bank of North Dakota
(North Dakota Century Code section 6-09-02 (Supp. 2001)) and the State Mill (section 54-18-02
(2001)) report to the Industrial Commission, composed of the Governor, Attorney General, and
Commissioner of Agriculture. N.D. CENT. CODE § 54-17-02 (2001). The Bureau should be held
politically accountable to the Governor or Industrial Commission. It is arguable that the legislature, in seizing the power from the executive and placing it in an employer dominated board, may
have violated the separation of powers doctrine. The recommendations of the National Commission to hold the governing body of the administrative agency to political accountability are crucial.
Recommendation 6.2, at 103. What is appropriate for the Bank of North Dakota and the Mill and
Elevator Association is also appropriate for the Workers' Compensation Bureau. See supra note
450; infra notes 462, 470.
459. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-02-03.1(1) (Supp. 2001) repealed by H.B. 1150, 2003 N.D.
Laws 565, § 1. Reference to composition of the initial board is no longer necessary. The Board
initially consisted of ten members; in addition to six employers, and three employee representatives, one nonvoting member was a member of the North Dakota Medical Association. Id. House
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board members will "represent employers" and three board members will
"represent employees." 46 0 The Governor appoints the replacement board as
seats expire, but is limited to a choice of three names supplied by the
board.n61 There is little or no political accountability. The perceived fairness of the compensation system to workers is polluted by the appearance
of impropriety engendered by the constitution of the Bureau's board, which
is dominated by employer representatives. The Bureau has been politically
sympathetic to employer proposals that save costs and generally unsympathetic to workers' concerns.
The dispute resolution mechanism is further tainted by an appearance
of impropriety as a result of commingling the insurance and oversight functions. The Bureau, as insurer, retains a direct economic interest in the outcome of the litigation it is engaged in as an adversarial participant, while a
462
legal fiction allows it to also act as the "impartial tribunal."
Though the court creates a legal fiction that the Bureau wears the insurer's hat and the impartial tribunal's hat, each operating under a separate
standard of conduct, a legal fiction, unlike a religious belief, does not make
it easy to accept that there are two entities where there is but one. In truth,
the insurer and tribunal are one and the same.

Bill 1150, section 2 eliminates "non voting" membership, providing the North Dakota Medical
Association member a vote, and it adds an eleventh member, at large. H.B. 1150, 2003 N.D.
Laws 565, § 2; see also infra notes 460-461.
460. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-02-03.1(2)(a)-(b) (Supp. 2001). House Bill 1150, section 1
reenacts these provisions as section 65-02-03.1(1)(a)-(b). H.B. 1150, 2003 N.D. Laws 565, § 1.
461. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-02-03.1(3). One of the employee representatives "must represent organized labor," and choose the list of candidates that is forwarded to the Governor for appointment. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-02-03.1(2)(b) & (3). House Bill 1150 prescribes the manner
for reappointment of all members. H.B. 1150, 2003 N.D. Laws 565, § 1.
462. KENNETH DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW §§ 2.2-2.6 (2nd ed. 1978). However, the experience in West Virginia, which also operates an exclusive state fund, is instructive. In 1990, the
West Virginia legislature created the Office of Judges to "establish an independent review which,
it was hoped, would provide a better guarantee of procedural fairness as well as being both more
rational and efficient." Emily Spieler, Assessing Fairness in Workers' Compensation Legislation,
98 W. VA. L. REV. 23, 71 (1995) (citing W.VA. CODE § 23-5-1(g)-(h) (1994), superseded by W.
VA. CODE § 23-5-8 (Supp. 1995)). Spieler says the Office of Judges was necessary because prior
to its enactment:
[t]he Commissioner was responsible for making both initial and post-hearing determinations on claims. As the Commissioner was also responsible for the fiscal integrity of
the program, s/he had (and has) an inherent conflict in making these decisions-much
as an insurer has an incentive to deny claims in order to minimize costs.
Id. at 71. The Bureau is charged with the duty to guard its actuarial health. N.D. CENT. CODE §
65-04-02 (Supp. 2001). But, this principle does not require the Bureau to draw negative factual
inferences against workers. Yet, is is the tendency of the bureaucracy to develop a jaded attitude,
discover that many workers are manipulative, and protect the Fund from payment. The legislature
must act in order to eliminate this inherent conflict. The suggestion presented here is to split the
insurance and oversight functions into two separate entitites. See supra note 458; infra note 470.
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Issues concerning the combination of executive, legislative, and judicial function in one regulatory body are a staple of administrative law. 463
Courts have held that this scheme does not pose constitutional problems.4 64
Yet, the usual administrative law justifications for unification of executive,
legislative, and judicial function in one regulatory body do not apply in
workers' compensation. The economic incentives do not exist except in a
few government programs. Unemployment compensation engenders little
litigation. Social Security is a national system, and individual cases receive
almost no attention from the director. For the most part, decisions made by
an administrative law judge in social security matters are decisions of the
agency.
Workers' compensation is also different because there is competition
among states to attract business, which provides incentive to deny claims
and lower premium rates. In most states, an insurer may not deny claims on
its own; 4 6 5 it must obtain approval of the premium rates from the regulatory
agency and dispute resolution is conducted by the agency. North Dakota is
unusual in that the insurer, not a separate and impartial state regulatory
agency as in other states, decides claims.
In his seminal article on due process, Judge Friendly listed the elements
of a fair hearing, the first element of which is an "Unbiased Tribunal." 466
At its most basic, "no man shall be a judge in his own cause." 467 This admonition should not apply with less force to an insurance company, even a
state fund. The North Dakota Workers' Compensation Bureau showed its
interest in privatization during the 2001 legislative session. 468 Likewise, the
2003 legislative assembly rejected a bill that would have allowed private
insurance in North Dakota.469
Whether the legislature eventually allows private insurers to compete
with the State Fund remains open to question.4 70 Claim payments need no
463. DAVIS, supra note 462, § 2.4.
464. Id.
465. McCluskey, supra note 3, at 868.
466. Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1279 (1975).
467. DAVIS, supra note 462, § 18.1 (quoting Bonham's Case, 8 Co. 114A, 118a (1610)).
468. See supra note 35.
469. House Bill 1304, introduced in 2003, was defeated eighty-seven to four. STATE OF
NORTH DAKOTA, JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE 389 (58th Leg. 2003). The bill did not address the
need to create an oversight agency for all insurers, including the State Fund.
470. Supra notes 34-35. The Bureau appears to be interested in "privatization" without
necessarily advocating the competition of other insurers, or the oversight of its activities as an insurer. Rather, privatization appears to be an effort to solidify the Bureau's status as its own fiefdom, subject neither to competition of other insurers or to political accountability. If private insurance is permitted in North Dakota, the Bureau can no longer also serve as the regulating
authority. In such case, the legislature should create an oversight agency, the board of which is
appointed by the Governor or Industrial Commission in accordance with the recommendations of

2003]

FALLING DOWN ON THE JOB

appropriations. 47' Administrative expenditures, including salary and travel,
do.472 Once free of the appropriations process, it is likely that administrative costs, including salaries, will increase. The Bureau should expect that
if "privatization" occurs, competition with private insurers will result and a
new regulatory oversight agency created. The Bureau would then simply be
'the State Fund', and a new agency would be created to oversee the Bureau
and its competitors. Of course, it will not do to "privatize" the Bureau and
allow it to also serve as the governmental regulator.
A study by Burton indicates that deregulation of insurance with real
competition among insurers for business may reduce costs. 473 Insurers that
succeed are those that induce the best safety modifications in their insureds'
businesses. 474 State funds were established to lower costs. Ironically, Burton found that states with competitive state funds have higher costs than do
states with only private insurance. 475 However, the National Commission
did not find that economic advantage accrues to any system of insurance
over any other. 476 Clearly, there is no easy answer as to whether allowing
private insurance to compete with the state fund will lower costs.
Nevertheless, there are sound reasons for the legislature to separate the
North Dakota Workers' Compensation Bureau into two entities. This separation would create political accountability in the regulator, a state agency
whose director and appeals board should be appointed by the Governor or
the Industrial Commission. Fair hearing from an unbiased tribunal would
be good for both workers who dispute claim decisions and employers who
dispute premium rate classification decisions.
The legislature should untangle the insurance function from the oversight function and create a separate politically accountable state agency to
the National Commission. See supra notes 458, 462. Whether or not the Legislature separates the
insurance and oversight function, control of the Bureau ought to be vested in the Governor or Industrial Commission rather than a political board. See supra notes 450, 458, 462.
471. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-02-06.1 (Supp. 2001).
472. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-02-03.3(5) (Supp. 2001) (requiring the board to prepare,
with the assistance of the Bureau, a budget which it "shall present to the governor for inclusion in
the governor's budget"). The statute goes on to explain that the Board may disagree with the
Governor and present its own testimony to the Legislature. Id. Along these same lines, North
Dakota Century Code section 65-02-05 provides that the Bureau shall use its fund to pay the cost
of office space, and it also provides that "[tlravel and other administrative expense payments ...
must be within the limitations designated by the legislative assembly in appropriation measures
adopted from time to time." N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-02-05 (1995). North Dakota Century Code
section 65-02-06 authorizes expenditures for "salaries and compensation." N.D. CENT. CODE §
65-02-06 (1995).
473. John F. Burton, Jr., National Developments in Coverage, Benefits, and Costs, 1994
WORKERS' COMPENSATION Y.B. 1-10 (LRP Publications).
474. Id.
475. Id. at I- 11.
476. NAT'L COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 113.
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oversee the insurer, whether or not it eventually elects to allow private insurance. The benefit to be derived from this conversion is substantial justice and political accountability and is in conformity with recommendations
of the National Commission.
2.

Reduction in Litigation

The National Commission recommended that state agencies regulate
attorney fees and collect information concerning all fees paid, including
those incurred as a result of representing employers and insurers in claim
disputes. 477 The no-fault workers' compensation scheme was advocated as
a system that would virtually eliminate litigation. 478 Most claims are not
litigated; estimates are that no more than five to ten percent of claimants
obtain legal services. 479 Nevertheless, claim disputes are often contentious
as well as costly, injuring the employment relationship. This fact partly explains the underfiling of work-related claims because, unlike other litigation, workers' compensation litigation normally requires the pursuit of the
claim during the existence of a relationship.
The costs of attorney fees are often portrayed as wasteful, reducing the
funds available for workers. The invocation of economic efficiency supplies employers and insurers with potent ammunition to lobby lawmakers to
control litigation. In response, many states have enacted alternative dispute
480
resolution mechanisms, such as ombudsman programs and arbitration.
These programs are represented as nonadversarial. Many procedural reforms that require informal dispute resolution have shifted control to the insurer and discourage claimants from seeking legal advice. North Dakota
attacked the problem directly, eliminating the Bureau's payment of fees to
the worker's attorney "win, lose or draw," instead authorizing payment only
1
when the worker prevails.48
Proponents of "litigation reform" cite data that shows that disability
payments are higher when claimants are represented by attorneys. 482 The
477. Recommendation 6.15, at 109.
478. 4 LARSON, supra note 45, § 80.05[4], at 80-23 (noting, for example, that schedule
benefits were thought to "prevent" litigation).
479. McCluskey, supra note 3, at 858. North Dakota's rate of litigation has dropped to .6%.
1999-2001 BIENNIAL REPORT OF THE NORTH DAKOTA WORKERS'

COMPENSATION BUREAU, at

7.
480. McCluskey, supra note 3, at 867.
481. 1993 N.D. Laws 619, § I amended North Dakota Century Code section 65-02-08 so
that, except in cases of arbitration, fees are contingent upon prevailing. 1993 N.D. Laws 619, § 1.
In 1995, fees in arbitration also became contingent upon prevailing. 1995 N.D. Laws, 614, § 2,
amending N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-02-15. See infra, notes 494-499 and accompanying text for information on arbitration.
482. McCluskey, supra note 3, at 860.
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argument assumes that awards resulting from litigation are less rational than
uncontested awards, being largely due to the efforts of wily lawyers rather
than the merits. Economic theory suggests that the level of attorney involvement is set by its value to workers.4 83 Legal services dismissed by an
insurer as an inefficient friction cost can provide a worker wherewithal to
obtain the benefits to which he or she is entitled. The question should be
whether litigiousness is more the result of excessive claiming or insufficient
acceptance of claims.4 84 The problem of litigation costs poses an "efficiency paradox": litigation decreases efficiency by raising costs and litigation increases efficiency by ensuring more accurate claims determinations. 485
There are important consequences to the extent reformers are successful in "squeezing out" legal representation. 486 First, reduced attorney involvement is accomplished by reduced benefit payments to workers.4 87
Most of these claims are probably legitimate, considering the data that underclaiming of benefits exceeds over reporting or excessive claiming.4 88

483. Id. at 870.
484. Id. at 869-73.
By assuming that reducing litigation should mean removing rather than expanding the
value added by litigation and by lawyers in the current system, proponents of recent
reforms [limiting access to attorneys through informal dispute resolution which discourages attorney involvement, and by direct regulation of fees] make a judgment
about the normal distribution of resources that should be available to injured workers.
By claiming that reduced "friction" will improve overall efficiency, proponents of recent reforms . . . beg the underlying question- whether litigiousness is more a problem of excessive claiming by workers, or of insufficient acceptance of claims by employers and insurers.
Id. at 870-71.
485. Hylton & Laymon, supra note 116, at 130.
486. McCluskey, supra note 3, at 862.
487. Id.; see also Hylton & Laymon, supra note 116, at 162. The authors state:
There are three ways in which the costliness of litigation leads to externalization under
the workers' compensation system. The first is claims that are dropped, never filed, or
settled for less than full compensation because the anticipated award is less than the
anticipated litigation cost. In these cases, the losses due to injury are bome by the employees, and therefore are obviously not shifted to the employer. If these are losses
that should be borne by the employer, which is the assumption behind the workers'
compensation system, then it is appropriate to refer to them as externalized losses.
The second way in which litigation results in externalization of losses is that the litigation costs of plaintiffs who pursue challenged claims are generally not shifted to the
employer. If the claim is valid, the cost of pursuing it should be considered part of the
loss resulting from the initial injury. In order to compensate the victim, this cost
should be shifted to the employer.
The third sense in which the costliness of litigation generates accident cost externalization is that the administrative costs of litigating claims-the incremental costs of
running the administrative machinery-are externalized to the public.
Id.
488. See supra notes 127, 422; see generally McCluskey, supra note 3, at 862.
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Moreover, the reduction in litigation costs do not appear to have resulted in
489
increased workers' compensation benefits.
As reforms succeed in inducing attorneys out of workers' compensation practice, the reforms sap the interest and strength of labor's most powerful political ally to a pro-claimant compensation system. 490 Finally, reforms aimed to reduce formal litigation inevitably shift to the insurer the
4
power to decide which claims are legitimate. 91
Requirements of mandatory informal dispute resolution systems prior
to formal claims proceedings simply delay claims payments, thereby increasing pressure on workers with no other income or medical insurance to
accept reduced benefits-so called "starve-out" tactics. The informal dispute resolution mechanism established through the North Dakota Workers'
Compensation System is the "Office of Independent Review" (OIR).492
The OIR procedure has reduced litigation to the detriment of workers, many
of whom dropped valid claims. Information obtained as a result of litigation with the Bureau establishes that the OIR is not independent of the Bureau; that the OIR "advocates" are not legally trained and obtain legal advice from the same Bureau counsel who assist in drafting the denials of
benefits; and that only sixteen to seventeen percent of workers receive some
benefit, however small, as a result of efforts of the OIR, while only one in
three appeal of the eighty-three to eighty-four percent who are not
helped.

493

489. Id.
490. Id. at 873.
491. Id. at 872.
492. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-02-27 (Supp. 2001).
493. See materials from the administrative litigation in the matter of the claim of Carole
Hennen, Claim No. 1998 556,013 N53 (On file with Author) (wherein attorney Mark G. Schneider contended that the Office of Independent Review is not independent of the claims department,
utilizes the Bureau's attorneys for legal advice, and arranges hostile IME's (so called independent
medical examinations)). Mr. Schneider deposed OIR "advocate," Cade Jorgenson, who admitted
Schneider's essential contentions. The OIR is able to assist workers to the extent the worker receives some benefit, however slight, only sixteen to seventeen percent of the time. Of the majority not helped, only about one out of three appeal. Hennen Hearing Transcript 222/5-13, and
222/14-19. Jorgenson grudgingly admitted that some of the workers who do not appeal may have
prevailed if they had pursued their claims through a hearing. In my experience, both as Bureau
defense counsel and as counsel for workers, the majority of these disputes should be resolved in
favor of workers. The Bureau ultimately agreed in a settlement reached with Hennen that the notice to injured workers would henceforth include language that:
a) OIR is independent of the Claims Department but is a function of the North Dakota
Workers' Compensation Bureau; b) OIR advocates are not lawyers and by law cannot
provide legal advice to injured workers; c) Injured workers have the option of retaining their own lawyer, and that if the injured worker utilizes the services of the Office
of Independent Review and makes a good faith effort to resolve the dispute, the injured worker's attorney fees will be paid if he/she prevails in subsequent administration [sic] or judicial proceedings, subject to applicable fee caps; d) The goal of the Office of Independent Review is to attempt to assist the injured worker quickly and
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It is evident that most workers do not receive an award as a result of
cooperation with OIR and most drop their claims or obtain legal representation. A large number of workers who unsuccessfully participate in the
"nonadversarial" OIR program receive benefits after litigation through a
formal hearing. It is apparent that workers engaged in disputes with the Bureau require legal assistance but are often cowed away from this assistance

efficiently and issue a "Certificate of Completion" to claimant, within 30 days of receiving a request for assistance.
Stipulation in the matter of the claim of Carole Hennen 1998 556,013 N53 (On file with Author).
The stipulation reveals that the OIR continues to function primarily to issue certificates of completion to allow the claimant to proceed to hearing. Notwithstanding the Bureau's minimal effort
to discontinue outright misleading of claimants, the Bureau's contention that it is fairly adjudicating claims is well illustrated by this statement in its 1997-1999 biennial report:
In 1995, the new management at NDWC put an end to skyrocketing settlement costs
by dramatically decreasing the use of compromise settlements ....
We decided to
simply pay full benefits for each claim-no more, and no less. We defend our benefit
decisions at hearing when they are challenged rather than settling them.... This new
approach saves money and gives more injured workers the full benefits to which they
are entitled.
NORTH DAKOTA WORKERS' COMPENSATION 1997-1999 BIENNIAL REPORT. The fallacy of this
argument is that it assumes that the hearing process always results in the correct decision. However, the Bureau sometimes reverses the administrative law judge if it disagrees, and this gloss on
the nature of fact-finding is equally absurd as a claim that decision-making is infallible. The Bureau has taken a slightly more realistic view of settlements in its most recent publications, noting
that "[diepending on the case, settlement may be appropriate. During this biennium, 364 cases
were settled. This slight upward trend is by design and shows that strict management controls
instituted in the mid 1990's to curb out-of-control settlement policies are no longer required."
NORTH DAKOTA WORKERS' COMPENSATION BUREAU BIENNIAL REPORT, 1999-2001, at 11.
This view of settlement as leniency to "out-of-control" workers is a story the Bureau is sticking to.
The problem is that the Bureau continues to litigate claims that it should have paid without dispute. Even when the Bureau does not reverse the AU, problems abound. Since 1995, the administrative dispute resolution mechanism has relied upon AUs assigned from the Office of Administrative Hearings, many of whom had never been exposed to workers' compensation prior to
involvement as an administrative law judge. The previous system, in which the Commissioners
(appointees of the Governor) decided claims, actually resulted in more decisions favorable to
workers. That may be explained by a more conservative bureau administration after 1995, but it is
also due, in part, to a few conservative minded AL's who acted as though they were appellate
judges and affirmed the Bureau if it could have reasonably decided as it did.
The Bureau's harsh attitude against settlement is grounded in a realization that an administrative agency, with all its resources, can usually put on some kind of defense by hiring expert witnesses and the like, knowing too, that it will be given deference on appeal. Settlements can be an
effective way to value a claim when there is some doubt about the merits. The Bureau's refusal to
settle claims bites the hardest in cases involving disability or vocational rehabilitation. Many of
the settlements with which I am familiar (from the time I was Bureau counsel) are cases in which
the Bureau contended that a worker with a work history of heavy labor could return to work, despite being placed on light work restrictions and despite a lack of skills, training, or education to
do light work, on the theory that the worker could perform jobs such as locksmith, telephone solicitor, salesman, or clerk. Some of those cases were settled, offering the worker funds to attend a
retraining program to obtain skills necessary to return to the work force. The Bureau is able to
prevail in most of the litigation concerning vocational rehabilitation because of its resources to
hire a vocational witness who has no compunction against concluding that nearly any worker can
find some type of job. The Bureau's proud proclamation that its preference is not to settle claims
is further illustration of the bargain shifted against workers.
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through detrimental reliance on the OIR advocate. The legislature should
repeal the OIR program.
An examination of North Dakota's experience with arbitration illustrates the rise of the mid-1990s reforms. Binding arbitration was initially
enacted in 1991 and did not contain any limit concerning the amount in dispute. 494 The legislature amended the arbitration procedure in 1995, limiting
its application to disputes concerning an amount "no greater than three
thousand dollars" and further provided the Bureau authority to revoke or
modify the award.4 95 The 1995 amendments provided that if the Bureau
prevails, the decision "is final and not reviewable by any court." 496 If the
497
worker prevails, the Bureau may revoke or modify the arbitration award.
It is my argument that this unequal distribution of power in the arbitration
process violated the worker's constitutional rights.4 98 The 2003 legislature
repealed arbitration altogether.4 99 A return to an option of binding arbitration, adjudicated by a true neutral, could blow fresh air into the workings of
494. 1991 N.D. Laws 714, § 30; see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-02-15 amended by 1995
N.D. Laws 614, § 2; N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-02-15-17, & -18 (1991) repealed by 1995 N.D. Laws
614, § 6. North Dakota Century Code section 65-02-15 did not provide any limitations concerning the amount in dispute. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-02-15 amended by 1995 N.D. Laws 614, § 2.
The arbitrators consisted of one employer representative, one employee representative, and one
member of the public. Id. Moreover, "a decision of the workers' compensation binding arbitration panel is final and nonreviewable by a district court, except as provided in section 65-05-04."
N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-02-18 repealed by 1995 N.D. Laws 614, § 6. The Bureau could exercise
its continuing jurisdiction under 65-05-04 to end, increase, or diminish an award, but it could not
alter the decision of the arbitrators. The decisions could be quite unpredictable, anathema to a
state agency enamored of control.
495. 1995 N.D. Laws 614, § 2. Thus, the reforms in the 1990's provided the Bureau authority to overturn an arbitration award and took from workers the independence of the arbitration
scheme. The Bureau lobbied for these amendments because arbitrators were unpredictable and
granted awards it could not stomach.
496. See id. (amending N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-02-15 (1995)).
497. Id.
498. The court refused to reach the merits in Johnson v. Traynor, 1998 ND 115, 579 N.W.2d
184 on a hypertechnicality that the worker had not exhausted administrative remedies by not petitioning the director for further review after the arbitration. Id. at 187-88. In my experience, no
claimant has ever made a request for reconsideration after arbitration. The arbitration ends the
matter, one way or the other. Moreover, nearly every appeal decided by the courts on the merits
after an administrative hearing reaches the court without the claimant having requested reconsideration. Clearly, the court elected to duck deciding the constitutionality of the statute on the merits. The arguments that former North Dakota Century Code section 65-02-15 violated the claimant's constitutional rights seem strong. First, the statute violates due process because it requires
arbitration but allows the agency to reverse an adverse decision. This "heads I win, tails you lose"
mechanism is inherently unfair. In Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138 (Cal. Ct. App.
1997), the court invalidated a one-sided arbitration provision that allowed an employer to maintain
a judicial action but required employees to submit to binding arbitration, characterizing the inequality as an unfair "heads I win, tails you lose" situation. id. at 151. Second, North Dakota's
workers' compensation arbitration statute precluded judicial review, denying claimants their constitutional right to open access to the courts. Third, legislative attempts to preclude judicial review
may contravene the separation of powers doctrine.
499. H.B. 1060, 2003 N.D. Laws 562, § 3.
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the Bureau. However, there is little chance the Legislature will reenact an
alternative dispute resolution mechanism, such as binding arbitration, because the Bureau opposes this loss of control.
Because disability benefits are not sufficiently high to contemplate a
reasonable income for a worker after reduction for an attorney's fee, North
Dakota is one of several states that pay an add-on attorney's fee.500 The fee
is paid by the Fund only when the worker prevails. 50 Fees are regulated by
the agency, which currently pays a contingent fee of $100 per hour and is
subject to caps at each stage of the proceeding. 02 The administrative rule
also sets maximum fee caps at each stage of dispute resolution. 50 3 The statute further limits attorney's fees to twenty percent of the amount awarded,
"[e]xcept for an initial determination of compensability." 50 4 The twenty
500. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-02-08 (Supp. 2001).
501. Id. In Ash v. Traynor, 2000 ND 75, 609 N.W.2d 96, the court issued a ruling in favor
of workers, holding that a worker could claim entitlement to the statutory fee under section 65-0208 even if she had entered into a private fee agreement with the attorney. Id. 5 9, 609 N.W.2d at
99. The court affirmed the ability of a worker to hire and pay counsel under a private fee agreement under which the worker pays the attorney, but the fee available from the workers' compensation fund is assigned to the benefit of the worker. Id. The worker is not harmed, she paid the
agreed on fee. Id. 55 8-10. The State is not harmed, it pays only the statutory fee. Id. 9. But
workers benefit to the extent the assignment practice provides them more choice among attorneys
who may be willing to accept their cases. Id. 55 10-11, 609 N.W.2d at 99-100. This case is one
bright spot ameriorating to some measure the plethora of rules and practices that have nearly
decimated the claimant's bar.
502. N.D. ADMIN. CODE. § 92-01-02-11.1. The final irritant is that even after a worker
prevails, the Bureau often delays paying the attorney's fee while any part of the claim remains in
dispute. This policy, totally lacking any legal justification, serves to discourage attorneys from
pursuing a workers compensation practice.
503. Id.
504. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-02-08. The twenty percent fee cap does not apply to any dispute arising from an "initial determination of compensability." Id. This should include a Bureau
denial of an "unrelated condition" that the claimant had alleged as causally related to the work
injury. For example, a low back injury may be found compensable. If the claimant subsequently
develops a neck condition or depression, allegedly related to the work injury, Bureau denial is an
"initial determination of compensability" as to this condition. The legislature specifically did not
use the term of art "compensable injury" in North Dakota Century Code section 65-02-08, precluding the Bureau from arguing that the twenty percent fee cap applies in every case except the
very first determination of compensable injury. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-02-08 (1995). This argument finds support in the court's construction of the impairment statute, section 65-05-15, as
different from the Legislature's definition of "permanent impairment" for an award due to loss of,
or loss of use of, a member of the body. Bruns v. N.D. Workers' Comp. Bureau 1999 ND 116,
13, 595 N.W.2d 298, 302. See my criticism of Bruns, supra note 318, which argues that the court
ignored a crucial element-that the purposes served in defining impairment are largely similar-in (1) making an impairment award and (2) determining application of the aggravation statute. The purpose of examining the meaning of impairment under section 65-05-15 of the North
Dakota Century Code is to determine whether the loss of function (impairment) is significant
enough to justify a reduction of the award. Similarly, the purpose of a definition of impairment
under section 65-01-02(26) is to determine the significance of the loss of function in making an
impairment award pursuant to section 65-05-12.2. In each case, impairment is defined as the loss
of function and is used to determine the worker's benefits. In contrast, North Dakota Century
Code section 65-01-02(11) defines "compensable injury" to determine the scope of coverage to an
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percent fee cap discourages prosecution of small claims and gives the insurer license to do its will. Few workers contest these claims, which frequently involve denial of medical benefits on the ground the treatment is
not causally attributable to the work injury.
The North Dakota Supreme Court has upheld the administrative rules
regulating attorneys' fees despite indication that the rules have successfully
"squeezed out" lawyers from practicing workers' compensation law. 505 No
such limitations exist on fees paid to the employer's or insurer's attorneys.
Moreover, the Bureau recognizes the necessity for legal representation; it is
always represented by counsel at disputed hearings.
In sum, the various mechanisms designed to reduce "attorney involvement" do not produce an aggregate savings to the compensation system but
represent another instance in which money is saved by employers and insurers at the cost of workers. A decrease in litigation achieved by limiting
workers' access to counsel does not represent a gain in economic efficiency; rather, the result is a simple redistribution of resources.
3.

The Limitations Period

The National Commission recommended a three-year statute of limitations. 506 North Dakota, as do the majority of states, requires workers to file
their claim within one year from the date they know or should know that
they suffered a compensable injury. 507 The claimant must have knowledge
of the nature and seriousness of the injury in order for the limitations period
to begin to run. 508 A three-year limitations period would assist workers who
injured worker; while section 65-02-08 defines "initial determination of compensability" to determine when to apply the twenty percent fee cap in paying the worker's attorney. N.D. CENT.
CODE § 65-02-08. The purposes are not aligned like they are in the impairment situation. Nevertheless, the Bruns court carefully distinguished a difference between "impairment" under the
award statute and the aggravation statute. Bruns v. N.D. Workers' Comp. Bureau 1999 ND 116,
5J 14-19, 595 N.W.2d 298, 302-03. The argument that the term "compensable injury" under
North Dakota Century Code section 65-01-02(11) is not the same as the term "initial determination of compensability" under section 65-02-08 is even stronger than a similar winning argument
was in Bruns. Id.
505. Little v. Traynor, 1997 ND 128, 26, 565 N.W.2d 766, 775; see generally, Brief for
Appellee, Little v. Traynor, 1997 ND 128, 565 N.W.2d 766 (No. 960283) (arguing against capping attorney's fees). The legislative curtailment of benefits to workers, including attorneys fee,
has reduced the litigation rate to .6% in the 1999-2001 Biennium. See supra note 479. Because
most workers prevail in litigation with the Bureau, the reduced volume of workers seeking to redress their greivances in an administrative hearing makes it likely that more workers are not receiving the benefits to which they are entitled, even under the "reforms." The OIR office, strident
fraud warnings, reduction in the claimant's bar, and the too often repeated necessity of a worker
having to fight for benefits contribute to workers' disincentives to file "rehearing" petitions and
fight for payment of legitimate claims in the administrative hearing process.
506. Recommendation 6.13, at 107.
507. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-01 (Supp. 2001).
508. 7 LARSON, supra note 45, § 126.10 (2002).
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suffer occupational disease and cumulative trauma because these are the
kinds of compensable injury least likely to be recognized as work related.
However, the statute is not tolled where the claimant, as a reasonable person, does not know the probable compensable character of the injury or disease. The limitations period should be construed liberally, so as to afford
relief. The North Dakota legislature recently directed its courts that the rule
of liberal construction does not apply, evincing little sympathy for the
plight of workers. 509
4.

Worker Fraud

Weeding out "epidemic" or "rampant" worker claims fraud is all the
rage, spreading nationally with that hollow but happy sound because, after
all, nobody favors fraud. Many states have enacted tougher penalties for
fraud and have established fraud investigation units. 5 10 McCluskey concluded "recent anti-fraud legislation will probably redistribute resources not
just from dishonest participation back to legitimate interests, but from
workers in general to insurers and employers." 5 II Most researchers believe
that "benefit fraud is 'not a major source' of recent cost increases."5 12
The fervor to root out worker fraud is unmatched by efforts to investigate employer fraud, who misrepresent job classifications and payroll or illegitimately employ "independent contractors." 5 13 The disproportionate focus on worker fraud converts the inherent uncertainties about causal
relationship and extent of disability into suspicions. Thus, investigators
"red flag" a number of "markers" of fraud, such as the Monday morning
injury. Surveillance of workers is increasingly common.
North Dakota facilitates proof of fraud by mailing to workers a
monthly form requesting information concerning return to work and receipt
of wages. North Dakota has generally upheld Bureau determinations of
worker fraud despite the severe statutory penalty mandating forfeiture of
medical benefits, impairment, rehabilitation, and disability.514
509. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-01; see also supra note 243 (contrasting the current climate
with that prevailing in the 1980s).
510. McCluskey, supra note 3, at 873-74.
511. Id. at 875.
512. ld. at 877.
513. Id. at 882-83.
514. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-33 (Supp. 2001). A Westlaw research session in April 2003
revealed twenty-four cases citing North Dakota Century Code § 65-05-33, most of them of recent
vintage. In the most recent fraud case Wanner v. North Dakota Workers' Compensation Bureau,
2002 ND 201, 654 N.W.2d 760, the court finally reversed a Bureau fraud determination. Id. T 16,
654 N.W.2d at 767. The court previously said that a failure to report "income" might justify forfeiture of future benefits. Unser v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 1999 ND 129, 5 18, 598 N.W.2d
89, 95; Snyder v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 2001 ND 38, 5 17-18, 622 N.W.2d 712, 719.
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The Wanner court distinguished these cases, affirming the Bureau's own conclusion that gardening was not work. Wanner, 5 21, 622 N.W.2d at 769. The court said, "While a failure to report
income from work is material to the Bureau's ability to determine a claimant's entitlement to
benefits and to calculate the amount of benefits, a failure to report money received apart from
work is not similarly material. It is not disputed that the AU did not find it material to payment of
disability benefits." Id. The majority opinion is welcome news, but unfortunately, the dissent is
correct that the case is not easily distinguished from the cases that came before it. Id. IT 40-52,
622 N.W.2d at 774-76. In my judgment, the Court had long abdicated meaningful review as to
what kind of conduct is "material" to justify forfeiture of all workers' compensation benefits. The
Bureau terminated Wanner's benefits and ordered forfeiture of all future benefits because Wanner
had not reported income from selling vegetables he grew in his garden. Id. $ 2, 622 N.W.2d at
763. The court reversed, finding that "Wanner's failure to report the receipt of money from the
sale of vegetables was not material." Id. I 11, 622 N.W.2d at 766. The court rested its conclusion
primarily upon the fact that "[slection 65-05-08(8), N.D.C.C., allows an injured employee to earn
up to ten percent of his preinjury average gross weekly earnings without a reduction in benefits."
Id. 5 16, 622 N.W.2d at 767; see also Snyder v. N.D. Workers' Comp. Bureau, 2001 ND 38, T5
15-20, 622 N.W.2d 712, 718-19 (upholding forfeiture of all future benefits, including medical
benefits under North Dakota Century Code section 65-05-33, which required workers to report
work when claimant opened restaurant, performed minor job duties, and earned $110-$140 per
month); Aalund v. N.D. Workers' Comp. Bureau, 2001 ND 32, 5 18, 622 N.W.2d 210, 216 (upholding forfeiture of all future benefits to worker as a result of worker's attempt to collect on false
claim for mileage reimbursement).
The materiality component of fraud appears to have been explained away by the court. See
Dean v. N.D. Workers' Comp. Bureau, 1997 ND 165, T 15, 596 N.W.2d 626, 629 (finding that a
false statement may be sufficiently material to support forfeiture of future benefits even though it
was not sufficiently material to mislead the Bureau into reimbursemening initial benefits). Once
the court upholds a finding of a failure to report income, the court shifts the burden to the worker
to prove that the amount of undisclosed income is not material. Unser v. N.D. Workers' Comp.
Bureau, 1997 ND 129, 5 20-22, 598 N.W.2d 89, 95. Of course, it is, in philosophy, considered
impossible to prove a negative-that the income was not material. The court has utilized the preponderance of evidence standard in determining whether the Bureau has met its burden of proof.
Renault v. N.D. Workers' Comp. Bureau, 1999 ND 187, 24, 601 N.W.2d 580, 587. In Renault,
the court rejected a worker's argument that the standard should be that of "clear and convincing
evidence" because the worker had not properly presented the argument in his specification of error
on appeal. Id. ST 11-14, 601 N.W.2d at 584-85. The court has applied the clear and convincing
evidence standard in commercial litigation. Fargo Foods Inc., v. Bernabucci, 1999 ND 120, 19,
596 N.W.2d 38, 43. It is not clear why the standard of clear and convincing evidence should not
apply in workers' compensation fraud matters.
In Sjostrand v. North Dakota Workers' Compensation Bureau, 2002 ND 125, 649 N.W.2d
537, the court affirmed the Bureau's order that the worker forfeit all benefits for misrepresenting
his physical condition. Id. 5 1, 649 N.W.2d at 539. The Bureau hired a notorious defense-minded
physician, Gregory Peterson, to conduct an "independent medical evaluation." Id. 5 3, 649
N.W.2d at 540. Dr. Peterson claimed that the worker had "generalized, variable, non-specific pain
complaints which are markedly out of proportion to objective findings." Id. Dr. Peterson reviewed surveillance videos of Sjostrand "performing very rigorous physical activities... [that]
demonstrate that he misrepresented his abilities with [sic] my interview with him." Id. The Bureau concluded that he made false statements, and it ordered forfeiture of all benefits. Id. 5 4, 649
N.W.2d at 541. The court rejected the workers' well-founded criticism of the weight the factfinder gave to the surveillance videos invoking the well known rubric that it is for the agency to
weigh evidence and not the courts. Id. 55 18-20, 649 N.W.2d at 546-47. The court, in an analysis
that must be characterized as superficial, rejected the workers' contention that the standard of
proof for fraud must be clear and convincing evidence. Id. 55 22-30, 649 N.W.2d at 547-49. In
essence, the court noted that although the Legislature has not specified the standard of proof in
workers' compensation fraud matters, the Administrative Agency Practices Act, which provides
for proof by a preponderance of evidence, should be applied. Id. T5 27-30, 649 N.W.2d at 548-49.
Why this must be so is not clearly explained. While the court notes that the Legislature has specified the standard of proof in a number of workers' compensation statutes, it cannot explain why
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G. EXCLUSIVE REMEDY
The employer's benefit from the bargain, immunity from tort liability
for injuries and disease that arise out of the employment, remains relatively
strong.5 15 Broad tort immunity is stressed as necessary to maintain the
original quid pro quo.
the "natural presumption against fraud" does not compel the higher standard of proof of clear and
convincing evidence. Id. 5 47, 649 N.W.2d at 553 (Maring, J., dissenting).
This natural presumption against fraud is "consistent with the legislature's practice of requiring presumptions under the Workers Compensation Act to be rebutted by clear and convincing
evidence." Id. The stigma attached to a finding of fraud, the possibility of criminal prosecution,
and case law from other jurisdictions support a conclusion that the standard for the Bureau to
prove worker fraud ought to be that of clear and convincing evidence. The court noted that in the
absence of the Legislature's specification of the burden of proof, the court would apply a standard.
Id. 5 29, 649 N.W.2d at 549. The court simply decides to apply the preponderance standard because most disputes are decided using this standard. That is not a reasoned analysis, and it cannot
compete with Justice Maring's cogent dissent. In construing fraud so easily, based on surveillance
tapes taken out of a true context and shown to a defense-minded IME physician who frequently
concludes that the worker is misrepresenting, the Bureau stacked the deck. The hyberbole of
worker fraud is a prime example of how, in practice, the workers' compensation system has broken the bargain promised workers to sure and certain relief.
515. Section 65-01-01.1 of the North Dakota Century Code provides that "[tihe sole exception to an employer's immunity from civil liability under this title, except as provided in chapter
65-09, is an action for an injury to an employee caused by an employer's intentional act done with
the conscious purpose of inflicting the injury." Section 65-04-28 provides that "[e]mployers who
comply with the provisions of this chapter shall not be liable to respond in damages at common
law or by statute for injury to or death of any employee, wherever occurring, during the period
covered by premiums paid into the fund." N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-04-28 (2001). Intentional torts
are the most common exception to the exclusive remedy exclusion. See infra notes 523-524. The
rapidly evolving bad faith exception against insurers for the willful failure to commence benefits
or the unjustifiable denial of benefits is controversial and worthy of a future law review article.
Professor Larson cites Smith v. American Employers' Insurance Co., 163 A.2d 564 (N.H. 1960) as
providing an impressive straightforward analysis of the issue. Id. § 114.03, at 114-3 to -5.
In Smith, the court noted that the statute authorizing an injured employee to obtain tort damages when a compensable injury is sustained under circumstances creating in "some person other
than the employer" a legal liability to pay damages in respect thereto should be interpreted in accord with its common usage. Smith, 163 A.2d at 566. Clearly an insurer is "some person other
than the employer" and so may be liable in tort. Id. at 566-67.
A representative case setting forth essentials of and rationale for the exception is Travlers
Insurance Co. v. Savio, 706 P.2d 1258 (Colo. 1985); e.g., Travlers, 706 P.2d at 1275-76 (finding
that to state a claim for bad faith, a plaintiff must establish that the insurer acted unreasonably and
with knowledge of, or reckless disregard for, the fact that no reasonable basis existed for denying
the claim); see Boylan v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 489 N.W.2d 742 (Iowa 1992) (summarizing earlier case law); see generally Robert R. Potter & Joan T.A. Gabel, The Emerging Bad Faith
Cause of Action Takes on the Exclusive Remedy Doctrine, 48 MERCER L. REV. 63 (1996). Professor Larson notes that insurers may be liable in tort for actions such as harassment in investigation
of a claim. 6 LARSON, supra note 45, § 104.05(2), at 104-22. Larson notes that it is rash to determine a majority view. Id. § 114.02, at 114-3. Nevertheless, he notes that twenty-four states
have, by statute, equated employers with insurers to immunize both. Id. § 114.04, at 114-7 to -9.
Section 65-04-28 of the North Dakota Century Code imunizes employers but does not immunize
the Bureau. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-04-28 (2001). Larson prefers to resolve the issue utilizing the
functional approach:
The employer assumes compensation burdens in exchange for tort immunity. The carrier assumes compensation burdens in exchange for payment of an insurance premium.
In the one respect that is decisive for present purposes, then, their positions are not
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Recent reformers contend that employer's immunity must remain inviolate while benefits for workers may be "reformed." To save costs, defenders of the exclusiveness of the compensation remedy rely upon efficiency arguments, primarily on the grounds of the initial bargain.
No-fault benefits are a valuable trade for workers if a significant number of workers would not otherwise be compensated. If a substantial number of work accidents are the result of employers who ignore known risks,
then the workers gain from the bargain diminishes.5 16 Considering the erosion of common-law tort defenses and a more liberal negligence standard
(such as the Federal Employers Liability Act), it is probable that, for workers, no-fault damages are no bargain.5' 7 Workers, in the aggregate, probably receive less as a result of workers' compensation than they would under
the modern tort system. Compensability restrictions, such as for heart attacks, usually mean that workers are left without a remedy.
Reform discussions invariably take the form of benefit reductions; legislators have given little consideration to allowing workers an expanded tort
option. Legislators typically zealously defend principles of broad tort immunity. The workers' compensation bargain implicitly rejects the premise
that expanded tort liability induces employers to expend more on safety and
substantially decrease known risks to minimize costs. 5 18 Yet, it is reasonable to conclude that exposure to tort liability would cause employers to
discontinue regarding work accidents as the inevitable byproduct of business. The "internalization" of work injury as a cost of industry and the
view that workers are the primary cause of their own injuries are a disincentive to safety. This reflects the shift of the paradigm of no-fault workers' compensation to one of worker-fault. 51 9
The intentional tort exception to the immunity principle is extremely
limited. Even conduct that goes beyond wanton negligence, such as
"knowingly permitting a hazardous work condition to exist, or knowingly
ordering employees to perform an extremely dangerous job, willfully failidentical at all. From this it can be deduced that, if the legislature chose to grant immunity by name to the employer and not to the insurer, this is not to be be explained as
some kind of oversight.
Id. § 114.07, at 114-16. Larson suggests recognition of a cause of action against an insurance
carrier for negligence in selection of a physician. Id. § 114.08, at 114-22. The decisive factor is
that in such case the insurer acts to control the event that caused injury. Id. at 114-23. While I
have witnessed Bureau actions that may only be characterized as bad faith as a factual matter and
court recognition of this cause of action would undoubtedly serve as stong incentive to treat workers fairly, whether the Court should do so is beyond the scope of this paper.
516. McCluskey, supra note 3, at 895.
517. Id. at 896.
518. Id. at 898 (citing Spieler supra note 9, at 172).
519. Spieler, supra note 9, at 211-13.
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ing to furnish a safe place to work, [or even] willfully violating a safety
statute" does not fall within the intentional tort exception520 The compensation system as a whole, the limited tort exception to the immunity principle in particular, does not provide strong incentives for employers to devote
52
additional resources to safety in the workplace. '
In Zimmerman v Valdak Corp., the North Dakota Supreme Court held
an employer immune from tort liability despite the employer's knowledge
that safety locks on an industrial centrifinge were disabled.522 Clearly the
injury that occurred-a worker's arm was torn from his body by a machine
known to be malfunctioning-was foreseeable. 523 The decision is in accord
524
with virtually every jurisdiction.

520. 6 LARSON, supra note 45 § 103.03, at 103-8 to -9; see generally George H. Singer,
Workers' Compensation: The Assault on the Shield of Immunity-Coming to Blows with the Exclusive-Remedy Provisions of the N.D. Workers' Compensation Act, 70 N.D. L. REV. 905 (1994). I
do not advocate erosion of the immunity principle. But, the fact that employer immunity has remained sacred while workers benefits have eroded is compelling proof of this thesis that the
worker-fault paradigm has come to predominate.
521. Spieler, supra note 9, at 187-202.
522. Zimmerman v. Valdak Corp., 1997 ND 203, 5 3, 570 N.W.2d 204, 206.
523. Id. However, the court concluded that "the North Dakota Workers' Compensation Act
does not preclude recovery for true intentional injuries and an employee can pursue a civil cause
of action against his employer for a true intentional injury. An employer is deemed to have intended to injure if the employer had knowledge an injury was certain to occur and willfully disregarded that knowledge." Id. 5 21, 570 N.W.2d at 209 (citing N.D.CENT. CODE § 65-01-01.1
(Supp.2001).
524. 6 LARSON, supra note 45, §§ 103.03, .05. The Zimmerman court provided a succinct
summary of the views. Zimmerman, 5 19, 570 N.W.2d at 208. The minority has determined that
if the employer intended the act that caused the injury or knew the injury was substantially certain
to occur from the act, the employer has committed an intentional tort. See, e.g., Woodson v.
Rowland, 407 S.E.2d 222, 228 (N.C. 1991). The majority "allow[s] an employee to pursue a civil
cause of action only if the employer intended the act and intended an injury." Zimmerman, T 20,
570 N.W.2d at 208; see also 6 LARSON, supra note 45, §§ 103.03, .05 (criticizing attempts to circumvent the exclusiveness of the compensation remedy). Some courts have defined an intentional
injury not merely as "the true intended tort" but also an injury "substantially certain" to follow.
Id. Under the "true intended tort theory," the actor must have intended both the act itself and the
injurious consequences of the act. Id. § 103.03. Under the latter, the actor must have intended the
act, but it is enough that he or she knew that injury was substantially certain to occur from the act.
Serna v. Statewide Contractors,429 P.2d 504 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1967) discusses the meaning of the
"substantially certain" test to determine whether conduct amounts to an intentional tort. Serna,
429 P.2d at 507. In that case, "two men [were] killed when a 25-foot ditch caved in burying them
alive." Id. at 505. During the preceding five months, there had been one cave-in, burying a man
up to his waist, and inspectors had warned the employer that "the sides of the ditch were not
sloped properly, the side was sandy, more shoveling was needed, and escape ladders should be
placed every 25 feet." Id. at 506. The warnings were ignored. Id. The Arizona court disallowed
the tort action, finding that the act was not done knowingly and purposely, with the direct object
of injuring another. Id. at 508. The Michigan court noted an example of a case that might come
out differently under the "substantially certain" test. Beauchamp v. Dow Chem. Co., 398 N.W.2d
882 (Mich. 1986). However, Professor Larson thought it useful to put it to a test:
Mark Twain observed that, in the last analysis, the most effective way to settle an argument is with a bet. Let us try this out on... the site of the cave-in, before it happened. [Suppose the bettors have full knowledge of the facts. One bettor says] "I think
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In 1999, the North Dakota legislature signaled its resolute commitment
to employer immunity by enacting a provision that provides a "sole exception" for "an injury to an employee caused by an employer's intentional act
done with the conscious purpose of inflicting the injury." 525 As Professor
McCluskey puts it:
To distinguish 'intentional' from 'accidental' work injuries, we
must decide the political and moral question of how much and
what kinds of harm workers should have to assume as part of the
standard work relationship (subject to limited compensation), and
how much and what kinds of harm employers should be obligated
to avoid (subject to make costly tort remedies....

They... im-

plicitly prescribe what the normal conditions of employment
6
should be.52

Employees can bring actions against a third party at fault for injury
sustained at work.52 7 For example, a worker may file a products liability
action against a manufacturer when injury results from use of the equipment
or materials at work. Occasionally employers contribute to the injury by

another cave-in here is substantially certain, causing injury and perhaps death." [The
second bettor] replies "I'll bet you there won't be, but you'll have to give me
odds..." [Larson concludes that] the most incorrigible betting man ...would never
risk good money on the behavior of a bank of dirt ....
6 LARSON, supra note 45, § 103.04[4], at 103-33. This, Larson believes, would not satisfy the
"substantial certainty" test. Id.
Another example is People v. Film Recovery Systems. Beauchamp, 398 N.W.2d at 892-93.
See Zimmerman, 21, 570 N.W.2d at 207 n.7. In the Film Recovery case, the employer was in
"the business of recovering silver from film negatives." Beauchamp, 398 N.W.2d at 892. The
negatives were placed in vats of cyanide, from which cyanide gas would bubble up in an inadequately ventilated workplace. Id. The employer knew all about the danger. Id. Because the labels on the chemicals contained adequate warnings, the employer hired employees who could not
speak or read English. Id. The workers complained daily about the fumes. Id. "In 1981, an inspector had warned that the operation had outgrown the plant." Id. at 892-93. The employer's
response was to triple the size of the operation but move the executive offices. Id. at 893.
"Eventually one worker died and several others were seriously injured" as the result of the cyanide
poisoning. Id. "The corporate officers were convicted of involuntary manslaughter." Id. Is this a
"true intentional tort?" The Beauchamp court was not so sure. Id. Larson believes that a well
plead complaint will suffice because the employer intended that these employees should undergo
the injury that they complained of daily. See 6 LARSON, supra note 45, § 103.04[3][c], at 103-29
to -30.
525. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-01.1 (Supp. 2001). The 2003 legislature has, however, created a new section allowing a worker to sue an employer, not for an injury at work but for unlawful firing, which is firing in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim. H.B. 1060, 2003
N.D. Laws 562, § 16. This is not a change in the law. The court previously held that a worker
may sue an employer if the firing is in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim. Krein
v. Marian Manor Nursing Home, 415 N.W.2d 793, 794-95 (N.D. 1987).
526. McCluskey, supra note 3, at 911.
527. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-09 (Supp. 2001).
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directly altering the product themselves. In almost all jurisdictions, em528
ployers are immune from contribution to the manufacturer.
At one time, New York allowed product manufacturers to seek contribution from employers. 529 The view is that contribution fairly apportions
responsibility and incentives. 530 The New York rule has been subject to
deep criticism by many commentators. The legislature eliminated contribution in 1996.531 The point is simply this: the concern for employers'
costs stands in stark contrast to the lack of concern shown to protect workers' benefits. When the quid pro quo is evaluated, the employer's immunity
is inviolate, 532 but the worker's no-fault right to sure and certain relief is
negotiable.
V.

CONCLUSION

When the National Commission on State Workers' Compensation met
in 1972, federal intervention was a real possibility. Over the next decade,
the threat of federal involvement was a topic of pressing concern. The tide
has washed away leaving no visible trace of remaining federal interest, despite the fact that after benefit reforms in the 1990's, states are far from
achieving most of the recommendations of the National Commission. The
majority of states show no interest in undertaking the expansions of coverage or improvement of benefits that the Commission deemed imperative in
1972. Little awareness of the state retreat from a commitment to improve
the compensation systems of injured workers is evident.
There are fifty different answers to the question how we should interpret and implement the workers' compensation bargain reached almost a
century ago. Some argue that the state compensation systems are invalu-

528. See, e.g., Barsness v. Gen. Diesel & Equip. Co., 422 N.W.2d 819, 822-23 (N.D. 1988).
529. Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 282 N.E.2d 288, 295 (N.Y. 1972).
530. Id. at 291.
531. 1996 N.Y. Laws, 635, § 1. In Lagano v. Chrysler Corp., 957 F. Supp. 36 (E.D.N.Y.
1997), the court noted that the "[p]urpose of New York's Compensation Reform Act, which bars
third-party actions against employers in absence of grave injury to their injured employee, was to
repeal... Dole." Lagano, 957 F. Supp. at 37.
532. See Joseph H. King, Jr., The Exclusiveness of an Employee's Workers' Compensation
Remedy Against His Employer, 55 TENN. L. REV. 405, 516 (1988) (contending that "[u]ltimately,
the continued vitality of the workers' compensation system will depend on the willingness of the
courts and legislatures to preserve the exclusive remedy against continuing probes and challenges
from claimants seeking to erode the rule in order to obtain tort damages"); Darin Calbreath Davidson, Expansion of the "Deliberate Intention" Exception to Washington's Compensation Exclusivity: Following Birklid v. Boeing Co., When Does an Employer Intend Employee Injury? 32 GONZ.
L.REV. 225, 246 (1996-1997) (urging that "[tihe Washington Legislature should recognize this
further erosion of the exclusive remedy doctrine as another signal that the notion of the quid pro
quo has broken down"). I argue that the opposite is true; benefit reductions to workers signal that
the quid pro quo has broken down.
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able as laboratories of invention, an evolutionary process in which the best
approaches can be mimicked elsewhere. Unfortunately, too many workers
have been economically disadvantaged by this experimentation. States
trumpet low compensation premiums as a lure for new business. Premiums
are generally low because benefits are low.
Some economists argue that the harmful effects to workers as a whole
are offset by job growth. 533 There is a theory suggesting an inverse relationship between compensation benefits and wages. 534 If true, many workers might prefer lower benefits to receive a higher wage. Support for the
theory comes from studies in the 1970s and 1980s when workers' compensation benefits were rising. 535 The studies concluded that a substantial portion of higher insurance costs was passed on to workers in the form of
lower wages. 536 Yet, it is not apparent that the reverse is necessarily true. 537
Workers demand for wage income is inelastic because they need jobs.538
Thus, workers find it difficult to pass on increased costs to employers. In
contrast, employers demand for labor, relative to workers, is elastic (employers may substitute automation or hire independent contractors or lower
paid workers). 539 Employers, therefore, are better able to pass off increased
costs to workers.5 40 That insurer's profits are rising also suggests that employees find it difficult to convert workers' compensation benefit reductions
into wage increases.54 1 The foregoing analysis tends to refute the argument
that benefit reductions indirectly benefit workers.
The workers' compensation bargain presupposes the equality of employers and workers. In reality, employers control the workplace and have
primary responsibility for safety. Workers' compensation has not provided
sufficient incentive to take necessary safety precautions. 42 Theories that
benefit reductions are economically efficient actually reflect value judgments about the appropriate distribution of resources.5 43 The value of the

533. McCluskey, supra note 3, at 752.
534. Id. at 752-53.
535. Id. at 755-56.
536. Id. at 756.
537. Id.
538. Id. at 756-57.
539. Id. at 757.
540. Id. at 756-757.
541. Mont, supra note 8. Mont states, "As benefits and costs declined in the 1990s, insurer
profitability quickly improved. The period from 1994 to 1997 was the most profitable period in at
least twenty years for workers' compensation insurance." Id. In North Dakota, likewise, the financial stability of the Fund improved substantially. See supra note 8.
542. Spieler, supra note 9, at 126 n. 15.
543. McCluskey, supra note 3, at 727.
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bargain to workers has significantly declined. The employer's benefit from
the quid pro quo, tort immunity, has increased and been zealously guarded.
It is unrealistic to expect the federal government to intervene in state
workers' compensation programs at this time. Yet, there are advantages,
especially uniformity and fairness. A workers' compensation benefit is
largely determined by which state claims jurisdiction over the injury. The
complexity of fifty separate state compensation acts is an obstacle to a good
conceptual understanding of the basic principles of workers' compensation
law. 544 The widespread confusion slows thorough examinations of the system as a whole.
Federal intervention is opposed on many grounds. A complete examination of the merits of this argument is beyond the scope of this article, but
one strawman should be disposed of. Claims that federal intervention turn
states into vassals of the federal government, requiring them to pay a set of
federal benefits under federal guidelines, are not what most envision.
Rather, the vision presented here is that states would continue to operate
separate workers' compensation acts. Under such a view, the federal government would mandate only that states meet essential recommendations
developed after a newly created National Commission studies the issue in
the current climate and issues a report. Such an approach would help to alleviate the downward pressure on benefits due to competition among
states.545
The optimal solution to the workers' compensation crisis is safety.
Safety is the highest priority every employer espouses, but few realize. Experience rating is not sufficient to accomplish this goal; 546 most accidents
result from known hazards. 547 According to Spieler, state OSHA programs
are a necessary first step to improve worker safety.548
Workers who are injured often find that the promise of the bargain is
illusory. Vocational rehabilitation services have been cut back.549 "Perma544. This thesis begins with a poetic description capturing confusion. Supra note 1. The
National Commission echoes this sentiment:
Workers' compensation is relatively complex. During our hearings a bewildering array of provisions were described. The terms used have different meanings according
to context. We can appreciate that State legislators and other officials have difficulty
understanding workmen's compensation and that lack of understanding too often has
led to lack of attention.
NAT'L COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 123.
545. See supra note 17.
546. Spieler, supra note 9, at 187-202.
547. CDC REPORT, supra note 10; see also Spieler, supra note 9, at 146.
548. Spieler, supra note 9, at 259-63.
549. Supra notes 358-368 and accompanying text. The Bureau's determination to reduce
vocational rehabilitation benefits is inconsistent with National Commission Recommendation 4.7.
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nent" partial disability in North Dakota ends after five years.550 Agricultural workers remain subject to risk of injury without compensation even
though these workers perform extremely hazardous work. 551 "Reforms"
abound as elderly workers receive much reduced disability benefits.552 The
income test was reduced to afford fewer vocational rehabilitation awards. 553
Impairment awards are subject to a fifteen percent "deductible," 554 and
worker's access to legal assistance has been impeded. 555 All of these reforms show a redistribution of resources from workers to employers.
Workers' compensation is viewed as social welfare when employee
benefits are freely negotiated away. The evolving no-fault to worker-fault
paradigm allows employers to escape legal responsibility for accidents and
provides a license to ignore moral obligations, viewing injury as inevitable.
The staunch defense of immunity has been stated by one court as a legislative choice to face "the unpleasant, even harsh reality ...

that industry

knowingly exposes workers to the risks of injury and disease." 556
Many reforms represent a trend backwards by attributing work conditions to workers' behavior or preexisting weakness and implicitly reviving
the common law defenses of assumption of the risk and contributory negligence. While the no-fault paradigm strictly excuses employers, allowing no
compromise of its half of the bargain, workers are left to be responsible for
accidents, claim filing, and rising costs, requiring downward negotiation of
their benefit. 557

The reformers one-sided view of the no-fault paradigm is better described as a worker-fault paradigm. 558 In so doing, reformers implicitly re-

Recommendation 4.7, at 82. The Bureau's sometimes stringent application (some would say
harsh under-utilization) of vocational rehabilitation services is exemplified by Zimmerman v. Valdak Corp., 1997 ND 203, 570 N.W.2d 204 (N.D. 1997), in which the young man had his right arm
torn off in an accident and was denied vocational services because he was capable of delivering
pizzas. Id. 5 4, 570 N.W.2d at 204. The decision ignores Zimmerman's long future occupational
life. Many occupations will not be available to a worker with such an injury, and it is virtually
certain that such injury will require the afflicted person to undertake higher education.
550. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-10(2) (Supp. 2001).
551. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(22)(a) (Supp. 2001).
552. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 65-05-09.3 to .4 (Supp. 2001).
553. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05.1-01(3) (Supp. 2001).
554. N.D.CENT. CODE § 65-05-12.2(10) (Supp. 2001).
555. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-02-27 (Supp. 2001). For reasons previously described, the
informal dispute resolution procedure retards legal representation. Supra notes 492-493 and accompanying text. Further, the fee schedule adopted pursuant to North Dakota Century Code section 65-02-08 is insufficient to support a vibrant claimant's bar. See supra notes 477-491 and accompanying text.
556. McCluskey, supra note 3, at 909 (citing Millison v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co.,
501 A.2d 505, 512-13 (N.J. 1985)).
557. McCluskey, supra note 3, at 895-96, 914-20, 928-41.
558. Spieler, supra note 9, at 211-28..
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ject the proper view-the safety paradigm. The safety paradigm places
upon employers and insurers primary responsibility for safety without
weakening employer immunity. 559 This view insists that injury is not inevitable, for employees are entitled to the best safety efforts of employers
and also a legitimate place at the table for negotiation of the bargain to better balance what has been lost in the reforms. The recommendations of the
National Commission remain a worthy goal.
This thesis has presented a number of recommendations consistent with
those of the National Commission. The Legislature of North Dakota should
revisit workers' compensation in a more comprehensive way in order to
bring the bargain back into balance. Political accountability and workers'
benefits should be restored to pre-reform status. The Bureau should report
to the Governor or the Industrial Commission. The Bureau's regulatory and
insurance functions should be separated. Workers have lost economically
and politically by not having been afforded treatment equal to that given
employers. Therefore, it is of utmost importance that the legislature restore
to workers both the economic benefits lost in the reforms and ameliorate
that "burden [which] still rests entirely upon [injured workers] if not
[solely] economically, surely in the loss of dignity." 560

559.
560.

Id. at 259-62.
Benson v. N.D. Workmen's Comp. Bureau, 283 N.W.2d 96, 107 (N.D. 1979).

